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This research aimed to investigate whether mechanisms of corporate governance affect the 
trade-off between methods of manipulation of earnings management (EM) that involve accrual-
based earnings management (AEM) and methods of manipulation that involve real-based 
earnings management (REM) in the UK and India.  
Mechanisms of corporate governance are considered to be the most important influences in 
monitoring the quality of financial reporting (Brown et al. 2014). This study identified the most 
important corporate governance mechanisms that have affected AEM and REM which 
managers’ use to decrease or increase earnings in firms. 
To achieve this, the study examines secondary data for the period 2006-2015, on FTSE 350 
companies, in the non-financial sectors in the UK, and on 500 non-financial companies, listed 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in India. The absolute values of discretionary accruals 
were used as a proxy for AEM using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and 
REM_1 and REM_2, were used to estimate aggregate real activities, as a proxy for REM. 
Performance-matched Model (Kothari et al. 2005) was used as a proxy for AEM and 
Roychowdhury Model (2006) was used as a proxy for REM, when testing for robustness. 
The results provide strong evidence that firms use AEM, REM_1 and REM_2 techniques as 
substitutes rather than as complements. The results also provide strong evidence that board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ownership structures constrained either 
AEM, REM, both or neither in the UK and in India. The results suggest that some, but not all, 
corporate governance mechanisms play a role in managers’ trade-off decisions between AEM 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW  
Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed a number of major corporate failures such 
as Enron, WorldCom and Barings Bank (Kiel and Nicholson 2003 and Bauwhede and 
Willekens 2008). The Asian financial crisis, during the 1990s, raised questions about whether 
companies with weak governance can survive (Rwegasira 2000, Ho and Wong 2001, Haniffa 
and Hudaib 2006). As a result of the financial crisis there have been both international and 
national initiatives to improve corporate governance and to promote greater transparency and 
accuracy in financial reporting (Weimer and Pape 1999 and Collett and Hrasky 2005), the goal 
of which was to help maintain stakeholder confidence and protect shareholder rights (Cadbury 
Report 1992). A common feature of most codes of corporate governance is that they mainly 
originated from the UK’s influential 1992 Cadbury Report (Wymeersch 2006). 
Given their voluntary nature, the ability of such codes to improve standards of corporate 
governance may be a function of the company’s economic and regulatory frameworks and 
market traditions (Healy and Palepu 2001 and Core 2001). Most of these studies, however, 
have been conducted in established economies with similar institutional contexts; evidence 
from emerging countries is limited (Barako et al. 2006 and Ntim et al. 2012). Voluntary 
compliance with codes of corporate governance could be different in emerging economies from 
that reported in established economies, which partly points to the rationale for this research: 
comparing the impact of corporate governance in the UK and India (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006, 
Krambia and Psaros 2006 and Ntim et al. 2012). A better understanding of the manipulative 
motivations of managers, and how to secure improved compliance with standards of good 
governance in emerging economies, serves as both the motive and rationale for this research. 
It may be important not only in improving the returns and value gains of investors in established 
economies but also in reducing the perceived risk of investing in emerging economies when 
they are in need of investment (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991 and Ahunwan 2003). 
 The main methods of manipulating accounting information and the activities they purport to 
measure are referred to as AEM (accrual-based earnings management) and REM (real-based 
earnings management) (Schipper 1989). There is evidence that companies make choices 
between AEM and REM (Badertscher 2011, Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010 and 
Zang 2012). It has been suggested that the distortion of reported earnings has reduced the value 
of accounting information in both developed and emerging economies and, thereby, the 
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relevance and usefulness of reported earnings when assessing risks and returns. This has the 
outcome of raising the threshold for the expected rate of return or the expected payback period 
(Biddle and Hilary 2006, Hope and Thomas 2008 and McNichols and Stubben 2008). Although 
manipulations may be permissible within a particular country’s accounting standards and laws, 
they are materially misleading and, sometimes, fraudulent (Peng and Bewley 2010). This alone 
sufficiently justifies the aim of this research, which is also aimed at gauging the extent and 
incidence of manipulation. It also investigates the relative frequency of use of the methods 
uncovered and the relative effectiveness of various mechanisms of corporate governance in 
mitigating manipulation in India (an emerging market) and in the UK (an established 
economy). India, as a developing country is learning, from those developing and developed 
countries whose company laws are similar to these in India (e.g. the UK Company Law) (Paul 
and Gupta 2014). 
Prior studies (Chen et al. 2007, Ching et al. 2006, Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling 
1976 and Klein, 2002) have suggested that, among other things, effective corporate governance 
provides counter-control and monitoring mechanisms which help to minimise the conflict of 
interests that is inevitable between principals (owners and shareholders) and their appointed 
agents (the managers) (Okeahalam and Akinboade 2003). In a different paradigm, 
manipulations by managers might be seen as reasonable behaviour within generally accepted 
accounting principles (Davidson et al. 1987). Tsui (2001) argues that the primary goal of 
corporate governance is to better align the inherent conflict between the interests of the 
principals and their agents. Xie (2001) and Klein (2002) claim that corporate governance 
reduces managers’ capability to manipulate reported earnings. None of the research provides 
strong evidence that there are sufficient financial gains to outweigh the financial costs of the 
monitoring and reporting involved in governance.    
This research attaches importance in detecting AEM and REM for two reasons: 
Firstly, companies may use AEM and REM simultaneously and this may mask or confuse the 
interpretation of their reported results (Fields et al. 2001 and Zang 2007). Secondly, although 
REM has been blamed for recent major scandals, such as Enron, it appears to have been largely 
undermined in the literature (Yaping 2005). One implied assumption in the literature is that 
manipulations are used opportunistically and typically upwards to serve the self-interests of 
managers. In other words, the switch from one method of manipulation to another is malevolent 
in its motivation and damaging in its consequences. This research examines the hypothesis that 
switching is a practical, pragmatic and predictable response to changing patterns of corporate 
3 
 
governance. AEM and REM have been examined in repeated studies, but usually separately. 
Researchers would naturally have found data in areas where they have chosen to look and may 
have missed compensatory or reciprocal changes that might have been picked up using a 
different method. This research thus narrows this gap by examining AEM and REM 
simultaneously. There is some recent empirical evidence that managers may be using AEM 
and REM simultaneously (Chen et al. 2012, Barton 2001 and Pincus and Rajgopal 2002). It 
will be interesting to see if this is the case in either the UK or India, both, or neither.  
Data from the UK and Indian economies have been studied in order to discern and elucidate 
differences and similarities between these two countries. The implications of some identified 
differences are considered. India has become a global growth engine. India is the world’s 
fastest economy growing and the fourth largest as measured by Purchasing Power Parity 
(Tiwari and Zaman 2010).  
The UK Combined Code is currently now known as the UK corporate governance Code 
(London Stock Exchange, 1998 and Financial Reporting Council, 2013). However, in India 
Clause 49 draws on the UK Combined Code. India is one of the biggest developing markets in 
the world in terms of its market capitalization (with over a billion shareholders in 2015, 
according to the Financial Times). The Satyam crisis revealed the ineffective corporate 
governance framework in India. Theoretically, the Indian framework is based upon the 
international best practices of corporate governance. Clause 49 in the listing agreement of 
companies. It was amended in 2003 and again in 2013 to adjust it with the UK Combined Code 
Act of 2010 (Bhandari 2018). 
On the other hand, the UK prides itself as one of the leaders in corporate governance. In view 
of this fact, this study has examined the UK FTSE 350, which houses the largest 350 firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which enjoys the reputation of being one of the 
most attractive capital markets in the world (Alhadab 2016). Extant research shows that the 
UK has a higher level of corporate governance in its listed companies than India (Soltani and 
Maupetit 2015 and Young and Thyil 2014).  
This research, therefore, explores the corporate governance impact trade-off between AEM and 
REM challenges for non-financial companies in the context of the UK and India. It explores 
these challenges from different perspectives, which previous studies have examined 
individually. Examining from approach offers a more robust analysis towards the challenges 
of different environments faced by the two companies. Based on the outcome of this study, 
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other countries may be motivated to employ a similar approach for different cultural contexts. 
This will not only lead to more convergence across the world, but also be more beneficial to 
investors who are worried about the manipulation of EM worldwide. Specifically, this 
approach should help investors to understand if there are distinctions to be made and whether 
differences in impact are linked to the different environments. 
1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This study examines agency theory as a way of understanding the relationship, if any, between 
corporate governance and a possible trade-off between AEM and REM to distort reported 
earnings. In addition, agency theory hypothesises that boards will improve the integrity of their 
financial reporting through control management (Peasnell et al. 2005). Then again, institutional 
theory shows these components are lawmakers who force certain practices in order to improve 
organizational effectiveness, or as a result of imitation. The overarching interest of 
shareholders is assumed to be to maximise the value of their shareholding. Since share 
valuation often reflects reported earnings, the risk exists of complicity between shareholders 
and management, to manipulate either accrual, real earnings, or both, to distort reported 
earnings in ways that favour the shareholder value. One purpose of corporate governance is to 
minimise this risk. Testable hypotheses arise from the question of whether this purpose of 
corporate governance is being fulfilled. For details, see chapter 3. 
 1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The main aim of this research is to examine the impact of mechanisms of corporate governance 
on trade-offs between AEM and REM in the non-financial sectors of UK and Indian companies 
during the period 2006-2015. To achieve this, the primary research question will be as follows: 
Do mechanisms of corporate governance impact the trade-off between AEM and REM 
in the UK and India? 
1.4. RESEARCH MOTIVES 
Beyond the expected motivation to learn the art and science of research by adding to an existing 
academic body of knowledge, this research is motivated by the following factors: 
Firstly, corporate governance seeks to prevent managers making decisions in their own 
interests that are not in the interests of the owners of the company. Agency theory provides a 
pervasive working assumption that malevolent manipulation by managers, as agents, against 
the interests of investors, as owners, is inevitable. The pervasiveness of this presumption about 
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managers contrasts with working assumptions about managers that are found in paradigms 
other than the economic-man paradigm that is popular with accounting researchers (Prior et al. 
2008 and Healy and Wahlen 1999). These presumptions about managers originate from agency 
theory and are prejudicial to the advancement of emerging economies (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). One motive for this research is to challenge the effectiveness of agency theories in the 
context of AEM, REM, and possible trade-offs, using the UK and Indian economies as focal 
points. 
Secondly, there have been attempts to mitigate the effects of earnings manipulations, in 
established and in emerging economies, by employing various mechanisms of corporate 
governance. There is insufficient evidence about which of these mechanisms, if any, actually 
reduce the overall level of distortion and misreporting of company earnings, in either 
established or in emerging economies. It is a secondary motive of this research to investigate 
this lack of consistency. The investigation will explore the assumption that this inconsistency 
may be caused, in part, by managers who trade-off between methods of manipulation when 
mechanisms of corporate governance make some methods of manipulation riskier, or 
potentially costlier, than others. Regarding this motivation, a particular concern of this research 
is to examine unintentional consequences of mechanisms of corporate governance, which can 
cause managers to the trade-off between AEM and REM (Zang 2012 and Cohen et al. 2008).  
Thirdly, by studying the UK and Indian economies, another motivation of this study is to 
explore the implications of corporate governance on the trade-off between AEM and REM in 
each country. This will also extend to observing and explaining the differences and/or 
similarities between these two countries. As indicated previously, several studies have focused 
on AEM and REM as separate models. This study, therefore, narrows this gap by using the two 
concepts simultaneously in the context of the UK and India.  
Fourthly, existing research has also found significant differences between the countries’ 
economy (Ali and Hwang 2000, Leuz et al. 2003 and Francis and Wang 2008). This has given 
rise to the speculation that different governance mechanisms may be needed in different 
countries, due to their different institutional, economic, and financial contexts as well as their 
different enforcement regimes (Mensah 2002 and Rabelo and Vasconcelos 2002). While there 
is a substantial body of empirical research on established economies, little is known about the 
emerging market when compared with the established economy, represented in this study by 
India and the UK. This study is, therefore, an attempt to narrow this gap between these two 
countries, which also have different levels of corporate governance. Similarly, this study 
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considers the impact of corporate governance on the trade-off between these two environments 
(the UK and India) as an area that has been largely previously in the field of accounting and 
finance research.   
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that managers can switch between AEM and REM to 
distort reported earnings (Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Graham et al. 2005, Roychowdhury 2006 
and Zang 2012). According to Zang (2012), when managers are constrained from AEM, which 
is easier to examine than REM, they naturally switch to the manipulation of REM. This switch 
is not without adverse effects on cash flow, sustainability and, liquidity in the development of 
new products and markets. In view of its potentially damaging impact on investors’ confidence, 
when reported earnings are distorted or when the sustainability of companies is threatened, this 
research is motivated to evaluate the extent to which managers practice manipulation, including 
the practice of trade-off and the effectiveness, if any, of corporate governance, in trying to 
minimise these manipulations. 
A gap in the existing literature also shows that the relationship between AEM and REM are 
both negative and positive. This makes it confusing. For instance, studies such as Braam et al. 
(2015), Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017), Zang (2012), Cohen et al. (2008), Doukakis 
(2014) and Zhu et al. (2015) show that the relationship between AEM and REM are negative. 
On the other hand, Kuo et al. (2012) and Das et al. (2017) argue that the relationship between 
AEM and REM are positive. To add to the confusion therein, other studies (Hadani et al. 2011, 
Kang and Kim 2012, Zgarni et al. 2014, Omoye and Eriki 2014, Hoang et al. 2017 and Susanto 
and Pradipta 2016) found mixed evidence on the relationship between corporate governance 
and EM.  
1.5. THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The main aim of this research is to examine the impact of mechanisms of corporate governance 
on the trade-off between AEM and REM in the non-financial sectors of UK and Indian 
companies during the period 2006-2015. 
To fulfill this aim, the following objectives are examined: 
 To examine the impact of mechanisms of corporate governance on the trade-off 
between AEM and REM in the UK non-financial sectors, as listed in the FTSE 350 
during the period 2006-2015. 
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 To examine the impact of mechanisms of corporate governance on the trade-off 
between AEM and REM in the Indian non-financial sectors, as listed in the BSE 500 
during the period 2006-2015. 
1.6. THE RESEARCH METHOD 
The details and specification of the methods, which were finally selected, including the 
justification for the selection, are set out in Chapter 5 (Methodology). Regarding the objectives 
of this research, the effect of mechanisms of corporate governance on the trade-off between 
AEM and REM are addressed in Chapter 6. This research builds on approaches used by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2005), Celik et al. (2013), Hassan and Harahap (2010), Mathuva (2012) and 
Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014), when the Modified Jones Model (1995) was used as a 
proxy for AEM and REM_1 and REM_2 were used as a proxy for REM. Furthermore, this 
study used robustness tests by using performance-matched model Kothari et al. (2005) as a 
proxy for AEM and Roychowdhury (2006) model as proxies for measurements of REM. These 
data were from secondary sources because they were easier to obtain and less expensive than 
other sources (Schmidt and Hollensen 2006).   
The study used statistical methods, such as panel regression, of 2230 company-year 
observations in the UK, and a potential 2120 company-year observations in India over the 
period 2006-2015. In addition, two models were applied in this study; to measures, the effect 
of corporate governance on the trade-off between AEM and REM, applied in this study to 
measure the effect Multicollinearity problems can be tested using a correlation matrix and the 
variance inflation factor (VIF).  
1.7. CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH  
This study made some contribution to knowledge, theory, and method as highlighted below: 
This research adds to the existing literature on the determinants of the relationship between 
mechanisms of corporate governance and AEM and REM (Habbash 2010, Ali et al. 2013, 
Peasnell et al. 2005, Anglin et al. 2013, Xie et al. 2003, Mulder 2017, Kumari and Pattanayak 
2014, Ahmed et al. 2006, Almasarwah 2015 and Hassan and Ibrahim 2014). Moreover, only a 
limited number of studies have attempted to examine the possibility of trade-off by managers 
between AEM and REM (Janeth 2016, Das et al. 2017, Chi et al. 2011, Cohen and Zarowin 
2010, Chen et al. 2012, Zang 2012, Abernathy et al. 2014 and Barton 2001). To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, to date, there is no known empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on any trade-off between AEM and REM. Enhanced 
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corporate governance is expected to contribute to reduced manipulation and increase a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
trade-off decisions by managers.  
This is the first study that the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the trade-off 
between AEM and REM in both the UK and India. This might improve the transparency and 
credibility of financial reporting in developed and emerging economies, by providing evidence 
from an emerging country, such as India, which has various business laws or code of conducts. 
India is considered representative of other emerging economies, compared with evidence from 
an established economy such as that of the UK. The outcome of this study will, hopefully, 
motivate other studies in different environments, and thus lead to more convergence around 
the world. It will also be helpful to investors who are worried about manipulation in earnings 
management. 
In terms of contribution to theory, unlike most existing studies (Clacher et al. 2008, Farag et 
al. 2014, Kamardin 2014 and Waweru 2014), which employed only agency theory, this study 
not only contributes, but extends previous corporate governance research by offering clearer 
insight into the agency, stakeholder, information symmetry, stewardship and institutional 
theoretical perspectives. This critically gauges the understanding of corporate governance 
compliance and helps to interpret empirical results relating to the trade-off between AEM and 
REM and corporate governance. This study, therefore, contributes to building a uniform 
theoretical framework that can be used to examine the impact of corporate governance on the 
trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are still in their nascent and transitional phase in India, a 
country that has recently emerged from its financial crisis. By comparing the monitoring 
mechanisms and the trade-off between AEM and REM in the UK and India, this study has 
expatiated on problems and possible impacts of external and internal monitoring in previous 
research. Additionally, this study has improved the awareness of the significant role of 
corporate governance in monitoring the transparency and credibility of financial reporting. By 
implication, this study is beneficial to regulators and legislators in the non-financial sector in 
their attempts to improve the quality of the available monitoring mechanisms. 
In terms of methodology, the study has also made a contribution.  A study by Geiger and Smith 
(2010), for instance, has advocated for a new approach or research method to examine the 
trade-off between AEM and REM. This study, therefore, responds to that call by using a mixed 
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research methods approach to address this critical issue in order to avoid the bias caused by a 
single method. Using mixed methods provided the study with reliable findings and 
interpretation of the results. Although other existing research has used two methods, no known 
study has approached the study of the Indian and UK environments with methods to examine 
the trade-off between AEM and REM. Again, the measurement of corporate governance could 
be the same, but the application offers different implications for different countries. 
Finally, while previous research focused on shorter timeframes of less than ten years, this study 
examines a ten-year period spanning 2006 – 2015. This timeframe enriches the research with 
more data and provides it with a larger scope. Using a longer timeframe for this study has, 
therefore, provided a more in-depth explanation and, by extension, more accurate findings. 
1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter One is an introduction that sets out the overview to, and 
rationale for, the planned research. It sets out aims, objectives, motivation, and potential 
research questions. Possible research methods and findings are outlined. Chapter Two is a 
review of the EM and briefly presents the external and internal corporate governance. Useful 
research questions emerge. Chapter Three extends the empirical literature review and 
hypotheses. Again, further research questions suggest themselves. The Fourth chapter of the 
thesis briefly presents the theoretical framework.  
Chapter Five describes and justifies the Methodology, Methods and research design chosen to 
examine the researchable questions that emerged from chapters One, Two and Three. It 
addresses Research Philosophy and Sample Selection and postulates possible sources of data. 
It proposes an underlying model and possible procedures for analysing the data to be collected.  
Chapter Six presents the results obtained when the research design, described in Chapter Five, 
was used to explore the questions about management manipulation, trade-off and corporate 
governance that had arisen in chapters One, Two and Three. Specifically, this investigated the 
behaviour of managers in the UK and India listed companies. Chapter Seven is a summary of 
the main conclusions of this research report. It attempts to attach meanings to the findings and 






CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE EM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
The present study framed the primary aim of the research; this chapter collects the appropriate 
prior reviews, and, from this, the research identifies the gaps. In general, the theoretical 
framework enables the reader and researcher to understand how the outcomes are associated 
accurately to the research aim. According to the literature review, it is noticed that there are 
four chiefs theoretical frameworks, which were utilised to analyse and explain the relationship 
between corporate governance and EM. Therefore, the present chapter reviews the previous 
studies, discusses the paradigm of EM and, furthermore, the chapter frames a suitable 
theoretical framework based on the objectives in Chapter 1. Hence, this chapter categorises the 
sections as follows; Section 2.2 shows the EM definition; Section 2.3 displays the motivations 
behind it and Section 2.4 shows the techniques involved in EM. Following this, Section 2.5 
discusses the measurements of EM. The next section, 2.6, discusses the substitutability of EM 
techniques. Section 2.7 the different and constrain AEM and REM. After this, section 2.8 gives 
a brief view of theories covers EM and ends with analysing the past studies that are relevant to 
EM.  
2.2. EM DEFINITION  
EM is a multidimensional phenomenon aimed at influencing financial reporting upwards or 
downwards to meet various goals, for example meeting earnings benchmarks (Degeorge et al. 
1999, Dechow and Dichev 2002 and Osma 2008), increasing share prices (Schipper 1989). 
Several studies have explored the motivations and consequences of EM practices (Dechow and 
Sloan 1991and Jones 1991), although there is a contradictory view as to what really constitutes 
EM and various techniques of EM. 
According to Healy (1985 p. 368), EM encompasses “a manager’s judgment as to the financial 
position of the company and configuring transactions to change financial reports either to 
mislead stakeholders about the financial performance or influence contractual outcomes, which 
predicted upon reported accounting numbers”. In line with this perspective, other authors found 
evidence supporting that managers increased earnings to meet performance-based 
compensation (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006 and Cheng and Warfield 2005). On the other 
hand, Schipper (1989) argued that EM focuses on the private gain as the main motivation to 
manipulate reported earnings. The author maintained that EM is a “purposeful intervention in 
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the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)”. 
Different investigations have concentrated on the topic of whether EM exercises abuse or 
happens inside the limits of GAAP. For instance, Beneish (1999) focuses on EM exercises that 
disregard GAAP and, specifically, earnings overstatement. While accounting decisions happen 
within the limits of GAAP and towards the end of the monetary year, genuine earning decisions 
(REM) happen all through the financial year and have coordinating outcomes for present and 
future cash flows (Roychowdhury 2006). This notion was compatible with Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) and Roychowdhury (2006), who investigate various real activity-based cash 
flows. Roychowdhury (2006 p. 336) proposed REM as “management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
thresholds”. In line with the above definition, a substantial collection of research, hypothetical 
and exact, has confirmed that managers engage in REM practices to improve financial 
performance (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005, Cohen et al. 2008, Gunny 2010, Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010 and Zang 2012).  
2.3. EM MOTIVATIONS 
Existing studies have proven that managers have both personal and business reasons to report 
impressive and satisfactory earnings levels in their financial statements (DeFond and Park 1997 
and Greenfield et al. 2008). A number of several other researchers have examined different 
drivers, which influence EM (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Gaa and Dunmore 2007, Habbash 
and Alghamdi 2015 and Hsiao et al. 2016). This section discusses various drivers of EM and 
dimensions of EM, such as capital market expectations, management compensation, lending 
contracts, regulatory considerations, political cost and, tax avoidance.   
2.3.1. CAPITAL MARKET EXPECTATIONS MOTIVATION  
According to Alghamdi (2012), capital market expectations involve “the Investor’s prospects 
on the risk and return of the firm's future performance”. They facilitate the execution of EM 
practices. For that reason, numerous literatures have argued that engagement of managers in 
EM would enhance stock prices (Friedlan 1994, Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Nelson et al. 
2002 and Graham et al. 2005).   
Some studies are in line with this perception, for instance, Nelson et al. (2002) and Graham et 
al. (2005). They revealed different drivers of EM practice such as forecasting achievement 
analysis, stock price influence, objectives of remuneration and increases in various future target 
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performances and motivational steps, which need to be taken by managers. They found this 
after examining data from 253 external auditors and 400 CEOs through questionnaires and 
interviews among selected US companies. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) and Ebaid (2012) 
interviewed managers of US and Egyptian listed companies and found that these companies 
are more likely to engage in EM behaviour to avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. 
These findings are consistent with Glaum et al.’s (2004) study, who found that companies 
practice EM to avoid losses and a decrease in earnings in order to meet analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  
Othman and Zeghal (2006) used comparative analysis and identified driving forces behind EM 
in 1,674 Canadian companies and 1,470 French companies for the sample observational period 
of 1996-2000. The researchers found that EM practiced in French companies related to the 
effective tax rates and contractual debt incentives, whereas market-related incentives, such as 
subsequent equity offerings and initial public offerings, are strong motivations for EM in 
Canadian companies.  
Peek (2004) investigated the drivers for Dutch managers to engage in EM practices, using 134 
non-financial companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1989-2000 
and using discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM. The researcher found that managers of 
Dutch companies tend to engage in EM before extraordinary items in order to reveal better 
performance.  For the period 1995 – 1999, a sample of Brazilian public firms were evaluated 
for EM practices by Martinez (2005). This study revealed that EM practices in Brazilian 
companies are practiced preventing the reporting of loss for sustainable performance 
achievement and stable cash flow maintenance. Through data gathered from 464 questionnaires 
and 16 Egyptian interview surveys, Kamel and Elbanna (2009) found that the essential reasons 
managers engage in EM among managers are to improve their odds of getting financial 
resources from external sources, to report a manager’s pay, to maintain performance of 
manager, to achieve high stock valuation and to abstain from revealing adverse.   
On the other hand, Matsumoto’s (2002) study focuses on a sample of non-financial US 
companies over the period 1993 to 1997 and found that firms with high growth tend to manage 
earnings to avoid a negative market response to bad earnings news. Moreover, Madhogarhia et 
al. (2009) investigated EM practices of growth versus value companies, using Compustat data 
on all US companies over the period 1997-2001. The researchers discovered that innovative 
companies are more likely to manage earnings upwards and downwards than low-value firms. 
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To summarise, capital market understanding has been considered a vital driver for managers 
to engage in EM practices. This notion is in line with Teoh et al. (1998), Noronha et al. (2008) 
and Habbash and Alghamdi (2015), who argued that managers become involved in income-
increasing EM to avoid potential losses and a decrease in earnings. In order to retain an 
expected dividend level earnings are manipulated in either an upwards or downwards direction 
(Cohen et al. 2008, Atieh and Hussain 2012 and Ebaid 2012), for balancing or increasing share 
prices (Graham et al. 2005 and Ambrose and Bian 2010) and to achieve or exceed forecasted 
earnings (Burgstahler and Eames 2006 and Ebaid 2012). 
2.3.2. MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION MOTIVATION 
The relationship between managers and principals inspires executives to take part in EM 
practices (Cheng and Warfield 2005) since this agreement is linked to the company's financial 
performance. Thus, managers are encouraged to practice income-increasing EM to achieve 
competitive advantages. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) reported observational outcomes, 
which demonstrate that utilising optional accruals to control the earning figure is more 
perceptible in organisations where the officials' reward is firmly connected to the estimation of 
choices and shareholdings. Several researchers have explored the impact of the earning-
increasing practice on remuneration. For example, Healy (1985) reported that an expansion of 
bonus plans provides a significant incentive to extend and manipulate earnings. This suggested 
that the manager’s decision of accounting accumulations is connected with wage expanding 
inspirations for their extra designs. On the other hand, Healy discovered a strong 
interconnectedness between bonus plans and discretionary accruals, whereas Dye (1991) 
showed that applying accounting records in remuneration contracts is viewed as one of the 
most critical drivers for implementing EM practices. In this way, directors tend to utilise EM 
techniques to enhance remuneration as rewards attached to the organisation's earning.  
Similarly, Guidry et al. (1999) investigated how managers of US companies control earnings 
to increase bonus arrangements. The study disclosed that bonus plans are a strong driver to 
make discretionary accrual decisions in order to enhance bonus schemes. Baker et al. (2003) 
examined management remuneration structures and, particularly, investment opportunities 
related to discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM conduct. The researchers discovered that 
higher performance choices are related to discretionary accrual choices in periods before 
option-award dates. Leuz et al. (2003) evaluated the impact of managers' remuneration designs, 
investment opportunity. They established that these compensation packages are related to the 
reported earnings figure, thus creating motivation. Kurniawan (2013) inspected the effect of 
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EM and deliberate revelations on information asymmetry. They indicated that, when the firm 
has a bonus plan, managers would shift earnings from the future into the present period in order 
to enhance current earnings. As a result, this increases their own compensation.  
In short, most management remuneration and reward design strategies are linked to the 
organisation’s performance. Besides this, managers have inward inspiration for controlling 
earnings utilising different methods. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Guidry et al. (1999) 
maintained that managers would probably move earnings from the future to the present period 
with the aim of improving profit-based bonus awards. Balachandran et al. (2008) added that 
managers might also use buyback strategies to raise the share price, therefore upgrading 
remuneration.  
2.3.3. MOTIVATION FOR LENDING CONTRACTS  
Avoiding breaching a liability arrangement is another consistent driver for EM. Leading 
agreement enables managers to share the wealth between shareholders and bondholders of a 
company sharing high dividends, raising a loan and causing the business’s net profits to fall 
below the minimum level acceptable to shareholders (Aljifri 2007). In relation to the lending 
agreement, the financiers would enforce limits on the share buybacks, on dividend payment 
and accept more loans in order to guarantee the repayment of the business’s liabilities (Beneish 
2001 and Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). Consequently, in an organisation with a large financial 
leverage ratio, the chief executive has greater power to impact the earnings disclosure to 
prevent the breaching of the loan bond (Dichev and Skinner 2002). In contrast, DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) studied the nature of working capital and abnormal accrual in firm’s 
incapable of keeping to a lending agreement. They revealed that changes in management 
practices possibly result in negative violation-year accruals. The aggregate abnormal accrual 
indicates a positive relationship with firms that meet the necessary conditions; however, there 
is no significant effect from zero. More so, the researchers discovered a significant positive 
effect on working capital accrual, which suggested that the manipulation of accrual occurs at 
the breach of a contract period.    
Accordingly, Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) examined whether businesses are 
inclined to interrupt loan agreements on account of changes in earnings recognition, accounting 
of depreciation, inventory methods and accounting estimates, or engaging in other 
arrangements that may raise profits, thereby preventing violation of the lending contract. The 
researchers indicated no association with EM. Alternatively, DeFond and Park (1997) claimed 
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that firms breaching lending arrangements employed AEM to enhance performance prior to 
defaulting.  
Jaggi and Lee (2002) used data from 216 US companies during 1989-1996 and investigated 
the influence of creditors’ waivers of debt-covenant violations on the possibility of income-
increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals. They show that chief executives use 
discretionary accruals when industries granted waivers after bankruptcy.  Similarly, Cohen et 
al. (2008) found that companies utilise profit control to meet profit targets. Rodríguez-Pérez 
and van Hemmen (2010) recognised that bordering growths in loans drive managers to use EM. 
Studies have also found empirical evidence that managers are inclined to control for earnings 
to decrease the cost of external financing and avoid contract restrictions (Dechow and Skinner 
2000). 
Moreover, Daniel et al. (2008) discovered that companies use earnings manipulation to meet 
dividend expectations. They contended that only companies with a great level of debt similar. 
In conclusion, outside bonds stimulate managers to control the release of earnings using 
income-decreasing EM (Kanagaretnam et al. 2003). 
2.3.4. REGULATORY MOTIVATION  
Regulations provide an existing foundation for easier implementation of EM practices 
(Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). Many chief executives are tempted to raise earnings because 
of strong law or conducts and minimise reputational risk. A number of studies have shown that 
regulations might force managers to execute EM practices (Belski et al. 2008 and Lim and 
Matolcsy 1999). Lim and Matolcsy (1999) investigated the relationship between EM activities 
and product price controls. They discovered that companies are inclined to be involved in EM 
income increasing when they are going public to control the share price. Christensen et al. 
(1999) examined the relationship between EM and regulatory standards. The authors 
recognised that compliance with laws was a strong driver for managers to embrace EM 
practices.  
On the other hand, Navissi (1999) explored the association between discretionary accruals of 
New Zealand companies and Price Freeze regulations. They found that income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals are applied for price increases. Thus, they opined that companies are 
more likely to involve in EM activities because of the monetary policy caused by price freeze 
regulation. This notion was consistent with Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca’s (2005) study; they 
argued that government price regulations encourage managers to participate in EM behaviour. 
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In addition, Haw et al. (2005) examined income-increasing EM as a reaction to new statutory 
regulations. They recognised that government regulations made robust help for EM practices. 
In summary, regulatory pressure forces managers to maintain reported earnings upwards or 
downwards to prove they are acting in compliance with regulations. The organisation managers 
facing regulatory pressure have reasons to shape the statement of earnings in order to cause 
firms to appear less cost-effective and minimise public disclosure (Hsiao et al. 2016). 
Nevertheless, enterprises are prone to income-increasing EM when going public to increase the 
share price (Lim and Matolcsy 1999). 
 2.3.5. POLITICAL COST MOTIVATION  
Political pressures are drivers for effective disclosure of earnings (Habbash and Alghamdi 2015 
and Hsiao et al. 2016). An organisation might use financial statements to communicate lower 
or higher earnings to decrease political forces (Hsiao et al. 2016). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) argued that political pressure prompts many firms to administer income-decreasing EM. 
This is in order to prevent public forces due to high disclosure of earnings, which may eliminate 
the influence of opposing political movements and unforeseen budgets.  
Han and Wang (1998) studied EM practices during the Gulf of Mexico oil and gas blast. They 
noted that the US oil and gas industries were more inclined to regulate for downwards earnings 
to decrease the influence of political costs due to antitrust government policies and regulations. 
As a consequence, diffusion of poorer earnings might reduce political resources (Key 1997). 
Similarly, Monem (2003) acknowledged that businesses in Australian carrying out income-
decreasing EM to reduce political costs.  
Kurniawan (2013) contended that multinational enterprises with greater political cost are 
expected to reschedule their disclosure of earnings for the year under review and declare the 
earnings in the future year to diminish political pressure. This is because political expenditures 
ascend while extraordinary effectiveness attracts the consumers’ and the media’s attention. 
Hsiao et al. (2016) investigated if the oil and gas enterprises in the US take part in EM practices. 
They demonstrated that some petroleum industries prepare income-decreasing EM reports in 
order to reduce public scrutiny and diminish political costs.  
In summary, political pressure serves as a driving force for chief executives to make accounting 
adoptions to demonstrate low-level disclosure earnings, which eliminates potential political 




2.3.6. TAX AVOIDANCE MOTIVATION  
An unexpected change in tax policy influences companies to manage earnings (Adhikari et al. 
2005). As soon as financial ratios are a basis for computing tax, hedging for tax drives 
companies to use EM activities. Lemke and Page (1992) explored the economic factors of 
accounting policy choices of listed companies in the UK. They revealed that most of the 
companies to use elected income-decreasing accruals to stimulate tax rule. The author proposed 
that these companies are eager to disclose lower earnings as a hedge for tax. Additionally, 
Adhikari et al. (2005) studied the association between EM and the effective tax rate in a non-
western context. They recommended that the influence of companies in Malaysia to report 
earnings might be related to changes in tax law.  
Similarly, Othman and Zeghal (2006) compared the determinants of EM in Canadian and 
French companies. They indicated that EM practices in French companies are linked to 
effective tax rates and contractual debt incentives. In contrast, subsequent equity offerings and 
initial public offerings are strong drivers for EM in Canadian companies. In furtherance of 
these results, Goncharov and Zimmermann (2006) listed several companies in Russia, which 
were involved in EM to hedge for tax expenses. This finding was compatible with Coppens 
and Peek’s (2005) study, which confirmed that in the countries with strict tax rules, companies 
are ready to disclose fraudulent net profit or even losses, which have a positive influence on 
tax policy. Rahman et al. (2013) advocated that opinions of multi-shareholders and tax laws 
encourage many firms to implement earnings. In conclusion, effective EM practices help 
numerous companies to hedge for tax. Many companies’ managers aimed to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage via reduced tax cost earnings reports. The participation of 
firms in earning-decreasing EM practices significant effect on tax minimisation (Guenther 
1994).  
2.4. EM TECHNIQUES  
This section discusses various EM techniques. In accordance with prior studies, it is appropriate 
to define EM as a method of selecting or violating GAAP in order to influence the reported 
earnings. Earlier researchers report that three techniques can be used in earnings manipulation: 
income smoothing, big bath, and accounting choices. 
2.4.1. INCOME-SMOOTHING TECHNIQUE  
According to Barnea et al. (1976), income smoothing entails “the deliberate dumping of 
fluctuations about some level of earnings, which considered normal for the firm”. There are 
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two basic types of smooth-income streams; these are i) naturally smoothed earnings, resulting 
from an income-generating process; and ii) intentionally smoothed by managers, resulting from 
real smoothing techniques (Eckel 1981 and Albrecht and Richardson 1990).  
Income smoothing technique is the same in different practices of EM. Sun and Rath (2010) 
argued that the income smoothing technique decreases variance in profit for some time. The 
company’s executives could employ income-decreasing EM practices as soon as they learn 
about the change in additional earnings in order to reimburse net loss years. It can also be used 
to provide for depreciation allowance for doubtful debts in both periods of both profit and loss. 
Earnings smoothing technique is termed “cookie jar reserves”. This may be because significant 
provisions are looked upon as cookies saved in a jar, to be used at the discretion of managers 
(Rahman et al. 2013). In this way, DeFond and Park (1997) argued that managers are forced to 
declare loss rather than profit in order to reduce earnings. For instance, assets may be recorded 
as expenditures, which must be recorded when incurred, such as research and development 
expenditure (R&D).  
Markarian et al. (2008) looked at the effects of research and development expenditure on EM 
practices. They found that businesses in Italy employed to research and development 
expenditure to manipulate earnings reports. The authors claimed that a decrease in earnings 
might perhaps be caused by increases in research and development expenditure, even though 
increased earnings may be capitalised on lower research and development costs. Similarly, 
other studies have also found support for a positive relationship between research and 
development expenditure and EM actions. Gunny (2010) discovered that companies control 
for earnings to meet benchmarks through reducing the discretionary investment of R&D costs, 
and Selling, General and Administrative expenses (SG&A) to decrease expenses.  
Moreover, Rusmin et al. (2012) found that managers are driven to reduce earnings after the 
current net profit outstrips the preceding period. In contrast, firms are expected to increase 
earnings if the current profits are lower than in the preceding period. Broadly, earnings 
smoothing is recognised as an important technique to misinform stakeholders regarding the 
firm’s risk level, or financial performance, in order to reduce the cost of capital and gain private 
benefits (Shubita 2015).  
2.4.2. BIG BATH TECHNIQUE 
The big bath approach proposed that firms suffering a shortfall in earnings in the current period 
could employ a discretionary accrual to reduce profits in the current year (Jordan and Clark 
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2011). It is used if the company’s profit specific period fails to meet estimated income or to 
reduce the number of current revenues to increase future earnings. Some studies contented that 
big bath accounting is employed to portray large profit reducing discounts or profit minimising 
EM within the profit and loss statement.     
Similarly, Pourciau (1993) maintained that company executives adopt AEM decreases within 
unanticipated time or rises profits in the future period to maintain returns shrinking within the 
first period.  
2.4.3. ACCOUNTING-CHOICE TECHNIQUE  
An accounting-choice approach encompasses the flexibility of the manager to select the proper 
accounting technique, for example, investment and leases, revenue recognition, and 
depreciating costs using discretion in the financial statement to assess accruals and change the 
financial statement (Aljifri 2007, Healy and Wahlen 1999 and Nelson et al. 2002).  In the same 
way, some studies concluded that an organisation might misuse the flexibility of GAAP 
provisions to alter earnings through assets depreciation and sale revenue practices. 
Furthermore, several organisations choose to use a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) approach to 
recording inventory expenditure if they decide to account for profits. Other companies, on the 
other hand, employ the approach of Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) to display lower profits. Aljifri 
(2007) claimed that the techniques of FIFO or LIFO are mostly used to adjust inventory 
assessment. In addition, FIFO was employed if the chief executives elect to achieve greater 
profits, especially during a period of price increases. Many authors claimed that an organisation 
moves between inventory cost approaches to change profits as soon as there is a threat of 
bankruptcy (Nelson et al. 2002 and Sweeney 1994). 
Moreover, Han and Wang (1998) recognised that numerous oil and gas industry firms adopted 
inventory assessment approaches to decrease the profit in their financial statements during the 
oil spill incident in the Gulf of Mexico. There are also other methods of depreciation, for 
instance, double-declining balance; sum-of-the-years digits and straight-line are accounting 
choices for managers. Even though the straight-line approach uses a very similar level of annual 
depreciation cost, companies’ managers are more likely to employ depreciation techniques to 
achieve earnings targets for better performance. Likewise, the managers tend to choose the 
deferred tax to enhance earnings. They may likewise, decrease the expenses of the current year 
along with capitalising expenditure. It is clearly demonstrated from the above factor that 
managers utilise distinctive methods to oversee profit, which will not be easily recognisable by 
20 
 
outside persons.  Consequently, numerous studies on EM have concentrated on the motivating 
forces of EM. The following section will discuss EM inspirations.  
2.5. THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF EM TECHNIQUES 
Previous literature still exists which shows that methods of EM, REM and AEM, might be 
utilised by firms as supplements or substitutes. In other words, the management of earnings is 
not limited to being either REM or AEM, and the authors present confirmation of both 
happening at the same time in firms (Roychowdhury 2006, Zang 2012, Cohen and Zarowin 
2010, Doukakis 2014 and Zhu et al. 2015). 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observed that organisations utilise methods of EM, REM and AEM, 
throughout seasonal equity contributions and that the decision as to which procedure to use 
differs. This is typical as a result of their capacity to utilise accruals manipulation and, in 
addition, the expenses of doing so. Doukakis (2014) contends that accounting decisions are 
liable to examination by auditors. Zang (2012) contends that organisations experience diverse 
imperatives for these two techniques and gives affirmation that the choice of trade-off is reliant 
upon the correlating expenses of these two methodologies during the period 1987-2008.  In 
addition, Zhu et al. (2015) explored the ways in which the Chinese reverse merger firms 
conduct trade-offs and EM by means of the two methods, REM and AEM, during the period 
of 1990-2011. They discovered that organisations substitute both techniques. With respect to 
the authors, organisations utilise REM instead of AEM because of the expenses and 
imperatives of using the AEM technique.  
Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou (2016) confirmed the effect of substitution among the EM 
strategies for US organisations during 1990-2009. This discovery is also corroborated by 
Cohen et al.’s work on US organisations during 1987-2005. As opposed to the discoveries of 
substitution impact, Kuo et al. (2014) show that the Chinese firms, during the period from 
2002-2011, show a long-haul positive connection between REM and AEM strategies. This 
shows that organisations can, likewise, utilise both the procedures to accomplish profit targets.   
Moreover, the evidence from the extant literature reveals that organisations are not confined to 
using EM methods such as REM or AEM and may utilise the two strategies as supplements or 
substitutes relying upon their relative expenses and the degree to which one technique is 





2.5.1. CONSTRAINTS ON REM  
Zang (2012) argued that the cost of applying REM is equal to the economic consequences for 
drifting away from the ideal business activities because the values of the company will be 
affected. Despite this fact, all these economic consequences would differ between various 
companies and all of these happen because of the working environment. To illustrate with an 
example, economically it is more costly to move away from traditional business practices for 
a company that encounters pressure from the competitors in their industry, because of this the 
competitive advantage over industry peers is reduced (Zang 2012).  
For this purpose, the competition level within each industry has limited the usage of REM. 
Because of the higher degree of monitoring, Rowchowdhury (2006) has established that higher 
positions of institutional ownership have minimised the application of REM. Additionally, this 
increases the book earnings by applying REM instead of using AEM. Thus, it resulted in 
creating high taxable earnings. Consequently, high marginal tax rates have fixed certain limits 
for using REM to increase the reported earnings (Zang 2012). Finally, Zang (2012) has 
contended that firms in financial distress would be perceived to implement REM as a costly 
device for manipulating earnings because the main aim is to enhance the normal operational 
activities. Because of the high costs, which are related to REM, Gunny (2010) has 
acknowledged that REM is costly because of the economic concerns. Gunny states that the 
benefits of implementing REM exceed the costs of meeting the targeted earnings. Meeting the 
targeted signals positive future performance because it shows the result of not meeting the 
target is a decrease in stock value.  
The best example of this is given by Skinner and Sloan (2002). Graham et al. (2005) explained, 
managers are eager to implement REM for meeting short-term earnings targets but, in the long 
run, it can be unfavourable. In addition, this can be observed in practice, so this can be 
understood as evidence for changing the company because it faces limited cash flow, which 
minimises the capital expenditure along with R&D expenditures (Fazzari et al. 2000, 
Himmelberg and Petersen 1994). Since Beaver (1966) has stated that financially distressed 
companies have less cash flow than healthy ones, he argues that financial distress is positively 
related to earnings that have been manipulated by activities such as R&D expenditures. 
Additionally, he revealed that 14 companies have financial difficulties that have been predicted 
accurately through the ratio of cash flow to total debts so, in this research, this ratio is a 
substitution for financial distress. This will be positively related to the determinants of REM. 
Consequently, the relationship between financial distress and REM is indefinite. Because of 
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the previous research Zang (2012), Rowchowdhury (2006) and Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) have not accepted the link existing between REM and financial distress. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to know the actual reason why the companies are financially distressed, so it is 
hard to examine the relationship more deeply. For a deeper understanding, the limitations on 
AEM and its outcomes are mentioned in the following section. 
 2.5.2. CONSTRAINTS ON AEM 
AEM can be explained as the use of managers’ preference for financial reports to manipulate 
earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Conversely, this preference can be limited by various 
features. At first, the use of AEM is restricted by auditors’ scrutiny. The reason for this is that 
Big 4 auditing firms have more experience and would not risk their reputation by failing to 
identify AEM (Becker et al. 1998). Secondly, the practices of AEM is limited by the company 
from having flexibility from accounting. Barton and Simko (2002) have exposed that a 
company’s ability is to influence earnings through accruals; this is limited by measuring the 
accruals that were applied in the previous studies because they were reversed in other 
researches. Lagged net operating assets are the substitutes for AEM in all the previous periods. 
Therefore, a high value signifies less flexibility in accounting.  
The operating cycle of a company affects the flexibility in its accounting. In case the operating 
cycle was longer then accrual reversals will be procrastinated to a long time (Zang 2012). 
Additionally, the probability of using the preferred method of EM in financial reporting is 
minimised by the scrutiny of the regulator because it reveals that the level of AEM is used for 
decreasing the SOX 15 adoption (Cohen et al. 2008). Since SOX is a way of protecting the 
investors from outside influences, it can be stated that the protection of investors in the 
company, with general limitations, is potentially a reason to apply AEM. Leuz et al. (2003) 
have confirmed the negative relationship existing between AEM and investor protection. The 
reason they give is that investors are prepared to accept more difficulties to obtain private 
controlling benefits that remove the encouragement for covering the full true economic 
performance.  
The application of AEM is restricted by the scrutiny of the auditors; this is considered to be for 
the investors’ protection and accounting flexibility. Because of the various limitations in AEM 
and REM, these are discussed and explained fully in the subsequent section, together with the 
way these limitations have affected the European companies that were listed in the trade-off 
AEM and REM.  
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2.5.3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AEM and REM 
Despite the possibility that AEM and REM happen with no violation of the GAAP regulations, 
where it must be prior to the literature which shows that these activities have various 
differences (Cheng and Warfield 2005, Roychowdhury 2006 and Cohen et al. 2008). To state 
an example, before issuance of the financial statements, the AEM indicates the choices, which 
were selected at the end of a financial year (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Particularly during 
the final stage of a financial year, the managers are more likely to know whether earnings have 
missed or matched the expected limit, so the reported earnings should be modified accordingly 
by using AEM for meeting the desired threshold (Roychowdhury 2006 and Gunny 2010).  
Additionally, AEM has no direct impact on operating cash flows, although it is very time-
consuming (Healy 1996, Givoly and Hayn 2000 and Ahmed et al. 2002). Therefore, there are 
two situations in which AEM might be used to manipulate the reported earnings. The first 
situation, when the expected earnings were less than the expected limit, AEM must be used for 
ensuring the expected limit is met. In the second place, the difference between the expected 
earnings and the expected limit is greater than what it expects by AEM. In this case, the 
managers have shown their involvement level by decreasing AEM, which has been used to 
account for a difference for the future (Scott 1997, Levitt 1998 and Barton and Simko 2002). 
From another point of view, it is exactly contracted with AEM and REM providing the 
managers with elasticity for manipulating throughout the financial year (Roychowdhury 2006 
and Gunny 2010). REM signifies the managerial decisions that deviate from normal business 
practices, for example, sudden reductions in R&D, general, administrative (SG&A) expenses 
and selling (Roychowdhury 2006). Thus, managers have decided that the time and volume of 
those activities with less risk and interference from regulators and auditors (Graham et al. 2005 
and Cohen and Zarowin 2010).  
Additionally, the managers are opting to use REM over AEM, whereas the accounting standard 
regulators and setters limit the regulations to weaken AEM (Graham et al. 2005 and Ewert and 
Wagenhofer 2005). To illustrate this, Cohen et al. (2008) have found that managers who have 
been using AEM prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) in the past have swapped their 
respective accounts to REM post-SOX. Cohen et al. (2008) have suggested that managers are 
planning to switch because they have constraints on AEM. 
In order to avoid the scrutiny of regulators and auditors, Graham et al. (2005) have found 
certain valid proofs that executives would prefer REM to AEM. From the studies of Graham 
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et al. (2005) and Chi et al. (2011), certain proofs were found in which SEO companies, which 
are audited by big N auditing companies would largely engage in the activities of REM to elude 
the detection of AEM.  
2.6. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK  
The UK’s corporate governance system has grown since the early 1990s. It has a range of 
quasi-voluntary codes, which originated in the Cadbury Committee in 1992. The history of 
corporate governance regulation in the UK reflects a reactive approach. The Cadbury Report 
(1992) itself originated as a reaction to the Maxwell and Polly Peck crises. In 1995, the 
Greenbury Report focused on directors’ remunerations, and the Hampel Report in 1998 
amalgamated the Cadbury and Greenbury reports to form a Combined Code of corporate 
governance (1998) (Taylor et al. 2017). Companies must comply with ‘The Code’ or describe 
in their annual report their reasons for non-compliance. The Hampel Committee received the 
extent to which the objectives of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were being achieved 
(FRC, NDb). The Code was revised in 2003. The Higgs Report (2003) on Non-Executive 
Directors; the Tyson Report (2003) on Board diversity and the Smith Report (2003) on auditing 
were further reactions, in this case to WorldCom and Enron. In 2003, revisions to the code 
recommended: 
• That at least half of the board (excluding the Chair) be comprised of non-executive directors; 
• That non-executives should meet alone at least once a year to discuss company performance; 
• That non-executive directors should have requisite information, time, knowledge, and skills; 
• That there should be a senior independent director to whom concerns could be expressed.  
Following the Turnbull Report in 1999, on internal controls later reviewed in 2004-5, the 2006 
Combined Code incorporated changes:  
• To allow the chair to sit on the remunerations committee;  
• To allow shareholders who are voting by proxy to withhold their vote and to require 
publication of the proxies at the AGM;  
• To allow companies to “make information available (provisions A4.1, B2.1, and C3.3)” on a 
website;   
• To set out disclosure requirements in its listing rules (FRC, 2006).  These 2006 changes in 
the Combined Code improved transparency. For example, allowing proxy shareholders to 
withhold their votes, helps the public to gauge the level of shareholder engagement. There was 
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a further review of the Combined Code in 2008 reflecting new EU requirements related to 
Audit Committees and Corporate Governance Statements. The 2008 changes were:  
• To allow an individual to chair more than one FTSE 100 company; 
• To allow the company chairman to be a member, but not the chair of the audit committee 
when the company is below the FTSE 350 (FRC, 2008).  
These 2008 changes seem a mild reaction to events at the time, but they reflected a 2007 review, 
which pre-dated the 2008 financial crisis. Major changes were in fact, made in 2010, following 
the Walker Review of 2009. In 2010, the cumulative effects of these historical reactions meant 
that any changes were incorporated in a ready named ‘The UK Code on corporate governance. 
In 2010 Changes to the Code included:  
• The Chair became responsible for leading the Board;  
• The Board became responsible for the long-term success of the company; 
• Directors had to be elected annually;  
• The Chair became accountable for a culture of openness in the company; 
• The non-executive directors became responsible for developing strategy; 
• The board was required to audit its balance of skills, experience, independence, and 
knowledge of the company and take corrective action through recruitment; 
• Recruited directors must have time available for their responsibilities; 
• Diversity of the board must be considered when making activities; 
• The board must undertake risk assessments and put controls in place to mitigate the risks 
assessed; 
• The chair is responsible for communicating shareholders’ concerns to all directors (FRC, 
2010b). Sanderson, Burgess, and Masters, (2010), expressed concern annual re-election of 
directors would increases short-term: This concern was shared mainly by institutional investors 
(FRC, 2010b).  
This new UK Code on corporate governance was then reviewed in 2012, 2014 and 2016. The 
code relies on the Companies Act 2006, the Listing Regulations, the Takeover Panel, and the 
Stewardship Code 2012 for its legal and judicial force (Solomon, 2013). This research and 
thesis concentrate on the workings of ‘The Code’ and the Stewardship Code. The UK and the 
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US have an Anglo-Saxon style approach to law, which emphasises the owner’s responsibility 
for governance. The UK approach is, however, less legalistic than that of the US. The principle 
of complying or explaining remains strong.  
It is not assumed that one size fits all. In this respect, the UK is resisting a worldwide move to 
greater government interference in corporate governance. However, UK resistance has 
crumbled over concerns about the effect of auditors generally, and the Big 4 Auditors in 
particular, especially when these auditors take a vested interest in supplying lucrative 
consultancy services to the companies they audit (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
2009). The EU released a green paper on audit policy in October 2010, which led to EU audit 
reforms in 2014. (European Commission, N.D).  
2.6.1. THE UK REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT   
Governance systems have been categorised by the type of ownership structure. The UK has 
been described as having a dispersed ownership structure, similar to that commonly found in 
the US (Armour et al. 2003). The UK framework is primarily focused on shareholder wealth 
(Armour et al. 2003). A recent response to a UK green paper on corporate governance proposes 
attention to a wider range of stakeholders. For example, there is a suggestion that public register 
is kept of companies that have 20% or more votes against the pay of directors thus 
strengthening the monitoring of directors pays. In addition, the government proposes to 
continue monitoring the level of disclosure of voting by institutional investors (Taylor et al. 
2017).  
2.6.2. THE STEWARDSHIP CODE  
This section discusses regulation related to institutional investors. Firstly, it considers the 
Hampel Report (1998) and the Myners Review (2001) and proceeds to examine the 
development of the Stewardship Code. The Hampel Report (1998) targeted funds. It suggested 
that pension funds should take a longer-term approach. Pension funds are the largest group of 
institutional investors. The actions of trustees bear on corporate governance. It was alleged that 
trustees put fund managers under undue pressure to maximise short-term gains in share value 
or to maximise dividend income at the expense of retained earnings. 
Myners (2001) thought that evidence to support this was limited. In 2001, the Myners Review 
of institutional investment in the UK highlighted:  
• A lack of skill amongst decision makers;  
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• A lack of constructive decision making;  
• Perverse over-reliance on investment consultants, and a small group of conservative proxy 
advisors, who were not accountable for their advice.  
• Alack of transparent aims and responsibility structures;  
• A lack of specialist expertise Myners concluded that trustees should report annually on their 
investment strategies and returns in the hope that it would lessen herd-like behaviour (Myners, 
2001 and HM Treasury 2004). The Stewardship Code was based on work by David Walker 
and the Institutional Shareholder Committee (ISC) code (Solomon 2013). In response to the 
Myners Review (2001), ISC made changes to some of these principles. In 2001, the ISC 
outlined the responsibilities of institutional investors in relation to shareholder activism. 
In 2007, preceding engagement to activism the ISC 3 report recommended that voting policies 
should be disclosed and reviewed regularly. Finally, in late 2009 the ISC issued the ISC 3, 
which was incorporated into the Stewardship Code (Mallin 2007).  
The Walker Review (2009) was in response to the financial crisis. It concluded that the 
Combined Code was fit for purpose. Weaknesses in board effectiveness were attributed to 
behaviour rather than to the organisation. The major problem seemed to be a lack of challenge 
before executive decisions were taken regarding risk and strategy. Boards have now allocated 
more time to risk management and engaging more effectively with the investee. Finally, 
concern was expressed about remuneration policies.  
The recommendation in the Walker report was acted on by the FRC, which published the first 
Stewardship Code in July 2010. The stewardship Code highlighted the need for institutional 
investors to comply or explain and to play an active role in monitoring investments. The names 
of compliant institutional investors are published on the FRC’s webpage. In 2012, the 
Stewardship Code was extended to cover proxy advisors. Many, however, questioned if this 
light-touch self-regulation was enough in a post-financial-crisis world (Edelman Trust 
Barometer 2017). Businesses, Government, Media, and NGOs, in particular; the UK 
government believed that a decrease in trust in UK business was partial because of excessive 
directors’ remunerations (Department for Business, Energy Industrial Strategy, 2017b p8).  
2.7. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA  
India is one of the largest emerging markets in the world in terms of its market capitalization. 
It had over a billion shareholders in 2015 (Financial Times). The Satyam crisis revealed the 
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ineffectiveness of corporate governance in India. Theoretically, governance in India is based 
on international best practice. It is a mix of the Anglo-American and German models. There 
are three types of corporations in India: private companies, public companies, and public-sector 
undertakings, including statutory companies, government companies, banks, and other 
financial institutions. Each gives rise to a different type of share ownership. Private companies 
are usually under the complete control of a private owner and his family. The regulatory 
agencies are the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI). The SEBI monitors the corporate governance for listed companies through 
Clause 49, of the listing agreement of the stock exchanges. 
 The SEBI has the highest number of trades in the world and stringent regulatory requirements. 
The MCA collaborates with the National Foundation for Corporate Governance (NFCG). 
Despite this framework, weak corporate governance results from weak enforcement. The 
consequences are slow, over-burdened courts, which are often corrupt.  
The question of weak enforcement was addressed in the capstone project by Palak Bhandari. 
He classified a One-Person Company (OPC) as a private company. An OPC is considered a 
separate legal entity with individual protection of its personal assets from bankruptcy and 
succession. Currently, every listed company with a turnover of Rs. 300 crores (over $46 
million) must have at least one female director, and every company with a net worth more than 
Rs. 5 crores (over $7.75 million), must have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee 
comprising at least three directors including one independent director.  
If a specified number of members and depositors believe that the management of a company is 
not conducting the affairs of the company rightfully, an application to the tribunal can be filed 
and the liability for any damages or compensation falls to the company and its partners. The 
Competition Act 2002, the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, and the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act 1951 give regulators additional powers. Clause 49 of the 
listing Agreement defines criteria for the composition of the board of directors, restricts a 
person from serving on more than seven listed companies as an independent director (three 
companies if serving full-time), defines a maximum tenure of 10 years (two 5-year terms) for 
a director, and requires companies to develop risk management teams. When a company is 
headed by an executive who is also the board chairman, 50% or more of the board of directors 
must be independent and there is protection for whistle-blowers. The compensation paid to 
executive directors (including independent directors) is fixed by the board of directors but does 
require authorisation by shareholders. The audit committee must have at least one financially 
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numerate normally a member, of either the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) 
or the Institute of Company Secretaries of India (ICSI). Although much has been learned by 
comparing Indian company law and UK firms’ law, many laws and codes were heavily 
influenced by the local custom and practice.  
The UK has been slow to revise its firm law and to some extent, it is able to learn from the 
experience of other countries. However, in India, the Companies Act 2013 has stepped ahead 
to meet rapid changes in its corporate world. In contrast, the UK change has come very slowly. 
The companies Act 2006 was a significant advance, following a long period of debate and 
consultation.  
The Act modified the duties of managers and introduced the idea of ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’ to draw greater attention to stockholders other than shareholders and to encourage firms 
to adopt long-term perspectives. It is too early to review the effectiveness of implementing the 
2003 UK firm law reforms and especially the stewardship code.  
The 2013 Companies Act does close some loopholes in the Company Act 1956. It has 
introduced significant changes in provisions relating to governance, e-management, 
compliance, enforcement, disclosure, norms, auditors, mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, 
it has introduced new concepts such as the one-person company, small companies, dormant 
companies, class action suits, registered values, and Corporate Social Responsibility. 
2.7.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE IN INDIA  
Ancient Indian literature laid down principals of corporate governance. Here, an effort will be 
made to summarise the subsequent evolution of the corporate governance Code in India. The 
CII initiated the development and promotion of code for corporate governance. This initiative 
by the CII flowed from public concern to protect investors’ interest, especially small investors’ 
needs; for transparency within business and industry; for the need to move towards 
international standards of the disclosure; and for the need to raise public confidence in business 
and industry. 
 A National Task Force was set up, with Mr. Rahul Bajaj, as the Chairman. The task force 
presented the draft guidelines and a draft code of Corporate Governance in April 1997. In 1999, 
the Birla Committee on Corporate Governance was set up by SEBI to promote and raise 
standards of corporate governance. The Birla Committee’s terms of reference included: 
suggesting suitable amendments to the listing agreement executed by the stock exchanges 
drafting a code of corporate best practices; and suggesting safeguards to deal with insider 
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information and insider trading. Several of the Birla Committee’s recommendations were 
incorporated in Clause 49 of the listing agreement of stock exchanges. The Department of 
Corporate Affairs (DCA) set up the Naresh Chandra Committee to examine the issues arising 
from US corporate scandals. Many of the Narech Committee’s recommendations were 
incorporated in the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2003. Narayana Murthy was asked by SEBI 
to review its performance. In 2004/5. Dr. J.J. Irani was asked to edit and revise the 1956 
Companies Act to enable a timelier response to ever-evolving business models and to further 
protect the interests of the shareholders and investors. 
2.8. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE  
Corporate governance institutions seem to be weaker in developing than in developed 
economies, making it easier for managers to finance low return investment by raising equity. 
Where corporate governance is strong, managers are more often found to finance growth and 
investment by the governance of internal cash flows. Thus, differences in corporate governance 
structures will be seen to describe both differences in the sources of finance for investment 
across countries and differences in the returns on investment (Gugler 2003). 
India’s corporate governance institutions were poor but have developed somewhat since 1991. 
Capital markets have been liberalized, and a takeover code was adopted in 1994 (Goldman 
Sachs, 2003). Peng and Jiang (2006) provide evidence that concerted ownership is beneficial 
for company performance in cases where there are weaker developed regulatory and legal 
institutions to protect shareholders. 
Lee and Oh (2007) have considered the relationship between corporate governance and the 
Perversions of corruption. Controversialley they have argued that pervasive corruption does 
not detract from growth and investment, in that it is predictable because it can be built into 
company calculations of cost. Investors, especially foreign investors are put off by corruption 
even at low levels when it appears to be arbitrary and unpredictable because it makes dealings 
more hazardous. In India, the most significant informal institutions, to interact with these 
formal governance institutions, are those related to business groups.  
Douma et al. (2006) found positive effects on the performance of concentrated corporate 
ownership by foreign companies, specifically when associated with a business group. Peng and 
Jiang (2006) found that the balance of benefits and costs of ownership in large companies 
depended on the regulatory institutions for investor protection. High levels of ownership are 
beneficial when formal legal institutions are weak.  
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Heugens et al. (2009) support this result, that when there is less than perfect legal protection of 
minority shareholders, ownership is efficient corporate governance. They provided, however, 
that a certain threshold level of institutional governance has already been achieved. Where 
owners can excerpt benefits from the corporations they control, then a high level of family 
ownership tends not to benefit the company.   
In 2017 Thapar warned against automatic liability, using humans and their cultural values to 
mitigate legal responsibility, arguing that some corporate cultures had led to rampant 
clandestinity and the general obliteration of the rights of minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Thapar and Sharma 2017). A change to all this was begun by integrating the 
Indian corporate system into a larger framework where the parochial traditions of local business 
slowly disintegrated under the manifold pressures of global integration (Chakrabarti et al. 
2008).   
This huge agenda involves more than the corporate sector. It includes a wide range of issues 
such as why the law enforcement is poorly developed in India, and why the culture of 
professionalism cannot take root and confront these issues (Mathur 2012). In India, there is 
insufficient legal protection for minority investors. The lack of liquidity reflects the absence of 
pension funds and life insurance money, common in more developed economies. Also, 
protections can trade in their shares in ways that are different (Helwege and Liang 2004). 
Related to the laws of the growth environment that determine whether or not crops will grow, 
the institutional environment impacts the health of corporate governance within a nation. Thus, 
understanding the institutional environment is essential to understanding corporate governance 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Comparative research into corporate governance can provide 
frameworks under which government legal systems can be influenced and improved 
(Whittington and Mayer, 2000).  
2.9. REPUTATIONAL INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS  
In general, Independent directors are predictable to act as monitors and give advice to executive 
directors on behalf of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent directors represent 
an important corporate governance mechanism and their presence on the board of directors is 
a commonly suggested governance exercise (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). 
Developing countries have weaker corporate governance than developed countries. Law 
enforcement agencies are often underfunded in developing countries and their personnel more 
willing to accept bribes. Gugler (2003) believes that the laws and regulations covering 
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corporate governance will be more consistently enforced in developed countries than in 
developing countries.  
The Cadbury Committee in the UK recommended that the majority of a board should be 
independent (Cadbury, 11 1992), a principle endorsed by successive reviews of corporate 
governance (FRC, 2010: 12).  
Corporate governance guiding principle elsewhere within the developed world echo the 
imperatives of independent directors and unbiased judgment on the part of the board. They 
particularly emphasise the necessity to insulate the boards from management selections and 
initiatives which will influence this concept of justice and equity to any or all shareholders, 
whether in operational management or not. In India, the imperatives of associated acceptable 
board balance were well articulated within the Committee Report on company governance. It 
suggested that “not but one-half of the Board (should comprise) non-executive directors”. In 
cases where an organization has a non-executive chairman, this should comprise a minimum 
of one-third of the board. This was mandated on listed corporations through clause 49 of the 
listing agreements between the businesses and, therefore, the stock exchanges. Indian company 
legislation does not specifically mandate non-executive directors on boards of firms, however, 
though it implies such a demand through provisions with reference to audit committees. 
In India, the surfacing of the problem in this modern or contemporary sense is certainly part of 
these worldwide trends and, in particular, of the cultural influence of Cadbury-style ideas of 
corporate reform (Banaji and Mody 2001). Prior studies exist to show that EM can be decreased 
through the adoption of good corporate governance, although the greatest part of these studies 
has been carried out in developed countries (Warfield et al. 1995, Alves 2012 and Bos et al. 
2013). However, Rahman and Ali (2006) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) argued that, 
differently to developed countries, most developing countries are characterised by weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests and concentrated ownership structures (Black 
and Kim 2012). Independent directors are generally believed to play a significant role in 
corporate governance. Fama and Jensen (1983) recommend that independent directors can 







2.10. SUMMARY  
This chapter presents the literature on the various definitions of EM and corporate governance 
and discussing those factors, which drive managers to manipulate reported earnings. Currently, 
managers use numerous accounting practices to meet earnings forecasts needs, without 
violating GAAP. This permit choosing other methods of accounting in order to estimate the 
company’s performance during the period under review. Based on experiences from studies of 
companies in the western worlds, three incentives for conducting EM have been identified in 
the literature. 
In the context of reviewing the literature of corporate governance, this chapter also started with 
the UK regulatory environment, the history of corporate governance in the UK, the stewardship 
code, the evolution of corporate governance code in India, Corporate Governance in India, 
institutional factors and corporate governance code and Reputational Independent Directors 
cost. This chapter reviewed the comparing corporate governance structure in developed and 
developing countries in order to show the differences and similarities.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that studies of EM in the UK and Indian firms are fairly 
recent extensions. Previous studies supported the notion that managers used either real 
activities or accounting choices. As Graham et al. (2005) and Chi et al. (2011) put it; managers 
prefer real activities to AEM to avoid the scrutiny of regulators and auditors. While there are 
few studies that examine the determinants of EM and the practice of REM, the majority of 
studies focus on the relationships between corporate governance variables and ownership 
structure and EM, without looking at the factors, which enable or hinder the interconnectedness 
between them. As such, there are insufficient studies, which investigate the influence of 
corporate governance variables on AEM and REM for firms in developed and developing 
countries. In furtherance, there are limited studies, which look together at how firms in the UK 
and India substitute and complement the two techniques or the combined influence of corporate 








CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to display the relationship between AEM and REM by 
analysing the observations of research already carried out by other scholars. In addition, 
literature regarding the impact of corporate governance is also discussed in this chapter, 
alongside that focused on the aspects of reducing AEM and REM.  
The topic distribution of the chapter is given below: 
Section 3.2 reviews literature related to the trade-off between AEM and REM; Section 3.3 
looks at the effect of board characteristics on EM; Section 3.4 looks at the effect of audit 
committee characteristics on EM; Section 3.5 the effect of ownership constraint on EM and the 
final section, 3.6, summaries this chapter. 
3.2. TRADE-OFF BETWEEN AEM AND REM 
The wide-ranging literature, which investigates EM mainly, highlight AEM (Zarowin 2015, 
Cassell et al. 2015, Yasser and Soliman 2018, Schipper 1989, Healy and Wahlen 1999 and 
Fields et al. 2001).  Other literature examines the possibility that managers manipulate REM 
to distort reported earnings (Huang et al. 2018, Chen et al. 2015, Yuliana and Alim 2017, Cohen 
and Zarowin 2010, Hribar et al. 2006, Herrmann et al. 2003 and Jackson and Wilcox 2000). 
Nevertheless, the costs and constraints of each method are taken into account when deciding 
on which EM process is carried out. If the costs involved in using a particular method for EM 
are high, then there is a possibility that management will opt for a less restrained substitutionary 
method to manipulate the earnings.  
A study by Zang (2012) and Abernathy et al. (2014) confirm that if a strategy of EM is costlier 
and constraining, then the managers will concentrate their attempts on finding other strategies 
of manipulation having lesser restraints and costs. On one hand, the managers can consider 
choosing AEM strategies, yet they can also consider REM methods. Nevertheless, the 
manipulation of earnings is not limited to being either AEM or REM. A study by 
Roychowdhury (2006) claims that companies completely depend on the manipulation of AEM, 
even though the expense concerning REM is high. There have been some mixed findings 
reported in this regard, as some firms have chosen for replaced relationship whereas others 




Chen et al. (2012) provided evidence that managers in Taiwan complement AEM and REM as 
Taiwan has a comparatively poor system of declaring accounts, weak asset protection laws and 
low legal action expenses. Mizik and Jacobson (2007) observed that managers practise both 
AEM and REM at the same time. However, Roychowdhury (2006) reveals that a greater extent 
of institutional ownership lessens the use of REM, as the monitoring levels are very high. 
Furthermore, it is also observed that the use of REM augments the taxable income level. Hence, 
a higher rate of tax would constrain the companies to employ REM (Zang 2012).  
Cohen et al. (2008) found that the use of AEM was limited after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
was approved in 2002. On the contrary, REM had increased significantly after SOX. This 
means that SOX approval had caused the managers to move from AEM to REM after SOX 
was enacted. Francis et al. (1999) found that companies which used more external auditors 
have reduced amounts of estimated AEM. For companies in the UK, Gore et al. (2001) 
explained that big auditing firms can constrain AEM better than smaller auditing firms. 
Additionally, the experiential outcomes from Myers et al. (2003) supported the theory that an 
extended duration of auditing in a company compels them to lessen the application of AEM. 
In addition to the analysis from auditors and managers, there is a restraint on AEM due to the 
flexibility of accounting systems in the company itself (Zang 2012; Abernathy et al. 2014). 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) reported that an organisation chooses the manipulation method 
based on the cost of EM methods.  
Zhu et al. (2015) reported that manager’s trade-off between both methods in Chinese 
companies. According to them, decisions were made innately by the prudence and ability of 
management and, thus, REM is less likely to be constrained and examined by the auditors. 
They also stated that any company that had used AEM before is more likely to use REM in the 
present and future because of the constraints of AEM. 
3.3. THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON EM 
3.3.1. BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND EM  
Agency theory expects boards to enhance financial reporting by monitoring the behaviour of 
managers, those behaviours that affect reported performance, financial disclosure, and tasks 
delegated to the boards’ sub-committees (Vafeas 2005). On the other hand, institutional theory 
cites these mechanisms as practices or regulations as an outcome of coercion from legislators 
who impose certain practices in order to improve organisational effectiveness, or as an outcome 
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of imitation. The following section reviews the researched relationship between board 
characteristics and EM. 
3.3.1.1. BOARD SIZE AND EM  
Previous research on corporate governance specifies that altering the board size affect its 
independence and efficiency (Elshandidy and Neri 2015 and Guest 2009). Oversize board size 
could negatively affect board effectiveness because of correspondence and coordination issues 
related with bigger gatherings. Larger than average boards may have lower levels of inspiration 
and fulfillment because of absence of participation in their decision-making (Ebrahim and 
Fattah, 2015).  
A research sample, collected from 282 US companies by Xie et al. (2003), observed that EM 
might not occur in firms having bigger boards. According to Yu (2008) state that there is no 
link between EM and board size. Peasnell et al. (2000) observed that the size of the board is 
slightly linked to EM in pre- and post-Cadbury intervals in the UK companies. The Canadian 
investigation by Park and Shin (2004), the Australian research by Kent et al. (2010), 
Almasarwah (2015), in Jordan, and Jaggi et al. (2009) in Hong Kong, all observed insignificant 
evidence of an association between board size and the amount of constraint on AEM. Idris 
(2012), in Jordan, Visvanathan (2008) considering a US sample, and Susanto and Pradipta 
(2016), in Indonesia, observed that the manipulation of REM was not considerably influenced 
by the number of board directors.  
A study carried out by Habbash (2010) used a sample of 471 UK companies covering the period 
between 2003 and 2006. This study stated that a large board is more likely to restrain EM. His 
observations support the argument of John and Senbet (1998) that an augmentation in board 
size augments the monitoring ability of the management. Likewise, Ebrahim (2007) suggests 
that the bigger size of the board is related to reduce the level of AEM. The negative link 
between bigger boards and the experiential indicator of EM is identical to the observations of 
Marrakchi et al. (2001). They found that board size is negatively linked with reduced EM.  
Exclusively related to this study in the UK, the following researchers found that increasing the 
size of the board restrained manipulation that distorted reported earnings. Sun and Rath (2010) 
chose 245 UK non-fiscal firms over the interval of 2006 and 2007; Rahman et al. (2013) used 
the FTSE-350 index, covering an eight-year duration from 2004 to 2011; De Andres et al. 
(2005) and Yu (2015) used the data of the firms mentioned on the (LSE) between the years 
1997 and 2011. These studies all observed that board size is linked to reducing REM. 
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Furthermore, Alhadab (2012) used a UK sample comprising 571 IPO companies between the 
years 1998 and 2008; he found that the board size has a negative association with REM. 
Talbi et al. (2015), in the US, observed that augmenting the board size raised REM. Similarly, 
some inference from Asian markets presented by Kao and Chen (2004), using 1,097 Taiwanese 
companies in 2002, showed a positive association between the size of the board and the extent 
of AEM. They used a sample of 97 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia, during the years 2002-2003. 
In addition, Garven (2015) indicated that the board size has a positive link with REM. 
Furthermore, Ahmed et al. (2006), in Singapore and Malaysia, observed a significant positive 
relationship between the board size and AEM.  
In the Indian market, Sarkar et al. (2006), Kumari and Pattanayak, (2014), Sarkar et al. (2008), 
Nagar and Sen (2016) found a positive link between board size and AEM practices. The 
research carried out in this regard, to find an association between board size, and EM need not 
be criticised since both the aspects, positive and negative, have been justified by evidence and 
they are logically satisfactory.  Nevertheless, another point of view disputes that bigger board 
size is more effectual, as bigger boards have a multiplicity of experience and more independent 
members. Furthermore, a bigger board is likely to take better-informed decisions as compared 
to a small one.  
3.3.1.2. BOARD MEETINGS AND EM  
Various earlier studies described the number of board meetings conducted and the role of 
directors in board meetings. In this aspect, Ronen and Yaari (2008) stated that directors have 
the responsibility to conduct board meetings for the purpose of decision-making through 
voting, and it has been considered as one aspect of corporate governance. In addition, some 
studies, such as Carcello et al. (2002) and Letendre (2004), report that these board meetings act 
as one of the most efficient opportunities for directors to solve the issues raised both inside and 
outside the firm, helping them to make decisions rapidly. From the perspective of agency 
theory, a higher number of board meetings may enhance the role of board monitoring (Fama 
and Jensen 1983).  
In Canada, the study by Anglin et al. (2013) showed a significant and negative relationship 
between AEM and the frequency of board meetings. However, the study in India by Jaiswall 
and Banerjee (2012) revealed that higher board meetings with a large attendance of board 
members lead to a decrease in the AEM. In Tunisia, Zgarni et al. (2014) and in the US, the 
studies of Visvanathan (2008) and Garven (2009) discovered that a higher frequency of board 
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meetings could decrease REM. In contrast, some prior studies reported that firms, which have 
a large, number of boards meetings, lead to an increase in EM, specifically if the firm has no 
qualified director. According to Awais and Wang (2011) and Gulzar (2011), in China, showed 
the board meeting has a significant and positive association with EM. 
In India, the study of Nagar and Sen (2016) found a positive relationship between the REM 
level and the number of board meetings. However, the majority of the researchers do not show 
any significant association between EM and board meetings. The study of Ebrahim (2007), for 
example, identified that the number of meetings might not limit the practices of EM. According 
to Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011), there is no association between EM and board meetings.  
Similarly, according to Rahman et al. (2013), there is no specific relationship between EM and 
board meetings in the sample of 215 UK listed firms during 2004-2011. On the other hand,  
3.3.1.3. BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND EM 
Supporters of the agency theory, Zahra and Pearce (1989) proposed that the existence of 
independent directors might affect the quality of the information and decision-making, leading 
to better performance. Beasley (1996) proposed that the competency of the director’s present 
on the board to constrain their accountability in firms was based on the separation of the board 
members from management. Furthermore, independent directors can augment board wealth in 
terms of competency, knowledge, and expertise (Kesner and Johnson 1990).  
Another study, by Anglin et al. (2013), also observed that the independence of the board might 
reduce the extent of EM, based on data from 153 companies between 2004 and 2008 in the US. 
Moreover, Lo et al. (2010), Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010), Benkel et al. (2006), 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) and Kapoor and Goel (2017) in India report similar findings 
that board independence is negatively related to EM. 
Osma (2008) in the UK and Talbi et al. (2015) in the US had observed that an increase in the 
number of independent directors could minimise the extent of REM. However, Kang and Kim 
(2012), in Korea, Zgarni et al. (2014) and Affes and Romdhane (2011), in Tunisia, observed 
that increasing the number of independent directors on the board minimised the REM. 
Rahman and Ali (2006), however, using data collected from 97 Malaysian companies over the 
period 2002-2003, propose that there is an insignificant relationship between board 
independence and EM. Their reason for the insignificant relationship is that the responsibility 
of the board of directors is considered to be ineffective in carrying out their monitoring duties 
because of the management dominance in the matters of the firm. Similarly, Siregar and Utama 
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(2008) collected data from the companies present on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Their 
observations did not prove that a company with a high ratio of independent directors is less 
likely to engage in EM.  
According to Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) state that there is an insignificant relationship 
between board independence and EM, based on the data from UK listed companies between 
2005 and 2008. Furthermore, Kumari and Pattanayak (2014), based on the data from 12 Indian 
companies between periods from 2007-08 to 2011-12, observed that there is no association 
between board independence and EM. Sarkar et al. (2008) observed that there is no link 
between board independence and EM, using 500 major Indian companies listed on BSE in a 
period during the years 2007 to 2012. Park and Shin (2004), using data from 539 Canadian 
firms for the period from 1991-1997, observed that the independent directors are not 
significantly related to EM, suggesting that the ratio of independent directors might not lead to 
the decline in EM. Additionally, Shah et al. (2009), in Pakistan, Almasarwah (2015), in Jordan, 
Rahman et al. (2013), Kent et al. (2010), in Australia, and Kam (2007), in China, observed an 
insignificant relationship between board independence and AEM. Visvanathan (2008), in the 
US and Yu (2015), in the UK, observed that the number of independent directors had no 
influence on REM. 
Overall, a large number of prior experimental results have stated that boards with a high ratio 
of independent directors support the honesty of the financial accounting process and present a 
better guarantee to stakeholders on the creditability of earnings accounted. Nevertheless, some 
researchers have reported unusual observations, declaring that board independence might not 
lead to mitigating EM. Their observations could be different because of the data used, control 
variables used, and the institutional ownership structure and the corporate governance methods. 
3.3.1.4. NUMBER OF FEMALES ON BOARD AND EM   
As the female directors are more inclined to abide by the regulations and have principled values 
(Barua et al. 2010 and Ittonen et al. 2013), women directors might have less risk as compared 
to men directors (Watson and McNaughton 2007 and Rau 2014), and their difference in 
decision-making approaches (Bosquet et al. 2014). Nevertheless, research on Chinese 
companies by Ye et al. (2010) found that gender had no impact on earnings quality.  
There are various possible explanations that increasing the number of females on the board 
does not mitigate the AEM. Firstly, the comparatively small ratio of women board members 
does not provide them with a strong platform to apply influence. Secondly, the imperviousness 
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of the male directors on the impact of females can be another factor (Sun et al. 2011). Thirdly, 
when there is homogeneity in principled values between the male and female directors, the 
increased number of women has no influence (Ye et al. 2010). 
Zalata et al. (2018), used a sample of US companies over the period 1992–2014. They provide 
evidence that there is a difference in the behaviour of financial reporting between male and 
female CEOs. This is because female CEOs have a high level of risk-aversion. However, they 
are certainly not more ethical than men. Nevertheless, it is recommended that board diversity 
might augment modernisation in various processes by introducing varied ideas, experience, 
awareness of various aspects and business contracts (Goodstein et al. 1994) that can augment 
the decision-making process (Baranchuk and Dybvig 2008 and Ntim 2015).  
On the contrary, board multiplicity might not essentially point the way to increased monitoring 
of management actions, as companies might recruit more women and ethnic minorities for 
symbolic reasons (Low et al. 2015). Riley and Chow (1992), Hinz et al. (1997) and Clikeman 
et al. (2001). They found that the females on the board of directors reduce deception and EM; 
the reason for that might be because women on the board have more risk aversion on decision-
making or because female board directors are more ethical in their decisions than their male 
colleagues.  
According to a study carried out by Krishnan and Parsons (2008), it was concluded that 
earnings quality has a positive relationship with gender difference. Additionally, Thiruvadi and 
Huang (2011) showed strong confirmation that more female members on the board account for 
a higher quality of earnings. Nevertheless, Lakhal et al. (2015) inspected the association 
between gender disparity on the board and EM by using the companies listed on the French 
stock exchange. They collected data from 170 companies and came to the conclusion that the 
ratio of females on the board reduces the EM. This result concludes with the fact that the female 
members on the board are efficient in the monitoring role and more likely to discover the EM. 
Gavious et al. (2012) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010), reported similar observations that an 
increased number of female board members is likely to lead to less use of EM practices. In the 
UK organisations, Arun et al. (2015) used data from the UK FTSE 350 index during the interval 
2005–2011. They found that a larger number of females minimises EM. A study by Hoang et 
al. (2017), in Vietnam, found that the number of female members on the board has a 
considerable negative association. Alternatively, Mulder (2017) had used the data collected 
from four West-European companies and found no link between the gender of the board 
members and the levels of AEM.  
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3.3.2. AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND EM 
Much emphasis has been placed on the audit committee's role in preventing irregular or 
fraudulent accounting (Klein 2002). The audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, 
monitoring and advising managers on the implementation of internal accounting control 
systems and on the preparation of financial statements (Arun et al. 2015, Bédard and Gendron 
2010 and Sun et al. 2011). The following section critically reviews research on the 
effectiveness of audit committees in reducing AEM and REM. 
3.3.2.1. AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE AND EM 
A bigger audit committee can be important in raising the helpful status of the company in the 
eyes of its internal and external auditors (Braiotta et al. 2010, Abbott et al. 2004 and Vafeas 
2005). However, audit committees with a large number of members have greater difficulty 
arriving at well-considered or insightful decisions and, in this sense, increasing the size may 
be detrimental to effective control of EM (Jensen 1993 and Yermack 1996). Nevertheless, there 
is a mixture of opinion, and the conclusions of prior researchers on the relationship between 
the size of the audit committee and EM differ.  
For instance, the study carried out by Lin at al. (2006), which was based on a sample of 106 
US companies, had found a negative relationship between the size of the audit committee and 
EM. Additionally, Mishra and Malhotra (2016) used a sample of 130 Indian firms for a duration 
of three years from 2013 to 2015. They found that the audit committee size has a negative 
influence on EM. Nevertheless, an encouraging association between audit committee size and 
quality of financial reports was also found by Hamdan and Mushtaha (2011) and Felo et al. 
(2003) who identified that powerful corporate governance, such as a large-sized audit 
committee, is definitely associated to the accounting quality. Lin and Hwang (2010) and Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) find that increasing the number of members on audit committees mitigates 
AEM effectively. It is predictable that large audit committees seem to have independent 
members who are able and capable of controlling opportunistic managerial behaviour in EM.  
Nevertheless, by making use of a sample of 282 companies in the US, covering the period 
between 1992 and 1994, Xie et al. (2003) observed no prospective impact or association 
between the size of the audit committee and the extent of EM. Similarly, Bédard et al. (2004), 
using a sample of 300 firms in the US in the year 1996, observed an insignificant association 
between the size of the audit committee and EM. Furthermore, Baxter and Cotter (2009), using 
a sample of data gathered from Australian listed firms in 2001, had observed that the size of 
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the audit committee is linked to the quality of earnings. Their observations revealed that there 
is no link between the size of the audit committee and earnings quality. Abbott et al. (2004) 
concluded that the size of the audit committee had no considerable effect on the quality of 
financial reporting. Furthermore, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) used the data collected from 
UK firms in the years from 2005 to 2008 and found an insignificant association between the 
audit committees’ size and EM.  
Yu (2015) asserted that there is an insignificant link between the size of the audit committee 
and AEM by making use of the data gathered from UK companies between the years 1997 and 
2011. Likewise, Alghamdi (2012) proposed that the relationship between audit committee size 
and EM is negligible. Correspondingly, Visvanathan (2008) confirmed that there is an 
insignificant relationship between the size of the audit committee and REM, by making use of 
pre-SOX data. Additionally, Garven (2015) used the data of US firms, collected from 2005 to 
2007, and concluded that the size of the audit committee is not related to REM.  
3.3.2.2. AUDIT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND EM  
The number of meetings held by the audit committee is very significant in resolving conflicting 
issues to help organisations grow. This leads to the maintenance of the internal control 
mechanism within companies (Vovchenko et al. 2017). Nevertheless, Page and Spira (1999) 
asserted that such meetings are ineffective in augmenting financial reporting.  
A sample data of 282 US firms, collected during the years 1992, 1994 and 1996 by Xie et al. 
(2003), found that the number of meetings of the audit committee could restrain the amount of 
AEM. Furthermore, based on a sample of US companies for the years 1999 and 2000, Ebrahim 
(2007) observed a negative association between audit committee meetings and EM. 
Additionally, a study by Adel Almasarwah (2015) found that a positive relationship between 
the number of audit committee meetings and EM, by collecting the data from the Amman stock 
market over the period 2005 to 2012. Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) used the data of UK 
firms during the years 2005 – 2008 and found a positive relationship between audit committee 
meetings and EM.  
Thoopsamut and Jaikengkit (2009) asserted that, in Thai firms, there is no significant 
relationship observed between audit committee meetings and EM. Baxter and Cotter (2009) 
used the data of Australian firms in 2001. Their results illustrated that a lesser number of 
meetings does not reduce the EM. Habbash (2010) used the data obtained from the top 350 
firms in the UK from 2003-2006 and concluded that there is an insignificant link between audit 
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committee meetings and EM. Bin-Muhamed (2013) asserted that there is an insignificant 
association between the audit committee holding many meetings and the extent of EM in 
Malaysian firms during the period 2004-2008.  
Rahman et al. (2013) used a sample of 215 UK companies during the period 2004-2011 and 
observed an insignificant relationship between audit committee meetings and EM practice. 
Furthermore, Alghamdi (2012) illustrated that there is an insignificant link between audit 
committee meetings and the extent of AEM by making use of all companies listed on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange. Similarly, Mishra and Malhotra (2016) used a sample of 130 Indian firms and 
examined them for a three-year duration from 2013 to2015. They did not find any significant 
relationship between audit committee meetings and AEM.  
3.3.2.3. AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AND EM   
Members of an audit committee might be able to increase the quality of financial reports, but 
if anything goes wrong with the reports; it might affect their reputation (Abbott et al. 2000). 
One of the studies carried out previously stated that the number of independent directors on an 
audit committee might lead to a reduction in the quality of financial reporting (Bédard et al. 
2004).  
Some of the previous studies suggest a negative relationship between the independence of an 
audit committee and the AEM level (Puat and Devi 2013, Hamdan et al. 2013 and Amar 2014). 
A study by Klein (2002), using a sample of 692 US companies, indicated a negative link 
between EM and the ratio of independent directors on the audit committee. Furthermore, 
research carried out by Piot and Janin (2007) investigated 120 French companies between 1999 
and 2001 and observed that the number of independent directors on audit committees has a 
marked impact on restraining the extent of EM. Sharma and Kuang (2014) observed that the 
ratio of independent directors on the audit committee is related to a reduced possibility of 
aggressive EM.  
Nevertheless, previous studies also suggest a positive relationship between the independence 
of an audit committee and EM. Lin et al. (2006) could not succeed in finding evidence, which 
supports the agency theory that independent audit committees can minimise EM. Their 
observations could be invalid as their amount of EM was not emphasised in AEM as a degree 
for earnings quality, and their sample only considered one year, which is not reliable. Similarly, 
taking a sample of 282 US companies for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996, Xie et al. (2003) 
found that audit committee independence is not significantly linked to decreased extents of 
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EM. Additionally, Rahman and Ali (2006) used a sample of 97 Malaysian companies and 
observed an insignificant relationship between independent audit committees and EM.  
Alghamdi (2012) used a sample of data from Saudi firms to show that there is an insignificant 
relationship between audit committee independence and the amount of EM. Bin-Muhamed 
(2013) used information from Malaysian companies from the years 2004 and 2008 to show that 
audit committee independence has no effect on EM practice. Baxter and Cotter (2009) observed 
that the audit committee’s independence is insignificant in reducing AEM. Katmon and Al 
Farooque (2017) used data from UK companies from the years 2005-2008. They found an 
insignificant link between independent audit committees and EM. Mishra and Malhotra 
(2016) used a sample of 130 Indian firms and studied a three-year period from 2013-2015. 
They stated that there is no measurable effect of an independent audit committee on the extent 
of AEM. In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005) found that there is no relationship between 
independent directors on audit committees and EM. The conflicting observations of prior 
studies are not surprising since there are several factors, which might influence the role of the 
audit committee.  
3.3.2.4. AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE AND EM  
Audit committee expertise is a significant aspect of the corporate governance mechanism. 
Previous studies believe that the existence of at least one member with financial expertise on 
an audit committee is effectual in mitigating financial irregularities (Abbott et al. 2004). 
According to Raghunandan et al. (2001), audit committees that include at least one financial 
expert have significant interaction with their internal and external auditors. Furthermore, Song 
and Windram (2004) examined the impact of UK audit committees on managing financial 
reporting. Their observations support the agency theory that audit committees, which are 
comprised of members with financial expertise, are able to monitor the quality of financial 
reporting.  
Another aspect that is considered by Lo et al. (2010), based on 266 listed companies in China 
in the year 2004, suggests that firms with a higher level of audit committee expertise possibly 
engage in minimal EM. Xie (2001) investigated the roles of the board members and audit 
committee concerning EM. They used a sample of 282 US firms, from 1992 to 1996, and 
asserted that a member with financial expertise on an audit committee is linked to a reduced 
level of AEM. Rahman et al.  (2013) and Habbash (2010) using the FTSE-350 index, observed 
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that the frequency of an independent director with accounting expertise, or a financial manager, 
on an audit committee is negatively linked to the extent of EM.  
Algamdi (2012) observed a negative association between an audit committee’s expertise and 
the amount of AEM, by making use of a sample of all companies listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange. Similarly, Rahman and Ali (2006) found no evidence to support the assertion that 
the existence of financial experts on audit committees reduces EM. Their observations may be 
due to the weak role of the audit committees in Malaysia. Moreover, their study sample is small 
in comparison to other research. 
Zalata et al. (2018) used data from US companies from 2007 to 2013. They examined the link 
between the audit committee’s financial expertise and AEM. They found that a percentage of 
financial expertise on the audit committee mitigates AEM. However, the relationship was 
further analysed using multiple regression; the finding revealed that the percentage of the 
female experience on the audit committee has a negative relationship with AEM. On the other 
hand, there is no evidence of an association between male expertise on the audit committee and 
AEM. 
Lin et al. (2006) maintain that there is no negative association between audit committee 
expertise and EM. Their observations might also be unreliable as their sample only considered 
a small sample of data from just one year. Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) used data from UK 
firms for the years 2004-2008. The observations revealed an insignificant association between 
audit committees’ expertise and EM. However, Carcello et al. (2006) observed a positive 
relationship between audit committee financial expertise and REM. Basiruddin (2011) stated a 
positive relationship between audit committee financial proficiency and the extent of EM.  
3.3.3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EM 
Previous studies have suggested that agency problems take place in two ways: vertical agency 
challenges, which take place between owners and managers, and horizontal agency challenges, 
which take place between majority and minority owners (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). A 
majority of the studies carried out in the domains of finance and economics have focused on 
corporate ownership structure decisions, which reveal attempts to reduce agency challenges 
between various stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The disparities in corporate 
governance methods within different countries and various ownership structures play an 
essential role in augmenting corporate governance techniques (Wei 2007). Alternatively, 
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focused ownership contributes to augmenting the quality of corporate governance methods. A 
brief review of the present literature examining the association is given below. 
3.3.3.1. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND EM 
The majority of previous studies concluded that shares held by managers would lead to a 
suitable coalition of interests (Peasnell et al. 2005). Managerial ownership might not lead to 
allied interests of management and shareholders, as managers might focus on augmenting their 
profits by making use of insider information (McConnell and Servaes 1990). Hence, higher 
extents of ownership by managers might lessen the monitoring of management deeds, which 
might negatively impact the procedures of EM.  
A greater number of shareholders has the prospect, resources, and ability to monitor, and 
impact, directors (Cornett et al. 2008). Reduced managerial ownership has enhanced 
enticements to manipulate accounting figures to reverse or alleviate the behavioural precepts 
imposed in accounting-based settlements (Warfield et al. 1995). 
Previous studies of the impact of managerial ownership on EM have a difference of 
observations on whether the association is positive or negative (Ruan et al. 2011, Biger and 
Hoang 2008, Banderlipe and Mc Reynald 2009, Idris 2012 and Mitani 2010). Alves (2012) 
used data collected from Portuguese firms and observed a negative association between 
managerial ownership and the extent of AEM. A study carried out by Habbash (2010), using 
the data from 471 UK firms spanning the period between 2003 and 2006, found that ownership 
structures have a negative effect on the extent of EM. Rebai (2011) also investigated the effect 
of managerial ownership concerning the REM. His findings concluded the links were 
significantly negative.  
Nevertheless, the observations from the study by Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) also revealed 
a positive, considerable link between managerial ownership and EM. Furthermore, Klein 
(2002) used a sample of 687 companies in the US and observed a positive association between 
managerial ownership and EM. Hsu and Koh (2005) used the data from Australian companies, 
based on a sample of 201 companies for the period between 1993 and 1997. They suggested 
that managerial ownership is linked to income-reducing AEM but negatively linked to income-
increasing AEM. Teshima and Shuto (2008) highlighted that there is a significant link between 
managerial ownership and AEM. Yang et al. (2008) show that there is a positive relationship 
between directors’ ownership and AEM. In another research by Limpaphayom and 
Manmettakul (2004) conclude that there is a positive relationship between managerial 
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ownership and discretionary accrual as a proxy for EM, using a sample of listed companies in 
Thailand for the period from 1998 to 2000 which involved 207 firm-year observations.  
Nevertheless, Almasarwah (2015) asserted there is an insignificant relationship between 
managerial ownership and the extent of EM. A study carried out by Peasnell et al. (2005) used 
data from UK firms and found no evidence to support the presumption that managerial 
ownership is related to the extent of EM. Demers and Wang (2010) stated that there is no 
significant relationship between managerial ownership and EM. Bos et al. (2013) showed that 
there is a non-linear association between managerial ownership and AEM in the UK. Alghamdi 
(2012) observed managerial ownership is expected to reduce the EM less in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, recent research by Spinos (2013), using US data spanning the period between 2004 
and 2009, observed that there is an insignificant relationship between managerial ownership 
and EM. Overall, the study concluded that corporate governance is negatively associated with 
EM, thus evidencing that corporate governance is playing a major role in overcoming this issue. 
Therefore, they may be less willing to report losses or decreases in earnings.  
3.3.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND EM  
institutional ownership has the prospect, resources, and capability to monitor managers. It was 
challenged in a study that ownership structure is a significant technique impacting the structure 
of corporate governance systems, as it delineates the quality of agency problems (Konijn et al. 
2011 and Salancik and Pfeffer 1980). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) disputed that ownership 
structure gauges the extent of monitoring over managers and, thereby, the quality of corporate 
governance.  
A number of previous studies have shown that institutional ownership has a negative impact 
on EM. (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 1999, Bushee 2001, Charitou et al. 2007, Hsu and Koh 
2005, Park and Shin 2004 and Osma and Noguer 2007).   
The study by Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) used the data from 393 Indian firms spanning the 
period 2008–2013; this indicated that companies with greater institutional ownership have 
lower levels of AEM. Furthermore, Velury and Jenkins (2006) collected data from 4,238 US 
firms, spanning the period between 1992 and1999, and concluded that there is a positive 
association between institutional ownership and earnings quality. Cornett et al. (2007) suggest 
that institutional ownership decreases the extent of AEM. Cornet et al. (2008) noted that EM 
is considerably lessened by institutional ownership, by making use of the top 100 US 
companies. Hassan and Ahmed (2012) concluded that there has been a negative relationship 
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between institutional ownership and EM, based on data from Nigerian firms spanning the 
period from 2008 to 2010. 
Hadani et al. (2011) indicated that the highest levels of institutional ownership have no 
relationship with an organisation’s EM. Elghuweel (2015) noted a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and EM, by making use of the data of Omani firms in 2002.  
Koh (2003), however, used a sample of 836 non-financial Australian listed companies during 
the period between 1993 and 1997. He observed a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and EM. Almasarwah (2015) noted that a greater percentage of institutional 
ownership could possibly augment EM. Isenmila and Elijah (2012), based on samples from 
Nigeria, found a considerably positive association between institutional ownership and EM. 
A practical explanation for this outcome might be that most institutional stakeholders are short-
term investors as there is a deficit of protection that does not provide sufficient monitoring. Al-
fayoumi et al. (2010) inspected the effect of managerial ownership on EM by using the data of 
firms listed on the Amman stock exchange in the period of 2001–2005. They asserted that there 
is an absence of any association between managerial ownership and EM. 
Overall, it can be seen that the power of institutional shareholders emphasises the extent of 
mean stakeholders playing a major role in monitoring and reducing opportunistic management 















Chapter three reviewed those empirical studies which were relatively close to this study. This 
study divided this literature into four sections. Since this study used data from the UK and 
Indian capital markets, it was undoubtedly important to start this chapter with a brief review of 
Trade-off between AEM and REM. 
 In the second section, it explored the role of the effectiveness of board characteristics on EM. 
The third section presented a review of the effectiveness of audit committee characteristics on 
EM. In the fourth section, we explored the effect of ownership structures on EM. These sections 
will be employed to help the further processes of this thesis.  
For instance, as mentioned before, Shen and Chih (2007) and Cornett et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that good corporate governance could reduce the level of EM, implying a 
relationship between these two items. In contrast, Abed et al. (2012) indicated that corporate 
governance has a weak effect on EM. This evidence can assist in developing the thesis’ aim to 
investigate whether a relationship between AEM and REM on the one hand, and corporate 
governance and the trade-off between AEM and REM, on the other hand, exists or not. 
Moreover, this chapter also introduces some prior literature, which investigates the important 















CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four will present a theoretical framework for the development of corporate 
governance, embracing such factors as regulation, culture, religion, and ownership structure. 
Principals and agents must balance an intricate relationship between agency, empowerment, 
stewardship, and responsibility. Agents are motivated by the nature of their relationship with 
their principals. They can help improve performance. However, factors can lead to 
manipulations of reported results that do not improve performance (Albrecht et al. 2004). The 
theoretical framework will need to link original expectations to what was finally discovered. 
The theoretical framework may need to be refined modified or even rejected if it is challenged 
by what is found. The theoretical framework must relate corporate governance to the practice 
of manipulation of reported results to distort reported earnings (Dean and Clarke 2003). The 
starting points for the development of a theoretical framework will be institutional theories and 
agency theories.  
4.2 THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Theories of which framework is relevant to corporate governance vary from country to country 
(Mallin 2007). Theories include agency theory, information asymmetry stakeholder theory, 
stewardship theory and institutional theory (Mallin 2007). These theories differ mainly in their 
approach to property rights and corporate objectives (Hoque 2006). 
Agency theory concentrates on the relationship between principals (owners) and the agents 
(managers) to whom the principals give authority to act and make decisions which benefit the 
principals. Under stewardship theories, managers, as stewards, are motivated by reasons other 
than say-interest, to act in the best interests of the owners (Clark, 2004). Stakeholder theory 
expects corporations to behave in a manner which is socially and economically responsible, 
yet also beneficial. Institutional theories are more concerned with organisational change and 
accounting practice. Mallin (2007) argues that, in general, useful theories need to map 
corporate governance, agency, and institutional theories and the hegemony of stakeholders and 
managers. In particular, she argues that directors see themselves as the elite at the top of the 
firm and that existing directors recruit and promote new directors according to how well new 




Corbetta and Salvato (2004) agree that boards “increasingly to perpetuate elite and class power, 
rather than provide genuinely diverse resources and insight”. 
Despite the fact that the literature review in chapter three found no consensus on the best 
theoretical base to use to underpin corporate governance. The literature review did uncover 
many studies, which had employed agency theories in their examination of the relationship 
between mechanisms of corporate governance and the manipulations used by managers to 
distort reported earnings, allegedly to serve their own interests. 
 4.2.1 AGENCY THEORY  
The interrelation between the principal and agent depends on agency theory. The background 
for agency theory activities is offered by segregating the proprietorship from the organisation 
in new business. The proprietorship is distributed through stakeholders where they do not 
participate in the organisation’s management. 
Thus, managers were employed to administer the organisation’s routine activities in these 
cases. There are possibilities of conflicts arising between the owners and managers because of 
the differences between proprietorship and leadership, which leads to explaining these 
disagreements, which are connected with cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Eisenhardt 
1989). The agents are inspired by individual benefits; they start working by manipulating for 
their personal welfare without thinking of stakeholders’ benefits or of increasing the profits of 
the stakeholders. This is the major foundation of agency theory. Agency theory focuses on the 
major difficulty that agents have with shareholders, that they seek the benefits of stakeholders 
besides their personal aims. The beginning of the agency issues, as discussed by Eisenhardt 
(1989, p. 58), is that “The goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult and costly 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing”. The inability of owners to supervise 
the manager’s productivity leads to conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The company’s 
expenses increase, including expenses related to outsourcing, choices of agents, which lead to 
financial loss, and the expense of monitoring and supervising the managers’ activities because 
of the self-centered nature of the mangers. The profitability of the organisation is affected by 
these activities, as stated by Leuz et al. (2003). 
Therefore, incentives introduced by the management, which supervises the revenue generated 
by the organisation, which can fulfill or exceed the expected revenue and the increments, are 
coupled with revenue of the organisation. Agents are not trustworthy. The company requires 
an approach, which segregates the decision control from the decision management, this will 
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minimise the cost for the organisation as a result of proprietorship and management separation, 
as stated by Fama and Jensen (1983, p.309). By using this method of organisation, expenses 
can be minimised by regulating the management’s power and assuring the benefits of the 
stakeholders. 
This can be seen in the Corporate Governance system. The opportunistic activities of the 
management can be restricted by the process of corporate governance and implementing the 
corporate governance process both inside and outside the corporation can diminish the 
expenses of the company, as asserted by Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983b) and 
Williamson (1988). That the expenses of the company can be minimised by the corporate 
governance process is also accepted by McKnight and Weir (2009). 
The fundamentals of governing the company by different internal and external processes are 
offered by the agency theory (Weir et al. 2002 and Roberts et al. 2005). The process of 
governing is devised to assure the grouping of both the owner’s and the agent’s benefits; 
stakeholder benefits are protected, thereby reducing the company expenses (Davis et al. 1997, 
p.23). 
The main aim of corporate governance is not to enhance the productivity of the corporation 
directly; however, the company’s issues are solved by overseeing the managerial activities and 
evaluating the economic reporting mechanism; this was upheld by the statements of Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985). The process of corporate governance is capable of diminishing the company 
expenses and protects the benefits of the stakeholders by supervising the actions of 
management so that the benefits of both the management and stakeholders are coordinated.  
The process included in corporate governance is the auditing board; members of the board 
allow stakeholders to regulate the agent's activities carefully. The self-centered nature of the 
agent can be favoured like increasing the earning by poor management. However, successful 
supervision of the company can be achieved by corporate governance, which diminishes any 
dishonest attitude. Utilising agency theory as a model, which narrates the reduction of EM by 
corporate governance, is a proper method for the present research. 
4.2.2. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY  
The main issues in an organisation’s communication are the informational asymmetry between 
the agents and stakeholders, which is indicated in the ideas behind of agency theory. The owner 
and the agent can get into a sensible relationship where the agents, who possess the ability to 
complete activity when the owner is incapable of an activity, can do it more cheaply (Clark 
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1985 and Saam 2007). Competence, motivation, skill and agent activities cannot be supervised 
without spending a greater amount of money, which results in informational asymmetries. 
However, the owner requires this data to remunerate the managers based on their performance. 
Agency theory believes that asymmetry information supports the managers (Saam 2007). 
Ethical risk issues may arise in informational asymmetry. The invisible activities are connected 
with ethical risk issues when the managers follow their aims regarding incentives. The agents 
can outsource and indulge in abnormal work, do less work or claim to be working effectively 
in ways, which cannot be examined by the owner (Saam 2007, Voigt 2011 and Fama and Jensen 
1983b). Furthermore, agents can possess certain valuable information and skills, which give 
them advantages they can exploit. Thus, the owners have placed information asymmetry in a 
non-beneficial place (Voigt 2011 and Schillhofer 2003). The information asymmetry can be 
reduced by the corporate report when it is controlled effectively; this is commonly considered 
a corporate governance process. Without this, agents can use the corporate report to maximise 
information asymmetry by providing data, which misleads the stakeholders’ and funding 
partners’ view of the company. 
 Management revenue is a risk associated with ethics where the agents can exploit the 
information asymmetry thus affecting the stakeholders’ opinions of the company’s worth. The 
agents are believed to be self-inspired, according to the agency theory, therefore there are 
possibilities to utilise EM to extend the information asymmetry by taking advantages of other 
people’s viewpoints to accomplish their own goals. This shows that the funding partners are 
misguided by the agents in order to realise their management’s personal benefits (Beneish 
2001).  The agents are using the increment through EM where they cleverly plan for a bonus, 
which increases their remuneration; this was found through the experimental study of Healy 
(1985). Agents can make use of the increment earnings of management, which impacts the 
company’s market value; this was confirmed by the further studies conducted by Sloan (1996) 
and Collins and Hribar (2000).  
A clear incremental abnormality in the economic market has been discovered by these writers; 
magnifying the continuity of increment earning elements by the market and thereby paying 
agents more (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). This implies that the funding partners are 
overconfident, and they are not able to detect the misleading reason behind in increment 
earnings. The funding partners are innocently speculating the pre-issue earnings by not 
completely understanding the shrewd influence of the incentives earned, as stated by Teoh et 
al. (1998). The stakeholders cannot supervise the agent’s activities because of the high-level 
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asymmetric information, which provides flexibility for the agents to misuse foresight in the 
economic report.  
This was additionally debated by Jiraporn et al. (2008). The analysts’ earnings errors and the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings are used by the writers as a precautionary step for information 
asymmetry. The institutional investor is gradually acquiring more shares in a company. Thus, 
the information asymmetry that exists between the agents and stakeholders will be eradicated 
because the institutional investors are experienced and make better decisions than just one 
partner thereby the level of EM will be reduced; this has also been debated by Al-Fayoumi et 
al. (2010). 
4.2.3. STEWARDSHIP THEORY  
The benefits of the firm’s management and stakeholders are linked to each; this is the basis of 
stewardship theory and is in contrast to agency theory (Albrecht et al. 2004). It is believed that 
management is loyal as far as their benefits are linked to the company and shareholders. The 
expense for supervision is not required because the management will not profit from a self-
centered attitude. 
The members of management and administrator’s heads were good to improve the 
stakeholders’ assets by providing a friendly atmosphere to execute the business operations and 
gain proficiency in business functionalities under the theory of stewardship. The administrative 
heads perceive the responsibility of board members, especially the CEO, as a complementary 
device rather than a supervisory body within the management process (Albrecht et al. 2004). 
However, the stakeholders believe that loyal management may be drawn into a situation where 
they can become involved in wrongful activities (Albrecht et al. 2004). Choo and Tan (2007) 
they facilitate a suitable environment for the management to act on their own initiative and 
follow their self-interest because their interests may not be compatible with that of the 
stakeholders in certain situations. 
The description of management attitude instead of conflicting perception (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998) can be demonstrated by both the agency theory and stewardship theory, as 
claimed by Clark (2004). The pros and cons of the executive board’s dualism and productivity 
cannot be explained adequately by ignoring the stewardship theory while describing the agency 
theory, and vice versa. There is a similarity between the stewardship and agency theories in the 
ideology of identification, motivation, and use of power in spite of disagreement (Clark 2004). 
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This dissertation supports the stewardship theory, where it provides another approach, which 
describes the favourable consequences of corporate governance in an economic report. 
Thus, the supervision of management by the directors is aided because the director acts as a 
guarantor to protect the benefits of the stakeholders. The deceptive plan to generate additional 
earnings for the management is reduced by a high degree of supervision, thus advocating the 
unfavourable link of corporate governance with the managements’ additional earnings. 
In summary, stewardship theory attempts to find explanations and results in the principal-agent 
relationship where agency theory seems looking or unhelpful. Stewardship theory is a social 
psychology model of managerial behaviour and motivation (Clark, 2004). Common 
distinctions between agency theory and a stewardship theory of motivation, identification, and 
power, are presented by Clark, (2004). 
Table (4.1) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STEWARDSHIP AND AGENCY THEORIES 
 Agency theory Stewardship theory 
Behaviour                           Individual                                           Collective 
 
Motivation                      Extrinsic value                                               Intrinsic value 
Governance     Monitoring                                                    Trust
Time frame Short term   Long term 
Power High power Low power 
Source: Based on Davis et al. (1997) and Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003). 
 
4.2.4. STAKEHOLDERS THEORY  
There are requirements for theoretical views, as a result of previous criminal acts by companies, 
to completely understand the complex nature of the corporate governance process and, also, 
the reason behind it for additional EM. The connection between the stakeholders (principal) 
and the management (agent) is only understood by comparing the agency and stewardship 
theories. At the same time, however, the stakeholders’ theory is engaged in a range of elements 
rather than focusing on a single community and it is not less significant when compared to 
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principal rights (Mallin 2004). The social group anticipates a corporate attitude towards social 
or economic advantages, which is the idea in this theory.  
Lee et al.’s (2012) explanation of poor management, where they do not allow the general part 
of company’s activities, also asserted that the current crimes have not created any serious 
consequence for the individual investor, but they have affected individual partners. The 
partners thus encourage the various models of corporate governance and the supervising 
process. Thus, an important role is played by a partner who remains independent of the 
directors in influencing the administrating process (Mallin 2004). 
The connection between the partners and the company must be flexible so the issues can be 
curbed, as advised by Alpaslan (2009). Thus, the framework of partnership can be more 
advantageous to the corporate governance framework of the company during a complicated 
situation, in spite of difficult conditions. Hence, the organisation must consider the benefits 
and needs of all partners and manage them fairly. The agency theory is useful in clearly 
explaining the immoral exercise aspects of accounting and economy problems, whereas the 
stakeholder theory is helpful in describing the immoral activities that may harm workers, 
investors, financiers, society, and government. This was confirmed by Culpan and Trussel 
(2005). 
The connection of the stakeholder theory with additional management earnings is introduced 
by Hoque (2006). He demonstrated that enhancing personal benefits, which is done by 
managers to gain additional earnings, occurs by exploiting the money of investors and other 
partners. The study of the relationship of corporate governance with managements’ additional 
earning benefits from looking at both agency and stakeholder theories. The partners can 
supervise their agents by providing their sources so that the agents’ demands can be met; this 
was proposed by the agency and stakeholder theories. The companies’ partner management 
was linked with better corporate governance, quality of additional earnings and low additional 
EM as discovered by Mattingly et al. (2009). 
In summary, the combination of agency and stakeholder theory is possible to envisage a 
responsibility of management to mitigate information asymmetry in order to safeguard the 






Table (4.2) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STAKEHOLDER AND AGENCY HEORIES 
Source: Ayuso and Argandoña (2009) 
 
4.2.5. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
The institutional theory originated within management studies and social science. It also 
appears in accounting literature (Scott, 1995). The institutional theory attempts to model 
economic phenomena within an environment that comprises social, political, cultural, 
religious, civil and technological factors.  
The institutional theory provides a complementary approach to both stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory (Clark, 2004). It offers mechanisms by which governments may seek to align 
perceptions of their practices and characteristics with prevailing social and cultural values in 
order to obtain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). According to the institutional theory 
developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) firms, embrace rules or practices because of 
“coercive”, “mimetic” or “normative” isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs when 
organisations change their institutional practices solely due to pressure from stakeholders 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations try to imitate 
institutional practices of other organizations to achieve a competitive advantage in terms of 
legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
 The final isomorphism is normative isomorphism, which models’ pressure from groups to 
adopt praise-worthy institutional practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 and Clark 2004), such 
as presenting recognised standards. According to NIS theory, the role of corporate governance 
 Agency Theory Stakeholder Theory 
Objective Maximise wealth of shareholder  Multiple objectives; different 
parties have different interests 
Governance structure Managers as agents of the 
shareholders 
Team model 
Governance Monitoring Coordination, cooperation and 
conflict resolution 
Performance metrics Shareholder value  Fair distribution of value  
Residual hazard holder Shareholders All Stakeholders 
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is to change organisational processes over time “fulfill ritualistic roles that help legitimize the 
interactions between the various actors within the corporate governance mosaic” (Cohen et al. 
2008). The institutional theory presents a picture of corporations that elucidate and define their 
goals to accommodate the expectations of their environment (Judge et al. 1985). Therefore, 
according to institutional theory, corporate governance should demand to define the managerial 
aims of the corporation in the situation of an existing value system within companies. The 
institutional theory claims that historical, social and political issues are relevant to the adoption 
or rejection of new systems of the regulation (Cohen et al. 2008). Thus, corporate governance 
as a new system will succeed in the area where there is a broad similarity between the new 
instructions and current routines in the corporation (Yazdifar 2003).  
Stedham and Beekun (2000) declare that allowing for institutional theory, the board of 
management has two main roles: relationship and administration. In the linkage role, the board 
of management is interested in creating a relationship between the corporation and the external 
environment in order to enhance legitimacy share value; while, in the administrative role, the 
board of directors is increasing share value by enhancing the performance of top management, 
in particular, the CEO. The linking roles and the administrative role may conflict, where 
management practices are adopted regardless of their effectiveness (Saudagaran 1997). When 
organisations apply effectiveness, mimetic isomorphism causes best practices to become more 
similar over time (Braiotta and Zhou 2006, DiMaggio and Powell 1983 and Cohen et al. 2008). 
Therefore, the use of both structures as a framework might be helpful in extending the 
understanding of corporate governance and board purposes. Allowing for institutional theory, 
EM incentives may be impacted by formal or informal compression, and variation may be 
created by an administration in order to model itself on other groups.  
Kury (2007) concluded that institutional theory delivers the best perception for examining EM 
practices. He offers the institutional argument to describe how EM is helpful to comprehend 
the view of agency theory. He further proposes that visions for EM comprise the combination 
of agency and institutional theory viewpoints to obtain a more complete understanding of the 








This chapter has reviewed the relevance of several theories in corporate governance and trade-
off between AEM and REM research. The argument has discovered that there is no one specific 
theory emerges which can fully elucidate the practice of corporate governance in relation to 
management manipulations that distort reported earnings. Several theories in corporate 
governance such as Agency theory, stewardship theory, information asymmetry, stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory (Mallin, 2004). The relationship between principals and agents 
is ambiguous in the UK and India because of the lack of research into the motivations of 
managers who manipulate reported earnings. Agency theory was the final pragmatic choice.   
Agency theory expects that the board of managers and its committees will enhance the honesty 
of their financial reporting by monitoring managers (Peasnell et al. 2005). Presnell prediction 
will be tested empirically. Institutional theory recommends that companies might adopt 
performances or rules as a result of coercion from legislators (Stedham and Beekun 2000) 
Institutional theory and agency theory appear complementary. Accordingly, hypotheses will 
be formulated and tested based on agency theory, and institutional theory will be used to 
interpret the test results. 
Agency theory and institutional theory are the most used theories in discovering EM practices. 
However, agency theory and institutional theory alone may not be sufficiently accomplished 
to adequately describe or justify the incentives and methods of earnings management; thus, 
convergence between agency theory and institutional theory may be helpful, since institutional 
theory also provides a precise interpretation of EM practices.  
Stedham and Beekun (2000) suggest that institutional theory and agency theory are 
complementary approaches to corporate governance. Consequently, using both as a framework 
might be supportive in deepening the understanding of corporate governance and board 
functions. Therefore, hypotheses will be formulated based on agency theory; however, 
institutional theory will be used in the interpretation of findings if they are necessary as 







CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
After discussing the theoretical framework and presenting a review of literature in the 
preceding chapter, which presented the theories relevant to this study, the research design and 
methodology used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 will now be discussed. As 
mentioned previously, this study aims to obtain impact corporate governance on the trade-off 
between AEM and REM. in the UK and India. The aim of this chapter is to review the 
formulation of the research hypotheses based on theoretical and empirical literature is 
discussed in section two and the research methodology used. In addition, this study discusses 
the sample selection and data collection. The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 5.2 presents a Hypotheses Development. 5.3 presents a Research Design. Section 5.4 
presents and discusses a Sample Selection and Data Collection. Section 5.5 contains the 
Measurement of Dependent Variables. Section 5.6 contains the Measurement of Independent 
Variables. Section 5.7 contains the Measurement of control variables. Section 5.8 describes the 
empirical Research Model. Section 5.9 presents and discusses Analytical Procedures. Section 
5.10 contains Multivariate Analysis. Finally, Section 5.11 contains the chapter summary. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
A hypothesis is formulated to fill the gap between the more abstractly stated research problem 
and purpose and the detailed design for analysis and data collection. Moreover, a hypothesis is 
a formal statement of the estimated relationship between two or more variables in a specified 
population and it interprets the research problem and purpose into a clear justification for, or 
prediction of, the estimated results of the study. 
This study includes four sets of hypotheses. The first set represents the trade-off between AEM 
and REM. The second set represents the board characteristics and AEM and REM. The third 
set represents the audit committee and AEM and REM. The last set represents the ownership 
structure and AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.1 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN AEM AND 
REM    
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, EM is an important topic which contributes to effective financial 
reporting. Thus, this section develops the arguments for the hypotheses of the study which 
relate to the relationship between AEM and REM. 
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the costs and constraints of each method are taken into account when deciding on which EM 
process is carried out. If the costs involved in using a particular method for EM are high, then 
there is a possibility that management will opt for a less restrained substitutionary method to 
manipulate the earnings.  
A study by Zang (2012) and Abernathy et al. (2014) confirm that if a strategy of EM is costlier 
and constraining, then the managers will concentrate their attempts on finding other strategies 
of manipulation having lesser restraints and costs. On one hand, the managers can consider 
choosing AEM strategies, yet they can also consider REM methods. Nevertheless, the 
manipulation of earnings is not limited to being either AEM or REM.  
Barton (2001) claimed that there is a substitute association between AEM and REM when he 
investigated a sample of non-financial, non-regulated fortune 500 US companies. Likewise, 
Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) observed a substitute relationship between AEM and REM by 
assessing the organisations that mainly deal with the oil and gas sector in the USA. However, 
Zang (2012) provided evidence from the perspective of the USA. She employed the modified 
Jones model (1995) to check for AEM, and for REM she used Roychowdhury’s (2006) model. 
She considered how directors choose to substitute between AEM and REM. She further argued 
that REM decisions are usually made in the early part of the financial year, whereas AEM 
decisions are taken at, or after, the end of the fiscal year.  
They further explained that the cost of AEM includes a possible penalty in the proceedings and 
the analysis of managers and auditors. Doukakis (2014) argues in agreement with this, stating 
that accounting options are based on the analysis of the auditor. However, REM decisions are 
less likely to be reviewed by the auditors. This supported the observations made by Zang (2012) 
in showing an inclination of managers to switch between AEM and REM around SEOs. 
Nevertheless, it was noted that there was a decline in the performance of REM as compared to 
AEM around SEO.  
Das et al. (2017) conducted research into 673 listed non-financial Indian companies for the 
period 2009–2013. The outcomes propose that Indian firms consider both the approaches, with 
a considerable inclination towards AEM. Chi et al. (2011) observed that the companies are less 
likely to choose AEM if expert auditors audit them, as their ability to manipulate AEM will be 
constrained. Furthermore, Badertscher (2011) observed that overrated companies switched 
from AEM to REM, as they did not have many AEM options to support their overrated equity. 
Fan et al. (2010) found that AEM is restrained by positive reporting in earlier times. McInnis 
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and Collins (2011) confirmed that AEM reduces due to the estimation of cash flow by trade 
analysts. Therefore, this study examines whether UK and Indian firms do substitute AEM for 
REM. Consequently, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Firms use REM and AEM methods as substitutes.  
 
5.2.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND 
EM    
Board characteristics is a very important aspect of corporate governance, given the complex 
nature of financial reporting. This section will discuss the development of the next hypotheses 
for the relationship between board characteristics and the trade-off between AEM and REM.  
Agency theory expects boards to enhance financial reporting by monitoring the behaviour of 
managers, those behaviours that affect reported performance, financial disclosure, and tasks 
delegated to the boards’ sub-committees (Vafeas 2005). 
5.2.2.1. BOARD SIZE AND EM  
Board size is considered another essential constituent in board characteristics, which might 
affect the practice of EM. Agency theory assumes that a bigger board size might result in lesser 
manipulation that distorts the accounted earnings (Fama and Jensen 1983 and Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Previous research on corporate governance specifies that altering the board 
size affect its independence and efficiency (Elshandidy and Neri 2015 and Guest 2009). 
Oversize board size could negatively affect board effectiveness because of correspondence and 
coordination issues related with bigger gatherings. Larger than average boards may have lower 
levels of inspiration and fulfillment because of absence of participation in their decision-
making (Ebrahim and Fattah 2015).  
Goodstein et al. (1994) and Jensen (1993) assert that a small board size, consisting of around 
four to six members, might be able to make better decisions and monitor the behaviour of the 
CEO. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that small board size is preferable as, according to 
them, monitoring and decision-making become easier with a smaller board.  
Other viewpoints disputed that smaller boards would be successful in monitoring the actions 
of top management (Zahra and Pearce 1989). However, most research states that bigger boards, 
having wide expertise, can develop enhanced monitoring and thereby lessen the occurrence of 
EM (Peasnell et al. 2005). A reasonable explanation of this viewpoint is that smaller boards 
are dominated by the senior executives, whereas bigger boards have members from various 
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positions. Yermack (1996) proposed that a bigger board size does not limit the speculatory 
behaviour of the managers, and that increasing the board size does not control the opportunistic 
behaviours of managers, which distort the accounted earnings. This could be because a bigger 
board size might create challenges of communication and harmonisation (Beasley 1996). Ntim 
and Soobaroyen (2013) indicate that larger boards were more competent in identifying the 
opportunistic activities of managers who distorted reported earnings, as bigger boards have 
diversity in competency, knowledge, independence, and expertise to solve problems.  
Adversaries of the bigger size of the board’s argument that they showed a lack of harmony and 
communication amongst members. For instance, Rahman and Ali (2006), Obigbemi et al. 
(2016) and Gonzalez and González and Garcia-Meca (2014) found that there is a positive link 
between EM and board size.  
Overall, the prior studies emphasised the strength of corporate governance in constraining the 
tendency of managers to manage the earnings of companies. This may recommend that 
regulators identify the importance of board size as internal corporate governance. Following 
the mixed practical and theoretical recommendations, the study expects a significant 
relationship between board size and the trade-off between AEM and REM without specifying 
the direction of the coefficient. Thus, the second hypothesis proposed in this study is:  
H2: There is significant relationship between the board size and trade-off between AEM and 
REM. 
5.2.2.2. BOARD MEETINGS AND EM  
Board meetings are another key characteristic of effective monitoring of the financial reporting 
process. In this section, board meetings are another key characteristic hypothesis of the effect 
of board meetings on the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
That the board of directors should conduct regular meetings to achieve their responsibilities 
was recommended (Conger et al. 1998). It is broadly considered that the regular attendance of 
directors at the time of board meetings reflects their diligence in their duties (Sonnenfeld 2002).  
As a result, such a regular board meeting might improve the performance of corporates. In 
contrast to this, the study of Donaldson and Davis (1991), considered frequently conducted 
board meetings might not improve the performance of corporates. Similarly, the study of 
Vafeas (1999) stated that recurrent board meetings might negatively influence the profitability 
of corporates since they can increase the agency costs, especially meeting and traveling costs.  
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According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), frequent board meetings may decrease the time which 
non-executive directors can efficiently spend monitoring insider directors. 
Some provincial researchers have also conducted research into the effect of board meetings on 
EM, be it positively, negatively or insignificantly (Sarkar et al. 2006, Alghamdi 2012 and 
Almasarwah 2015). According to the study of Xie et al. (2003), boards that conduct meetings 
for the main purpose of discussing the issues of EM was found among 282 firms. They 
concluded that EM is negatively and significantly related to the number of board meetings. 
Similar, in a study by Bin-Muhamed (2013), a significant and negative relationship was noted 
between EM and the number of board meetings in the firms of Bursa Malaysia during the 
period of 2004 – 2008.  
Habbash (2010) conducted a study, which showed the insignificant relationship between the 
number of board meetings and EM in a sample of the top 350 firms listed on the (LSE) for the 
period 2003-2006. Similar to this finding, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), Marrakchi et al. 
(2001) and Kent et al. (2010) stated an insignificant association between AEM and board 
meeting frequency. A recent study by Singh et al. (2017), in India, reported an insignificant 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and AEM. Their study mainly explained 
that this association at first is a corporate governance weakness: the board has fewer meetings 
and, secondly, the skills and education of directors on the board is less (Vafeas 1999).  
Thus, there is mixed evidence in terms of the association between EM and the number of board 
meetings in studies of both developed and developing economies. Consequently, firms would 
prefer REM over AEM since REM activities could be masked in the form of everyday 
transactions to avoid being detected. Based on this argument, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H3: There is no significant relationship between the larger frequency of board meetings and 
trade-off between AEM and REM. 
 
5.2.2.3. BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND EM 
Board independence is another key characteristic of effective monitoring of the financial 
reporting process. In this section, hypotheses of the effect of board independence on the trade-
off between AEM and REM. 
Supporters of the agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Brickley et al. (1994), argue that 
independent directors might decrease agency costs and increase organisational performance. 
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They assert that the independent directors can monitor and control the activities of the 
organisation and decrease the opportunistic behaviour of the managers and appropriation of 
organisational resources.  
In general, a huge number of researchers have documented a negative relationship between 
independent directors and EM, hence supporting agency theory. Xie et al. (2003) observed that 
the presence of a large number of independent directors would lead to decreased EM. This was 
based on data from US companies collected between the years 1992 and 1994. A study carried 
out by Klein (2002), using data from 687 US firms between the years 1991 to 1993, records a 
negative relationship between AEM and the number of independent director’s present on the 
board. Similarly, based on the data of Canadian organisations during the years 2001-2004, Niu 
(2006) observed that the extent of the number of independent members on the board is 
negatively linked to the extent of AEM. Furthermore, Peasnell et al. (2005), using data from 
the UK, and Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012), using data from France and Canada, showed that 
boards with more independent director’s leads to reduced EM. 
Overall, a large number of prior experimental results have stated that boards with a high ratio 
of independent directors support the honesty of the financial accounting process and present a 
better guarantee to stakeholders on the creditability of earnings accounted. Nevertheless, some 
researchers have reported unusual observations, declaring that board independence might not 
lead to mitigating EM. Their observations could be different because of the data used, control 
variables used, and the institutional ownership structure and the corporate governance methods. 
Agency theory supposes that the inclusion of independent members on boards of directors will 
improve boards' ability to monitor management (Young, 2008). However, based on the 
research results, which show a negative relationship between AEM; and independent directors, 
it could be hypothesised that independent directors mitigate AEM behaviour, thus leading 
managers to resort to REM.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis proposed is: 
H4: There is significant relationship between the high proportion of independent board 
members and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
5.2.2.4. NUMBER OF FEMALES ON BOARD AND EM   
The number of females on the board is an important attribute of good corporate governance as 
it contributes to the effectiveness of the board function, which affects the company’s financial 
reporting quality. This section will discuss the hypotheses of the relationship between the 
number of females on the board and trade-off between AEM and REM 
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Differences in gender are likely to create exclusive information that facilitates the management 
to take better decisions, as different directors might have access to significant communities in 
the external environment (Carter et al. 2003). It is a general observation that men are more 
likely to use unethical means to achieve their goals, compared to women (Hazari et al. 2007). 
Additionally, Betz et al. (1989) observed that men are more liable, compared to women, to 
break the regulations in business and abuse organisational approaches with regard to cost 
reports to gain personal profit.  
The studies carried out previously indicate that female board director presents a high level of 
monitoring actions, reduce agency costs and agreement between balance manager’s welfare 
with that of the investors. A study by Gul et al. (2011) concluded that the female board directors 
in US companies have high levels of earnings quality. Lückerath-Rovers (2010) found that 
when a board has at least three female members it leads to better decision-making. The female 
board directors make it more active and dynamic. 
Women are more careful and less assertive than men in several decision-making situations 
(Byrnes et al. 1999), and are less prone to risks, specifically in taking decisions concerning 
finances (Powell and Ansic 1997). They also are inclined to act more resolutely than men to 
augment earnings quality because they are extremely responsive to loss of reputation and the 
risk of lawsuits (Srinidhi et al. 2011). Omoye and Eriki (2014) noted that the gender difference 
on the board of directors has a negative impact on EM.  
According to a study carried out by Lakhal et al. (2015) inspected the association between 
gender disparity on the board and EM by using the companies listed on the French stock 
exchange. They collected data from 170 companies and came to the conclusion that the ratio 
of females on the board reduces the EM. This result concludes with the fact that the female 
members on the board are efficient in the monitoring role and more likely to discover the EM. 
Gavious et al. (2012) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010), reported similar observations that an 
increased number of female board members is likely to lead to less use of EM practices. In the 
UK organisations, Arun et al. (2015) used data from the UK FTSE 350 index during the interval 
2005–2011. They found that a larger number of females minimises EM.  
Awais and Wang (2011), Gulzar (2011) and Shawver et al. (2006), in China, had found a 
positive relationship between AEM and the presence of female members on the board of 
directors. A number of female board members might be less willing to report the loss. Thus, an 
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increased number of female board members may lead firms to engage in a greater extent of 
AEM and REM. Based on this argument, the fifth hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
H5: There is significant relationship between the higher percentage of females on their boards 
and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AND EM    
As discussed in Chapter 3, the audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring and 
advising managers on the implementation of internal accounting control systems and on the 
preparation of financial statements (Arun et al. 2015, Bédard and Gendron 2010 and Sun et al. 
2011).  
5.2.3.1. AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE AND EM 
Audit committee size is a very important aspect of corporate governance, given the complex 
nature of financial reporting. This section will discuss the development hypotheses for the 
relationship between audit committee size and the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
The theory of Resource Dependence proposes that the board of a firm offers a number of 
resources, and additional directors on the board will augment the existing resources of the board 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Primarily, additional directors on the audit committee might make 
certain that the board has got the minimum knowledge source (Vafeas 2005). The board 
provides a number of resources, and a large number of members will augment the principal 
sources of the board (Habbash 2010). A bigger audit committee can be important in raising the 
helpful status of the company in the eyes of its internal and external auditors (Braiotta et al. 
2010, Abbott et al. 2004 and Vafeas 2005). However, audit committees with a large number of 
members have greater difficulty arriving at well-considered or insightful decisions and, in this 
sense, increasing the size may be detrimental to effective control of EM (Jensen 1993 and 
Yermack 1996). Nevertheless, there is a mixture of opinion, and the conclusions of prior 
researchers on the relationship between the size of the audit committee and EM differ.  
Several studies have also concluded there is a negative association between audit committee 
size and EM, such as the ones carried out by Almasarwah (2015), Yang and Krishnan (2005), 
Ghosh et al. (2010) and Saleh et al. (2007). Furthermore, Baxter and Cotter (2009), using a 
sample of data gathered from Australian listed firms in 2001, had observed that the size of the 
audit committee is linked to the quality of earnings. Their observations revealed that there is 
no link between the size of the audit committee and earnings quality. Abbott et al. (2004) 
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concluded that the size of the audit committee had no considerable effect on the quality of 
financial reporting. Furthermore, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) used the data collected from 
UK firms in the years from 2005 to 2008 and found an insignificant association between the 
audit committees’ size and EM.  
Habbash (2010) used the data of 350 top UK firms, covering four years of reporting from 2003 
to 2006, and stated that there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the audit 
committee and the level of EM. A study by Bin-Muhamed (2013), using a sample of listed 
firms in Malaysia between 2004 and 2008, found an insignificant relationship between the audit 
committee and EM.  
A study by Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) in the UK found that audit committee size has an 
insignificant effect on EM. In a study carried out by Davidson et al. (2005) on 434 listed 
Australian companies, they did not observe any relationship between the extent of AEM and 
the size of the audit committee. However, Saleh et al. (2007) found that there is a positive 
association between audit committee size and levels of EM.  
Therefore, if firms use AEM and REM methods as substitutes and trade off one method for the 
other depending on the relative costs and constraints of each, then it can be expected that audit 
committee size would reduce the extent of AEM, thereby leading firms to shift toward REM. 
Therefore, the following sixth hypothesis has been developed: 
H6: There is significant relationship between the large size of audit committee and trade-off 
between AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.3.2. AUDIT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND EM  
The audit committee meetings are another key characteristic of effective monitoring of the 
financial reporting process. In this section, hypotheses of the effect of audit committee 
meetings on the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Page and Spira (1999) asserted that such meetings are ineffective in augmenting financial 
reporting. Abbott et al. (2000) explained that the companies with very independent audit 
committees, which hold their meetings only twice a year, had less financial reporting 
challenges. Inaam et al. (2012) specify that the reduced number of audit committee meetings 
provide a better chance of detecting EM. Onukwuli (2014) showed that a strong corporate 
governance mechanism (e.g. audit committee meetings) is linked to the quality of accounting 
in Jordanian firms during the period from 1997 to 2007. The studies carried out previously to 
69 
 
investigate the link between EM and the number of meetings of the audit committee present 
mixed opinions. 
Visvanathan (2008) found that the number of meetings held by the audit committee reduce the 
practise of REM in abnormal discretionary expenses. Similarly, Garven (2015) concluded that 
audit committee meetings have a significant negative relationship with REM, by making use 
of a sample of US firms during the years 2005 to 2007. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
audit committee meetings and EM is positively associated, as confirmed by Saleh et al. (2007) 
and Rahman and Ali (2006). A study by Adel Almasarwah (2015) found that a positive 
relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and EM, by collecting the data 
from the Amman stock market over the period 2005 to 2012. Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) 
used the data of UK firms during the years 2005 – 2008 and found a positive relationship 
between audit committee meetings and EM.  
Even though several studies showed a relationship between audit committee meetings and 
aggressive EM practices, many other studies were unable to find any association between audit 
committee meetings and EM (Beasley et al. 2000, Lin et al. 2006 and Bédard et al. 2004). 
Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), using the data of UK firms over the period 2004 to 2008, 
observed that the number of audit committee meetings is insignificantly linked to EM. 
Furthermore, Alghamdi (2012) illustrated that there is an insignificant link between audit 
committee meetings and the extent of AEM by making use of all companies listed on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange. Similarly, Mishra and Malhotra (2016) used a sample of 130 Indian firms and 
examined them for a three-year duration from 2013 to2015. They did not find any significant 
relationship between audit committee meetings and AEM. Singh et al. (2017) used a sample of 
36 large capitalisation firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange for the duration of 2005 to 
2015. He found that the frequency of audit committee meeting is insignificantly related to EM.  
Thus, there is mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between EM and audit committee 
meetings in studies of both developed and developing economies. However, firms would prefer 
REM over AEM. Firms use AEM and REM methods as substitutes and trade-off one method 
for the other depending on the relative costs and constraints of each. Thus, it can be expected 
that more frequent audit committee meetings would reduce the extent of AEM, thereby leading 




H7: There is significant relationship between the high frequency of audit committee meeting 
and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.3.3. AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AND EM   
The independence of the audit committee is another key characteristic of effective monitoring 
of the financial reporting process. In this section, hypotheses of the effect of audit committee 
independence on the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Agency theory proposed that non-executive directors are more independent than the executive 
directors are; hence, they can monitor more efficiently (Fama and Jensen 1983 and Elshandidy 
and Hassanein 2014). Independent audit committee members, as non-executive directors, 
might seek to enhance their reputations as experts in decision-making by joining the audit 
committee (Fama and Jensen 1983). Members of an audit committee might be able to increase 
the quality of financial reports but if anything goes wrong with the reports, it might affect their 
reputation (Abbott et al. 2000).  
Some of the previous studies suggest a negative relationship between the independence of an 
audit committee and the AEM level (Puat and Devi 2013, Hamdan et al. 2013 and Amar 2014). 
A study by Vafeas (2005) reported that the ratio of internal members on the audit committee is 
related to a lower quality of reporting. The setup of independent board committees is accounted 
as a significant technique to improve governance performance (Hearn 2011 and Vafeas 1999).  
Chang and Sun (2009) show that audit committee independence is significant in restraining 
EM in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period, but insignificant in the pre-SOX period 
(during the years 2002–2003). Kapoor and Goel (2017) used the data of 297 Indian companies 
over six years (2007–2012). The outcomes demonstrate a negative relationship between audit 
committee independence and AEM. Taking a sample of 194 New Zealand companies during 
2004-2005. 
Nevertheless, previous studies also suggest a positive relationship between the independence 
of an audit committee and EM. For example, Singh et al. (2017) used a sample of 36 large 
Indian capitalisation firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange for the period from 2005-06 
to 2014-15. They observed that audit committee independence is positively related to EM.  
Siregar and Utama (2008) chose Indonesian companies on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Their 
sample comprised 144 companies and spanned the periods 1995–1996, and 1999–2002, but 
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they could not succeed in finding any relationship between audit committees’ independence 
and EM.  
The conflicting observations of prior studies are not surprising since there are several factors, 
which might influence the role of the audit committee. These include ownership structure or 
the prevalence of an audit committee that cannot make sure the skills of the monitoring process 
or its efficacy to find out and restrain manipulation. However, independent directors on an audit 
committee incur a higher marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies. In this 
case, managers might perceive AEM as relatively costly since their primary goal is to improve 
operations. Therefore, independent directors on an audit committee lead to higher AEM and 
REM Based on this argument, accordingly, the eighth hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
H8: There is significant relationship between the high percentage of audit committee 
independence and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.3.4. AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE AND EM  
Audit committee financial expertise is a very important aspect of corporate governance, given 
the complex nature of financial reporting. This section will discuss the development of the next 
hypotheses for the relationship between audit committee financial expertise, and trade-0ff 
between AEM and REM. 
The degree of expertise in the audit committee might lead to an augmentation in the quality of 
financial reports (Baxter and Cotter 2009). This is in conjunction with audit committee 
members having the essential qualifications, proficiency certificates, competencies and 
expertise in accounting and financial issues that would help augment the efficacy of the audit 
procedures and guarantee the precision of fiscal reports (Hamdan et al. 2013). Xie et al. (2003) 
confirm that an independent director with a corporate or financial background is experienced 
with the diverse types of EM. Previous studies believe that the existence of at least one member 
with financial expertise on an audit committee is effectual in mitigating financial irregularities 
(Abbott et al. 2004).  
Previous literature proposed a negative link between audit committee financial expertise and 
EM (Badolato et al. 2014, Almasarwah 2015, Baxter and Cotter 2009, Dhaliwal et al. 2010 and 
Bin-Muhamed 2013). Considering a sample of 300 US firms in the year 1996, Bédard et al.’s 
(2004) observations report tentatively that audit committees’ financial experts are negatively 
related to AEM.  Another aspect that is considered by Lo et al. (2010), based on 266 listed 
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companies in China in the year 2004, suggests that firms with a higher level of audit committee 
expertise possibly engage in minimal EM. Research by Qi and Tian (2012) presented 
investigated that audit committees having expert directors are observed to be highly successful 
in reducing the extent of EM.  
Garven (2015) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) demonstrated a negative association 
between audit committee expertise and the degree of REM. Nevertheless, based on data 
gathered from the 97 top companies for a period of two years 2002-2003, Rahman and Ali 
(2006) found no evidence to support the assertion that the existence of financial experts on 
audit committees reduces EM.  
A study carried out by Mishra and Malhotra (2016) used a sample of 130 Indian firms and 
researched a period of three years; 2013-2015. The study indicated that the existence of at least 
one financial expert on the audit committee has no significant effect on EM. Katmon and Al 
Farooque (2017) used data from UK firms for the years 2004-2008. The observations revealed 
an insignificant association between audit committees’ expertise and EM.  
Thus, on the evidence stated by Bédard and Gendron (2010), the effectiveness of financial and 
accounting expertise in limiting financial reporting abuse is mixed. There are several possible 
causes for the contradictory outcomes on the efficacy of the audit committee. Possible variables 
could be the sample size, the tactical method used, duration and place of study. Thus, there is 
mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between EM and audit committee expertise of both 
developed and developing economies. Thus, firms would have a preference for REM over 
AEM since REM activities can be masked in the form of everyday transactions to avoid being 
detected. Therefore, in line with prior studies, the ninth hypothesis in this study is: 
H9: There is significant relationship between the high percentage of audit committee expertise 
and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
 
5.2.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
EM    
As discussed in Chapter 3. According to prior research evidence from developed and 
developing countries, previous studies have suggested that agency problems take place in two 
ways: vertical agency challenges, which take place between owners and managers, and 
horizontal agency challenges, which take place between majority and minority owners 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
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5.2.4.1. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND EM 
The arrangement of management and shareholder interests can be increased along with a rise 
in director’s ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Samaha et al. 2012), and that might 
restrict the need to take on good corporate governance. Companies with larger managerial 
ownership will be less accountable to the general public because outsiders (shareholders) in 
those companies are inclined to have comparatively small interests (Eng and Mak 2003 and 
Khan et al. 2013). Conversely, managerial ownership might not lead to allied interests of 
management and shareholders, as managers might focus on augmenting their profits by making 
use of insider information (McConnell and Servaes 1990). Hence, higher extents of ownership 
by managers might lessen the monitoring of management deeds, which might negatively 
impact the procedures of EM.  
Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013) also recorded that managerial ownership is negatively related 
to the financial performance of firms in the UK. A study carried out by Alves (2012), using a 
sample of 34 non-financial Portuguese firms, also observed a negative link between AEM and 
managerial ownership. A study carried out by Rebai (2011) also investigated the effect of 
managerial ownership concerning the REM. His findings concluded the links were 
significantly negative.  
In another research by Limpaphayom and Manmettakul (2004) conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accrual as a proxy for EM, using 
a sample of listed companies in Thailand for the period from 1998 to 2000 which involved 207 
firm-year observations. A study by Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) showed that there is a significant 
and positive relationship between managerial ownership and EM, by collecting data from 195 
Jordanian industrial companies covering the period 2001-2005. Additionally, Rauf et al. (2012) 
used the data collected from 598 Malaysian listed firms, for the period of 2002 and 2003, and 
concluded that a positive relationship exists between managerial ownership and the extent of 
EM. Bin-Muhamed (2013) showed a positive association between managerial ownership and 
EM based on data collected from Bursa Malaysia firms spanning the period 2004 – 2008.  
Agency theory advises that high insider ownership provide improved corporate governance 
structure that leads to a high quality in financial reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 2005). Overall, 
the studies highlighted the power of corporate governance in constraining the tendency of 
managers to manage earnings of firms and thus, ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting 
process. Overall, the study concluded that corporate governance is negatively associated with 
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EM, thus evidencing that corporate governance is playing a major role in overcoming this issue. 
Therefore, they may be less willing to report losses or decreases in earnings. Thus, greater 
managerial ownership may lead firms to engage in a greater extent of AEM and REM. Based 
on this argument, the tenth hypothesis in this study is: 
H10: There is significant relationship between the high percentage of managerial ownership 
and trade-off between AEM and REM. 
 
 5.2.4.2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND EM  
Institutional owners have a considerable role in reducing agency problems, as they are inclined 
to have a better motivation to monitor the opportunistic conduct of management and reinforce 
the corporate governance arrangement of their companies (Barako et al. 2006 and Dong and 
Ozkan 2008).  
Marrakchi et al. (2001) noted that firms having an elevated ratio of institutional ownership 
generally have a reduced level of AEM. Alternatively, an increase in the volume of institutional 
ownership in the companies could impact the directors and provide them with private contracts 
at the cost of other shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman 2007).  
This shows that instructional ownership is powerful enough to monitor the decisions taken by 
corporate managers and directors (Ping and Wing 2011 and Rose 2007). Institutional 
ownership has a considerable role in effecting EM. For example, when institutional 
stakeholders own a high number of shares of the firms, which would permit them to monitor 
the company, this would motivate them to augment earnings and fulfil the pre-requisites of 
institutional ownership (Koh 2003). It is hard for board members to manipulate REM when 
they have a greater percentage of institutional ownership as there is a greater extent of 
monitoring. Roychowdhury (2006) concluded a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and REM to overcome accounting of negative earnings.  
Li and Zhang (2010) found that greater levels of institutional ownership are considerably 
related to lower levels of abnormal cash flow from operations and raised extents of production 
expenses.  
However, Rahman et al.  (2013) found that institutional ownership is not significantly related 
to EM alternatives. The insignificant effect of institutional shareholders might be credited to 
the type of institutional stakeholder in the UK. These observations are similar to those in 
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research carried out by Alghamdi (2012), Rebai (2011), Peasnell et al. (2000) and Peasnell et 
al. (2005) who state that there is no association between EM and institutional investors. A 
practical explanation for this outcome might be that most institutional stakeholders are short-
term investors as there is a deficit of protection that does not provide sufficient monitoring.  
Overall, it can be seen that the power of institutional shareholders emphasises the extent of 
mean stakeholders playing a major role in monitoring and reducing opportunistic management 
behaviour such as EM techniques. Alternatively, a large percentage of institutional 
stakeholders might be effectual, but this is not the case when the institutional ownership share 
is lower (Cheng and Warfield 2005). Thus, there is mixed evidence in terms of the relationship 
between EM and institutional ownership in studies of both developed and developing 
economies. Firms would prefer REM over AEM since REM activities could be masked in the 
form of everyday transactions to avoid being detected. Based on this argument, accordingly, 
the eleventh hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
H11: There is significant relationship between the high percentage of institutional ownership 
and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
 
5.3. RESERACH DESIGN  
Saunders et al. (2012) offered the research onion model, which is the main influence on the 
methodology of this research. The research onion model explains metaphorically the way 
different basics involved in the research need to be tested. 
5.3.1. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
The first point of any study is to orient a study question to a particular philosophy. Hudson and 
Ozanne (1998) described ontology as the role of reality, and Carson et al. (2001) defined 
epistemology as the relationship between this certainty and the researcher. The philosophical 
attitude of this research is located in the outermost layer of Saunders, onion. According to 
Saunders et al. (2012) in the outer layer there are four different philosophical types that can 
usefully be considered: the first is positivism, the second is realism, the third is interpretivism 
and the fourth is pragmatism. 
Positivism: Carson et al. (2001) claim that a positivist ontology will consider the world to be 
only what is extrinsic, while; Hudson and Ozanne (1988) add to positivist judge that there is 
only one truth regarding the researcher's experience or finding. Positivist researchers require a 
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basic and disciplined approach to monitoring research (Churchill, 1996 and Carson et al. 2001). 
This can be achieved by selecting a clear theme, formulating an appropriate theory and then 
selecting a suitable method. Carson et al. (2001) believe that numerical methods are paramount 
in positivist research and that researchers must be participants having no control over the each 
other.  
Positivism: is mainly based on outcomes and seeks to relate cause to effect. Positivist 
researchers typically emphasise their use of ‘scientific method’ for proposing and testing 
theories using measurable structured data. Typically, positivist designs induce large samples 
of quantitative data, which are subject to statistical analysis.    
Realism: Realism is similar to Positivism. Realism asserts that the existence of realism is not 
dependent on the awareness and the senses of the researcher. Realism researchers worry that 
researchers can be influenced by their past experience and world view. Philosophers categorise 
realism in two ways: the first is direct realism and the second is critical realism. Direct realism 
assumes that an accurate representation can be obtained from what is experienced through the 
senses. Critical realists believe that what is experienced through the senses is later processed 
subjectively by the mind. As a result, Saunders et al. (2012) identify that, under this philosophy, 
the various analysis procedures and gathering techniques will vary using either or both 
qualitative data and quantitative data. 
Interpretivism: According to Hudson and Ozanne (1988) interpreters believe that there are 
numerous realities, which; Lincoln and Guba (1985) contend are dependent on the different 
connotations of different observers. Defining permanent reality is challenging (Neuman 2006). 
Carson et al. (2001) contend that all knowledge is partial and socially forged. Interactive 
research adopts an empathic stance to understand the world-view of the people involved. 
Pragmatism: Pragmatic researchers seek research findings, which can lead to practical 
consequences. They believe that multiple realities may need to be considered. Pragmatic 
research design facilitates relevant, reliable and credible data collection so that constructive 
action can be taken. Typically, pragmatic knowledge claims emerge from consequences 
pragmatism is concerned with applying new knowledge to solve problems (Patton 1990). 
5.3.2. RESEARCH APPROACHES  
According to Babbie (2010), it is the research approach that leads to the formulation of the 
research strategy, which in turn leads to the choice of research methods. Research approaches 
can be differentiated into two types: the first is deductive and the second is inductive. 
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Deductive: According to Saunders et al. (2012), in a deductive approach, previous theories are 
used to formulate hypotheses relevant to the research inside. This study uses a deductive 
approach to investigate the effect of corporate governance on any trade-off between AEM and 
REM. 
Inductive approach: Additionally, non-numerical data is used in this research to substantiate 
the numerical analysis. The inductive approach includes building theories based on data 
collected through interviews (Bell et al. 2018). 
5.3.3. RESEARCH METHODS  
Research methods are the next layer of the research onion. There are different ways of selecting 
research methods (Punch, 2013). The first method is the mono method, which employs a single 
data collection technique, followed by a consistent qualitative or quantitative analysis process 
(Bryson et al. 2014). The second method is multimethod, wherein several methods are used 
during the analysis. 
Multimethods arise either by employing various data collection methods within a given type 
of data analysis or by employing mixed methods of research (i.e. both quantitative and 
qualitative). Here, multiple quantitative data (e.g. from structured observations or 
questionnaires) can be analysed statistically (Collis and Hussey 2013). According to Saunders 
et al. (2012), in the case of mixed methods research, different quantitative (e.g. questionnaire 
data collection) and qualitative (e.g. semi-structured interview) data collection methods can be 
used. The rise in the popularity of mixed paradigm between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Creswell 2013). Campbell and Fiske (1959) pioneered the concept of mixing 
various methods while studying the validity of psychological traits. They developed a 
"multimethod matrix" in which the biases of one method could be cancelled or neutralised by 
the biases in others (Sieber 1973). 
Mixed method designs can start with either data collection or interviews and then be followed 







5.3.3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND RESEARCH APPROACH FOR CURRENT 
RESEARCH  
The choice of research philosophy and strategy is based on the objectives of the current 
literature. The research philosophy points to the methods that can be used in gathering data, 
analysing it and then using this data (Collis and Hussey 2003). In the current study, positivism 
was followed, since it is investigating the actuality of a phenomenon which already exists 
between corporate governance and trade-off between methods of manipulation of EM in the 
UK and Indian listed companies. This study also requires the use of existing theories in 
developing hypotheses, which can be rejected or confirmed according to the study results 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Furthermore, the research method used in the present study is consistent 
with the quantitative strategy, based on the positivism philosophy. This strategy uses theories 
that help the researcher to find a link between study variables and achieves the research aims 
(Crotty 1998). In addition, Babbie (2010) argues that there are two main research approaches, 
which are inductive and deductive approaches. Inductive reasoning is used through moving 
from specific observations to wider generalisations, hence forming theories. The deductive 
approach, on the other hand, hinges on theories in order to develop an appropriate hypothesis, 
meaning that the study hypothesis is built based on the theories. Thus, the research strategy is 
planned to examine the hypothesis through the collected data. The current literature applied the 
deductive approach, since the study’s hypotheses were built according to the existing literature 
and theories. Furthermore, in line with the positivists’ approach, statistical analysis techniques 
were used to examine these hypotheses. This method is in line with the main aim of this 
research, which is to investigate whether mechanisms of corporate governance affect the trade-
off between methods of manipulation of EM. 
 
5.3.3.2 TIME HORIZON  
The last layer of the research onion, just before the core, emphasises the time horizon within 
which research is undertaken. According to Bell et al. (2018), the research design can be of 
two types, longitudinal or cross-sectional, involving successive independent sampling. The 
majority of surveys found in the literature review were cross-sectional and linked by being 





5.4. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
5.4.1. DATA COLLECTION  
To test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, firms’ accounting data is collected, which will 
be secondary data. Collection of secondary is easy, efficient and economical (Schmidt and 
Hollensen 2006). The main database used will be FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy), the 
OSIRIS Database, Annual Reports, and Company Websites. Data on corporate governance 
have been collected directly from company reports published between 2006 and 2015. Most 
were available online. Chang and Most (1985) and Jizi et al. (2014) found them easier to 
compare than press releases or analysts’ reviews.  
5.4.2. SAMPLE SELECTION  
The primary sample for this study will be a balanced panel of UK non-financial companies, 
listed in the Financial Times Stock Exchange FTSE 350. The FTSE 350 includes FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 companies. The FTSE 350 represents approximately 90% of UK market 
capitalisation (Hawas and Tse 2016). This sample has been selected because of the following 
considerations: 
Firstly, the sample contains a broad range of manufacturing and commercial activities and 
accounts for a significant proportion of UK economic output.  
Secondly, FTSE 350 companies make available extensive data, which are amenable to 
statistical analyses.  
Thirdly, FTSE 350 firms are characterised by similar codified features of corporate 
governance, whereas smaller companies outside the FTSE 350, exhibit lower levels of 
compliance with the UK code of corporate governance (Habbash 2013).  
This leaves data to be analysed on 223 private sector manufacturing companies spanning 12 
main industries, producing 2230 firm-year observations. 
In India, the sample includes the top 500 private sector manufacturing companies listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) for the period from 2006 to 2015. This selection takes into 
account the most recent data available. The main justification for selecting this sample is that 
these companies account for more than 90% of Indian market capitalisation, as at March 2010 
(Rudra and Bhattacharjee 2011). The sample excluded:  
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Firstly, financial services companies, banks, insurance and other financial companies that were 
subject to tighter regulatory control and which had unique characteristics and specific 
regulations (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, French et al. 2004 and Sun and Rath 2010). 
Secondly, the sample excluded government-owned and utilities firms, because their 
governance mechanisms are not thought reliable (Sarkar et al. 2008). Utilities companies are 
much regulated by the government, have devious incentives, and manipulate reported earnings 
(Peasnell et al. 2001, Klein 2002 and Daske et al. 2008). Thirdly, the sample excluded firms 
whose data are incomplete.  
Fourthly, firms established after 2006 were excluded.  
Finally, in India, the sample excluded foreign owned, or foreign affiliated, companies, because 
they have differing regimes for corporate governance (Beuselinck and Deloof 2014 and Chen 
and Zhang 2014). This leaves data to be analysed on 212 private sector manufacturing 
companies spanning 12 main industries, producing 2120 firm-year observations. 
In the research, data are used that cover the period from 2006 to 2015. A main motivation for 
choosing this period is that spans several economic cycles. Up to 2015, the data required are 
uniformly available for all FTSE 350 companies and top 500 private Indian companies. 
India has emerged as the fastest growing telecom market in the world. Indian teledensity was 
1.4 percent in 1995 and 60 percent in 2010. In big cities, like Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and 
Bengaluru, teledensity is much the same as in Europe and North America. However, teledensity 
in rural India hovers around 28 percent. India is the second largest telecom market in the world. 
The total number of telecom subscribers in India increased from 6.4 million in March 2002 to 
812 million in March 2011 (Muruganandam 2012).  
As the fastest growing telecommunications industry in the world, it is projected that India had 
1.159 billion telecom subscribers by 2013. It is the fastest growing telecom market in the world 
(Muruganandam 2012).  
On the other hand, developed service sectors in the UK in 2013, for example the maritime 
business services sector, made a £1.6 billion gross value-added to the UK economy. This 
comprises £890 million contributed through the output of shipping insurance activities and 
£388 million contributed through shipbroking. To give a sense of scale, the maritime business 
services sector’s gross value-added contribution to GDP is larger than taxi operations, cargo 
handling and freight air transport. Compared to 2011, the direct value-added contribution of 
the UK maritime business services sector has increased by 15% in real terms (Storey 2016). 
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TABLE (5.1) UK AND INDIA SAMPLE SECLECTION  
Description UK sample Indian sample 
Number of firms Percentage Number of firms Percentage 
Initial sample 350 100% 500 100% 
Excluded:     
Financial, insurance and 
investment companies 
(57) 16% (94) 19% 
Utilities firms (13) 4% (43) 9% 
Missing data and unavailable 
annual reports 
(17) 5% (61) 12% 
Established after 2006 (40) 11% (25) 5% 
Foreign majority-owned and 
foreign affiliates firms 
---------- -------- (65) 13% 
















TABLE (5.2) INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION  
Code Industry group UK sample Indian sample 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
1  Oil & Gas 11 5% 11 5% 
2 Telecommunication  19 8% 32 15% 
3 Health  13 6% 19 9% 
4 Manufacturing & service  16 7% 24 11% 
5 Travel & leisure  25 11% 14 7% 
6 General Retailers 17 8% 16 8% 
7 Personal & household goods 14 6% 12 6% 
8 Food Producers & Processors 17 8% 11 5% 
9 Construction & Building Materials  25 11% 18 9% 
10 Chemicals 16 7% 24 11% 
11 Support services  33 15% 13 6% 
12 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 17 8% 18 8% 
 Total  
 
223 100% 212 100% 
 
5.5. MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES (EM) 
According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) the EM approaches are used to avoid detection 
by outsiders. 
5.5.1. MEASUREMENT OF EM  
Kiattikulwattana (2014) classified measurement of EM to include accounting action and real 
economic action. Roychowdhury (2006) dropping discretionary expenses (such as maintenance 
and advertising, research and development), changes in sales and overproduction activities may 
be identified from abnormal production costs. Whereas Roychowdhury (2006) adopted 
abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal cash flow and abnormal production as REM 
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measurements, other studies used increased production, the change in shipment schedules, 
acceleration of sales, and the delay of R&D and maintenance expenses as REM techniques 
which managers might deploy (Roychowdhury 2006, Healy et al. 1999 and Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). Gunny (2010) adapted Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to improve other 
methods and recognise abnormal production costs, abnormal SG&A, abnormal gains on sale 
of assets and abnormal R&D. Similarly, the accounting practices of EM are described as AEM; 
certain accruals are changed with no direct effect on the cash flow (Kiattikulwattana 2014). 
Most of the studies on EM proposed that managers tend to use AEM because it may be subject 
to alteration and difficult for external participants to observe. Thus, abnormal accrual values 
are employed as a proxy for EM. Overall, Bowman and Navissi (2003), Kothari et al. (2005) 
and many others have used aggregate accruals methods, while Beneish (2001), Beatty et al. 
(2002) and Beaver et al. (2003) adopted specific accruals (loan-loss provisions and the loss 
reserve) and frequency distribution of earnings to investigate the presence of EM (Degeorge et 
al. 1999 and Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). As such, each of these approaches will be briefly 
discussed in the following sections.  
5.5.1.1. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS APPROACH  
Various techniques are used for estimating EM; however, the aggregate accruals approach is 
the most widely recognised in accounting studies (Dechow et al. 1995).  Aggregate accruals 
have two parts: Discretionary Accruals (DA) and Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA). The DA 
is managed by the managers, which means that EM and NDA are impacted by outer variables 
and, therefore, outside the managers’ control.  The most widely recognised models in the 
aggregate accrual’s method are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.5.1.1.1. THE HEALY (1985) MODEL 
The model proposed by Healy (1985) was the principal endeavour to measure discretionary 
accruals utilising total accruals in proportion to the slacked value of total resources in a 
particular year (van Praag 2001). This model endeavours to calculate the total accruals by 
withdrawing the reported earnings from the operational cash flow. It presumes that the 
aggregate accruals include DA and NDA, and it does not isolate them. This model is shown 
below: 
EDAit = TAit / Ait - 1                                                                                        [5.1] 
Where 
EDAit:   Estimated discretionary accruals for the firm i in year t. 
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TAit:   Total accruals, defined as the difference between reported earnings and operating cash. 
Ait – 1:  The lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
The Healy model's primary theory is that the NDA volume is evaluated to be zero during the 
period of estimation. This supposition has been criticised for a few reasons: Kaplan (1985) 
stated that the volume will vary based on the economic conditions of the firm, but it should not 
be zero for any given time-period.  Perry and Williams (1994) stated that the total accruals 
level, including NDA, is typically negative for some organisations because of the depreciation 
expenditure impact. 
5.5.1.1.2. THE DEANGELO (1986) MODEL 
DeAngelo (1986) introduced the second endeavour to evaluate DAs; this expelled the Healy 
model’s shortcomings by not perceiving a standard for the foreseen accruals (Aljifri 2007).  
This model characterises total accruals as the entirety of NDA and DA and measures 
aggregate accruals as the variation emanated from the net earnings deducted from the 
operational cash flow. NDA is estimated as the total accrual of the previous period scaled by 
the lagged value of total assets. 
EDAit = (TAit – TAit – 1) / Ait – 1       [5.2] 
Where 
EDAit: Estimated non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in year t, measured as the difference           
between total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the estimated year. 
TAit:   Total accruals, defined as the difference between net earnings and operating cash 
Ait – 1:  Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
The model proposed by DeAngelo (1986) operates on the supposition that NDA follow a 
random walk and some of the changes are consistent over the long haul and is, thus, zero 
(approximately) in the period of estimation. A few researchers of EM have condemned this 
because the NDA must change in light of changes in the company's conditions and should not 
be consistent after some time (Aljifri 2007). Because of the denial of the fact that the company’s 
economic conditions influence the NDA, researchers are not willing to compute DA using the 
models of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), but these are known as the simplest models 




5.5.1.1.3. THE INDUSTRY (DECHOW AND SLOAN 1991) MODEL 
Because of the defects of DeAngelo’s (1986) and Healy’s (1985) models, which expect the 
NDA to be constant after some time, Dechow and Sloan (1991) acquainted ‘the industry model’ 
to detect EM. They contended that organisations in a similar division have the same NDA 
variations and, accordingly, they are equivalent to the mean of total accruals in a particular year 
separated by the slacked estimation of total resources for all non-test organisations in the same 
industry sector. Subsequently, NDA estimated for the industry model is computed as follows: 
NDAit = α1 + α2 Median j (TAit – 1) / Ait – 1                            [5.3] 
Where: 
NDAit: Non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in the year t, measured by using the difference            
between total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the estimated year. 
Median j (TAit – 1) / Ait:  Median value of overall industry accruals, firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged value of total assets. 
Tait: Total accruals, resulting from the difference between net earnings and operating cash         
flows. 
Ait – 1:  Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year 
α1 it and α2it: Firm-specific parameters as estimated by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
on observations in the estimated period. 
Despite the fact that the industry model endeavours to keep away from the inadequacies of the 
models of DeAngelo (1986) and Healy (1985), it has two shortcomings. To begin with, it 
disregards the NDA variation that is basic in the very same organisation. Hence, if NDA 
changes reflect reactions for the fragile economic conditions of the organisation, at that point 
DA might be classified incorrectly as NDA. Secondly, it disregards the DA changes, which 
indicate correlation with organisations in the similar sector. Consequently, the model cannot 
legitimately differentiate DA from NDA (Jones 1991 and Dechow et al. 1995). 
5.5.1.1.4. THE JONES (1991) MODEL 
This model is the most widely recognised and utilised as part of investigations of aggregate 
accruals because it can separate accruals into NDA and DA (Peek et al. 2013 and Islam et al. 
2011). It is believed by Jones (1991) that revenue changes would cause operating capital 
changes, resulting in an accruals variation.  Jones proposes a direct model based on regression, 
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which controls for the earning changes and deterioration to evaluate DA. The author utilises a 
two-stage marker to segment total accruals into two segments: NDA and DA (Xiong 2006).  
At the preliminary stage, Jones correlates NDA to gross property and revenue change (∆REV), 
plant and hardware, all institutionalised by the slacked estimation of aggregate resources 
utilising time-series information as follows: 
DAit   = α1 (1 / Ait – 1) + α2 (∆REVit / Ait -1) + α3 (PPEit / Ait -1) + ɛit      [ 5.4] 
Where 
Tait:                 Total accruals for the firm i in year t. 
∆REVit:           Change in revenue for the firm i in year t scaled by total assets. 
PPEit:              Gross property, plant and equipment for the firm i in year t scaled by assets.  
Ait – 1:            Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
α1, α2, and α3:   Firm-specific parameters.  
ɛit:               The residual. 
The parameters such as α1, α2, and α3 from the (5.4) equation are utilised to examine the 
information from the given year t, in the succeeding stage of DA evaluation. The equation 
below is utilised to appraise DA: 
NDAit= [TAit / Ait -1] – [α 1 (1 / Ait – 1) +α 2(∆REVit / Ait – 1) +α 3 (PPEit / Ait – 1) +ɛit]   [5.5] 
Where 
NDAit:     Non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in period t. 
The model proposed by Jones incorporates fixed assets (PPE) and revenue changes (∆REV) to 
influence deterioration and the organisation’s circumstances respectively. Hoang et al. (2014) 
stated that controlling the revenue changes and fixed assets depreciation without incorporating 
the adjustments in accounting receivables prompts missing an element that managers could 
utilise to change the profit. The model proposed by Jones depends on the supposition that the 
earnings are NDA, because earnings are probably going to be controlled by managers (e.g. for 
expanding sales acknowledgment close to the year-end period). Utilising the Jones model 
causes some DA removal. Thus, Islam et al. (2011) stated that the Jones’ model does not 
consider the accruals discretionary component. Regardless of the model’s prevalence, it has 




5.5.1.1.5. THE MODIFIED JONES (1995) MODEL 
Levels of discretionary accruals are used as a proxy to gauge AEM (Zang 2012). The proxy 
models range from simple models, in which total accruals are used as a measure of 
discretionary accruals, to more sophisticated models, which utilise regression analysis to 
deconstruct accruals into their discretionary and non-discretionary components (Bartov et al. 
2000). This thesis will employ the Modified Jones Model as proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). 
This is the most common model used to capture EM (Dechow et al. 1995, Kasznik 1999, Jha 
2013 and Doukakis 2014). The Modified Jones Model is found to provide a more powerful test 
of EM as compared to the standard Jones Models (Islam et al. 2011, Swai and Mbogela 2016 
and Doukakis 2014).  
There are two approaches to predicting total accruals: Firstly, balance sheet approaches (Healy 
1985 and Dechow et al. 1995). Secondly, cash flow approaches (Becker et al. 1998, 
Subramaniam 1996 and Xie et al. 2003). Both approaches are extensively described in the 
literature. Previous studies have preferred cash flow approaches (Becker et al. 1998, Kim et al. 
2012 and Pyo and Lee 2013). It is claimed that using the cash flow approach results in a greatly 
reduced rate of error, using cash flow approaches, is significantly better than when using 
balance sheet approaches (Hribar and Collins 2002).   
Dechow et al. (1995) argue that the implicit assumption, which underlies the Jones Model, is 
that all revenues are non-discretionary and that this leaves out some of the revenues. The 
modified Jones Model adjusts the revenues by the net receivables. 
Dechow et al. (1995) go along with the first stage of the unmodified Jones Model in which 
revenues are used to control for working capital non-discretionary accruals and property, plant 
and equipment are used to control for the depreciation of non-discretionary accrual.  
The Modified Jones Model differs from the Jones Model by the extent of change in the accounts 
receivable from revenue. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the manipulation of 
earnings using credit sales is easier than the manipulation of cash sales. 
While trying to overcome the inadequacies of the real Jones model, it accepts that earnings 
cannot be determined by administrators and, accordingly, NDA. Dechow et al. (1995) put 
forwarded an improved version to limit the estimation error in DA by means of deduction of 
the debtors’ accruals change (∆REC) from the revenue change (∆REV) to exclude the 
component in revenue change. That is required to be administered at the discretion of managers 
(the modified model of Jones challenges’ the presumption that earnings are exogenous).  
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Therefore, this model utilises cash revenue changes, as opposed to total revenue changes, 
because some credit earnings may be optional in the period (Stubben 2010).   
This study used cash flow methods for estimating total accruals, by using the following 
equation by Jo and Kim (2007, p. 572). 
TAit = EBXAit - CFOit                                                          [5.6] 
Where  
TAit = Total accrual for the firm i in period t. 
EBXAit = Earnings before abnormal and extraordinary items for the firm i in period t. 
CFOit = Cash flow from operational activities for the firm i in period t. 
The estimation of non-discretionary accruals (NDA) is calculated by:  
DAit = β0 (1 / Ait – 1) + β1 (ΔREVit/Ait – 1) – (ΔRCEit / Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit / Ait – 1) + ɛit    [5.7]  
Where  
DAit =            Ddiscretionary accruals for the firm i in period t. 
ΔREVit =       Change in revenue for the firm i in period t. 
ΔRCEit =       Change in accounts receivable for the firm i in period t. 
PPEit =          Gross property, plant and equipment for the firm i in period t. 
Ait =              Total assets for the firm i in period t. 
Ait – 1 =          Total assets at the beginning of year for the firm i in period t. 
T =                Year; 1…N  
i =                firm; i…. N  
Ɛit =              Error term for the firm i in period t. 
β0, β1 β 2 are predicted coefficients from the equation. 
Estimating Discretionary Accruals (DA)  
DAit = TAit – NDAit                                                   [5.8] 
Where  
TAit = is total accruals for the firm i in period t. 
DAit = Discretionary accruals for the firm i in period t. 
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NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in period t. 
Dechow et al. (1995) assumed that the accounts receivable variation in the given year is 
completely due to DA since it is the outcome of managers’ discretion to use credit sales instead 
of cash sales. The standard Jones (1991) model was initially built using the method of time-
series, which thus needs an adequately prolonged period of information (e.g. a minimum of 8-
10 years) to give powerful estimator coefficients.  In any case, utilising a time-series strategy 
has many restrictions. In the first place, (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994 and Peasnell et al. 2000) 
stated that it has the possibility to cause survivorship inclination issues. Secondly, the 
supposition that the evaluation of net PPE changes and earnings are consistent over time is not 
suitable. By resolving equation 5.7 (stage one) for each industry on a year-specific, rather than 
a company-specific, basis and then estimating the coefficients of predicted DA for each 
company through equation 5.8 (stage two) to control for year and industry-specific the outcome 
showed. 
While trying to avoid these issues, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Subramanyam (1996) and 
Becker et al. (1998) utilised the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model. Nowadays, 
investigations have preferred to utilise the cross-sectional method rather than the time-series 
method to avoid the constraints embedded in the last method (Xie et al. 2003, Bergstresser and 
Philippon 2006, Haniffa and Hudaib 2006, Iqbal et al. 2009, Chen et al. 2010, Katmun 2012, 
Peek et al. 2013 and Islam et al. 2011).  
5.5.1.1.6. THE PERFORMANCE-MATCHED (KOTHARI et al. 2005) MODEL 
Further development of the Jones model is recommended by Kothari et al. (2005). Numerous 
accruals studies have raised the importance of performance level as a variable when EM is 
computed. For instance, Dechow et al. (1996) and Kasznik (1999) recommend that the results 
estimated by the Jones model suggest that discretionary accruals are significantly positively 
associated with the return on assets (ROA). To investigate this matter of performance, several 
studies were conducted by Kasznik (1999), Bartov et al. (2001) and Kothari et al. (2005). They 
found that they could exclude the influence of any correlation between discretionary accruals 
and earnings performance by using a matched-firm method to adjust the discretionary accruals.  
Kothari et al. (2005) were the pioneers of the matched firm methods. They argued that 
discretionary accruals, as measured by both the Jones and the modified Jones models, might 
be erroneous when these models disregarded the performance of the firm. Thus, the 
discretionary accruals are measured by the residuals of the following cross-sectional model: 
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NDAit = [TA it/Ait – 1] – [α1 (1/Ait – 1) + α2 (∆REVit /Ait – 1 - ∆RECit /Ait) + α3 (PPEit/Ait – 1) 
+ α4 ROAit – 1]                          [5.9] 
Where 
ROAit – 1:   Lagged value of return on assets for the firm i in year t. 
Kothari et al. (2005) also include the constant term in their model for numerous reasons. First, 
they argue that it offers additional control for heteroscedasticity not alleviated by using assets 
as a deflator. Second, they claim that it decreases the problems arising from an omitted scale 
variable. Lastly, they contend that models of discretionary accruals which reject a constant 
term are less symmetric, which causes the control of the test comparisons to be less clear cut. 
The addition of a constant term in the Kothari et al. (2005) model is an additional distinction 
from the modified Jones model. 
5.5.1.1.7. KASZNIK MODEL  
In the past literature, extreme financial performance has led to type 1 errors, when there were 
changes in accruals, which had been wrongfully attributed to EM. Among others, Kasznik 
(1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) mention performance matching as a possible remedy for type 
1 errors. Furthermore, Kothari et al. (2005) advocated an alternative way to control for 
performance, and Kasznik (1999) included changes in cash flow as a variable in the modified 
Jones model. Dechow et al. (1996) found that cash flow was negatively correlated with total 
accruals. According to Jeter and Shivakumar (1999), including cash flow from operations in 
the regression model not only raises precision but also grows the power to detect EM, 
particularly at minor levels of EM. Therefore, Kasznik adds the change in cash flows to the 
modified Jones model as a driver of the accrual process following Kasznik’s (1999) model: 
NDAit = [TA it/Ait – 1] – [α1 (1/Ait – 1) + α2 (∆REVit /Ait – 1 - ∆RECit /Ait) + α3 (PPEit/Ait – 1) 
+ α4 ∆CFOt /it – 1]                  [5.10] 
Where ∆CFOit = change in cash flows from operations  
Consistent with earlier studies all variables have been scaled by lagged total assets to reduce 
heteroscedasticity.  
5.5.1.2. THE SPECIFIC ACCRUALS APPROACH  
Many EM scholars, such as Beneish (2001), Sun and Rath (2010) and Kashmiri (2014) 
discovered that aggregate accruals models are better than the specific-accruals method as a 
substitute to find EM. Healy et al. (1999, p.372) highlighted the importance of more research 
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in view of specific accruals. They contend that, "generally, there is small-scale of proof on EM 
utilising specific accruals, proposing this is probably going to be a productive region for the 
researches in future.  By examining specific accruals, researchers can offer direct evidence for 
standard setters in areas where standards work well and where there may be room for 
improvement”. Beneish (2001) identified that the specific-accruals method was needed 
because of the challenges associated with utilising the methods of total-accruals.  Specific 
accrual is utilised to measure EM in some studies, including arrangements for depreciation 
(Teoh et al. 1998), deferred tax (Phillips et al. 2003) and bad debt (McNichols and Wilson 
1988).  Other studies, for example Sun and Rath (2010), stated that only a small number of 
firms are using specific accruals, whereas aggregate accruals are used by many companies, 
which will affect the reputation of researches on specific-accruals. Similarly, Ali et al. (2015), 
utilising an example of 35 nations including 291 banks during 2003-2010, utilised the 
provisions of loan loss to assess DA as an intermediary for EM. They revealed the fact that 
Islamic banks take part in EM less frequently than ordinary banks, perhaps in light of the fact 
that they are restricted to additional monitoring by more governance layers. 
5.5.1.3. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION APPROACH  
The frequency distribution approach makes efforts to identify EM. As a result, it tests the 
reported earnings distribution. A number of the researchers have discovered the trace of EM 
practices (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997 and Degeorge et al. 1999). As Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) revealed, to hedge for losses, EM can be practiced using low frequencies of slight losses 
and high frequencies of slight profits. The author added that avoiding a reduction in earnings 
might be accomplished through low frequencies of minor earnings decreases and high 
frequencies of minor earnings increases. As such, an organisation with low pre-managed 
earnings takes part in improving their profits in the financial statement, whereas those with 
negative pre-managed profits embrace earnings increase to disclose greater profits in their 
financial statements (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). The author identified that changes in 
working capital and cash flow from operations are the main tools for earnings manipulation.  
Consistent with this notion, Degeorge et al. (1999) argued that managers might wish to avoid 
reporting losses and seek to disclose a profit related to the preceding profits.  However, Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) indicated that the practices might not assess the amount of EM. According 
to Beatty et al. (2002), most banks have demonstrated that poorer growth in earnings and levels 
of decrease were valued, because only a few slight modifications in the earnings were reported. 
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Xiong (2006) stated that the distribution reported earnings approach would be more effective 
while identifying the practices of EM. 
In accordance with the reasons stated above, one can conclude that there are no significant 
benefits to using the total-accrual approach for detecting EM, instead of the two other 
approaches. The main advantage is the justification why a large number of EM researchers 
were used for total-accruals methods for detecting EM. 
5.5.2. MEASUREMENT OF REM  
According to Cohen and Zarowin (2010), companies may prefer to manipulate relativities in 
order to distort reported earnings, because the manipulation of accruals may be scrutinised by 
regulators and auditors in order to meet an earnings target. A number of studies demonstrate 
the way reported earnings might mislead in minimising the cost of products sold through the 
overproduction of inventory and decreasing discretionary expenditures. These include items 
such as research and development (R&D), advertising, selling, general, and administrative 
expenditures (Zang 2012, Roychowdhury 2006 and Zamri et al. 2013). The amount of 
abnormal production costs is used to measure the decrease in the cost of goods sold using the 
overproduction of inventory, since the fixed cost per unit reduces with growth in production 
volume (Kuo et al. 2014), while the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is used to 
measure the reduction in discretionary expenditures. 
Currently, it is more significant to emphasise that the data set of Roychowdhury (2006) is based 
on various firms, which have reported earnings that are more or less equal to zero. In other 
words, the data contains companies, which were suspected of practicing REM to exclude their 
losses completely. Despite the fact that usage of signed residuals that permits to examine the 
managerial invectives for engaging the EM to a particular direction also it does not allow 
anyone to test the general propensity for managing the earnings. To act accordingly, unsigned 
residuals were used for measuring the success of the company by properly handling the 
earnings as per the requirement (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). Simultaneously, the studies have 
estimated that signed residuals, using Roychowdhury's model for investigating the relationship 
existing between corporate governance mechanisms and EM, show the outcomes, which show 
earning-increasing or earning-decreasing effects, not the potentiality of these mechanisms in 
an uncomfortable EM practice. A few examples of these studies, for instance Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), have confirmed that SEO companies were engaged in increasing REM, while 
Demers and Wang (2010) show a negative association between REM and younger managers. 
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This explains that this type of outcome shows limited application for future research. 
Additionally, Roychowdhury’s (2006) model suffers from a key limitation that is associated 
with the substitution of sales manipulating activities. The sales growth is continually boosted 
by giving price discounts and different credit terms, all of which increases the current earnings 
period, so it results in lower cash flows in the current period (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Subsequently, the contributions, which are made by Roychowdhury, have been widely 
acknowledged for this model in the subsequent chapters of the study.  Consequently, the model 
is accepted by this thesis for a suitable estimation model, which constrains REM. 
This research follows Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010) and Athanasakou et al. (2011) to 
examine sales manipulation or abnormal operating cash flow, discretionary expenses 
(advertising, R&D and SG&A), and production costs (overproduction) as proxy of REM. 
5.5.2.1. SALES MANIPULATION OR ABNORMAL OPERATING CASH FLOW 
(CFO) 
In order to create an abnormal boost in sales, managers may reduce prices or offer lenient credit 
terms (Camara and Henderson 2009). Margins will be lower for the additional sales, resulting 
in a decrease in the cash flow per sale, but total earnings in the discounted period may rise, as 
a result of the increased volume of sales. Payment leniency reduces each flow (Roychowdhury 
2006).  
To detect sales-based manipulation, normal levels of cash flows from operations are estimated, 
for each industry and year, using the equation.  
𝐶𝐹𝑂i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1=  0 + β1 (1/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β2 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β3 (Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1) + 𝜀i𝑡     [5.11]   
Where  
CFOit:             operating cash flow for the firm i in period t. 
𝐴i𝑡−1:            total assets at the beginning of year Sales for the firm i in period t. 
Salestit:          net sales for the firm i in period t. 
(Δ) Salesit:    change in current sales for the firm i in period t. 





5.5.2.2. PRODUCTION COSTS (OVERPRODUCTION) (PROD) 
The manager uses overproduction to raise earnings by bringing down the fixed costs per unit 
and, thereby, reducing the cost of sales (Roychowdhury 2006). This study describes production 
costs as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in the value of inventory 
(Roychowdhury 2006). To measure abnormal production costs, following Roychowdhury 
(2006), this study will use the question:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑Cosit/𝐴i𝑡−1= 0 + β1 (1/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β2 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β3 (Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β4 
(Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡−1/𝐴i𝑡−1) + 𝜀i𝑡                             [5.12] 
Where:  
ProdCosit:   is production costs, calculated as the totality of costs of goods sold and changes 
of inventory for the firm i in period t. 
Abnormal production costs are measured as the residual value of equation (5.12).  
5.5.2.3. DISCRETIONARY EXPENSES (DEXP) 
Managers can adjust discretionary expenditures, including advertising expenses, R&D 
expenses and selling, general and administrative expenses, to raise earnings (Roychowdhury 
2006 and Cohen et al. 2008). Companies that opportunistically cut discretionary expenditures 
will have unusually low reported sales costs and correspondingly higher reported earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006), takes discretionary expenditure to include expenditures on research and 
development (R&D), advertising, selling, and general and administrative (SG&A) expenditure. 
Roychowdhurys’ Model (2006) assumes that discretionary expenditure is a linear function of 
sales.  
To measure discretionary expenses, following Roychowdhury (2006), the following equation 
is used:  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝i𝑡/𝐴i𝑡−1=  0 + β1 (1/𝐴i𝑡−1) + β2 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i𝑡−1/𝐴i𝑡−1) + 𝜀i𝑡      [5.13]      
Where: 
DiscExpit: is discretionary expenses, calculated as research and development (R&D), plus 




Abnormal discretionary expenses are detected using the residual value of equation (5.13) and 
used as a marker for the extent to which manipulation of discretionary expenses are being used 
to distort reports earnings. 
5.5.3. AGGREGATE REM MEASURES  
This examination consolidates the three different measures, which can be used to determine 
the widespread activities of REM. According to Zang (2006), this investigation multiples 
abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one 
and includes it in abnormal production costs. Furthermore, it consolidates them into a single 
measure, since, at the time of handling sales and/or discretionary expenses. Actual operating 
cash flows and actual discretionary expenses are not lower than operating cash flows and 
discretionary expenses estimated. The greater the aggregate measure amount, the more 
probable it is that the organization is involved in the activities of REM. 
In order to capture the total effects of REM, the measurement of aggregate REM has been 
developed. Gunny (2010) figures a variable aggregate REM as the sum of the residuals from 
the abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs multiplied by negative one. 
In current literature, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) develop and combine the 
three measures of REM to compute an aggregate measure of REM activities. By using the same 
metrics, they provide further evidence that these measures capture REM. For the First measure, 
RM_1, consistent with Zang (2006), multiply abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one 
and add it to abnormal production costs.1 A higher amount of this aggregate measure implies 
that suspect firm-years are more likely to be cutting discretionary expenses and overproduction 
to increase reported earnings. Thus,  
REM_1 = Ab_DISEX * (-1) + Ab_PROD                        (5.14) 
For the second measure, REM_2 – again, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang 
(2012) – abnormal cash flows from operations and the abnormal discretionary expenses are 
                                                          
1 Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), I do not multiply abnormal production costs by negative one because 
higher production costs are indicative of overproduction to reduce the cost of goods sold. I do not combine abnormal production 
costs and abnormal cash flows from operations because the same activities that lead to abnormally high production costs also 




multiplied by negative one and then aggregated into one measure.2 As for REM_1, I multiply 
it by negative one so that, the higher these amounts, the more likely it is that the firm is 
engaging in sales-based manipulation and cutting discretionary expenses to manage reported 
earnings upwards. Thus, 
REM_2 = Ab_CFO * (-1) + Ab_DISEX * (-1)                    (5.15) 
Even though single REM proxies have different implications for earnings, aggregating these 
measures may dilute the empirical results. 
 
5.6. MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (MECHANISMS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE) 
This research has examined the effect of the following mechanisms of corporate governance 
as independent variables in models, which have been chosen to represent the way manipulation 
of AEM and REM can be used to distort reported earnings: board characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics and ownership structures.  
5.6.1. BOARD CHARACTERISTICS  
This research contains the variables: board size, number of board meetings, board 
independence, and number of females on the board.  
5.6.1.2. BOARD SIZE (BSIZE) 
Following Abbott et al. (2004), Peasnell et al. (2000), Xie et al. (2003) and Badolato et al. 
(2014), this research measured board size as the total number of members of the board at the 
year-end. 
5.6.1.3. BOARD MEETINGS (BMEET) 
Following Vafeas (1999), Beasley et al. (2000) and Xie et al. (2003), this research measured 
the number of board meetings as the number of meetings held during the year.  
 
                                                          
2 Following the approach of Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) I multiply abnormal discretionary expenses and 
abnormal cash flows from operations by (-1) so that positive values represent income increasing REM to allow all measures 




5.6.1.4. BOARD INDEPENDENCE (BIND) 
Following Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Davidson et al. (2005), 
this research measured board independence as the proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  
5.6.1.5. FEMALES ON THE BOARD (BFEM) 
Following Velte (2016), this research measured the number of female directors on the board as 
a percentage of the total number of directors on the board. 
5.6.2. AUDIT COMMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS  
This research contains the following variables: audit committee size, number of audit 
committee meetings, audit committee independence, audit committee expertise and number of 
females on the audit committee.  
5.6.2.1. AUDIT COMMMITTEE SIZE (ACSIZE) 
Following Xie et al. (2003), Davidson (2005) and Farber (2005), the size of the audit committee 
is measured by the total number of audit committee members existing at the year end. 
5.6.2.2. AUDIT COMMMITTEE MEETINGS (ACMEET) 
Following Xie et al. (2003), Vafeas, (2005) and Davidson et al. (2005), this research measured 
the number of audit committee meetings as number of meetings held during the year.  
5.6.2.3. AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE (ACIND) 
Following Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005), this research 
measured audit committee independence as a percentage of the total number of independent 
members on the audit committee board. 
 5.6.2.4. AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE (ACEXPE) 
Following Madi et al. (2014), Albring et al. (2014) and Kankanamage (2015) this research 
measured audit committee expertise as the percentage of members on the audit committee with 
academic and professional qualifications in accounting or finance and financial accounting 
expertise. 
5.6.3. MEASUREMENT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  




5.6.3.1. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP (MOWNE) 
This research measured managerial ownership as the percentage of total shares of the company 
that were owned by managers of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year (Drakos and 
Bekiris 2010, Bhagat and Bolton 2008 and Florackis et al. 2009). 
5.6.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP (INSTITU 3%) 
Following Chung et al. (2002), Jiambalvo et al. (2002) and Koh (2003) this research measured 
Institutional Ownership as the proportion of shares held by institutions which each control at 
least 3% of the total. 
5.7. MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES  
Zang (2012) and Abernathy et al. (2014) identified the control variables incorporated in this 
research such as firm size, leverage, return on assets, firm growth and Big 4 auditors. These 
five factors control measurement errors at any rate to some extent, in the selected proxies for 
EM. This investigation directs different components that have been observed to be identified 
with the variation of corporate governance or which may increase AEM.  
The present study states that estimating the connection between the factors of EM and corporate 
governance without control factors will probably prompt misspecification issues and 
heteroscedasticity in the models of EM (Habbash et al. 2014, Jaggi et al. 2009 and Kothari et 
al. 2005). Consequently, this research uses five control variables in addition to the independent 
variables that have been discussed in the previous sections. Many investigations have reported 
that control variables are significant in guaranteeing that the focus of tests will be more 
precisely on the distinctions made by the inequalities in EM (Habbash et al. 2014, Rahman et 
al. 2013 and Dechow et al. 1995). These control variables are examined independently in the 
following section, alongside the estimation technique for every factor. 
5.7.1. FIRM SIZE (FSIZE) 
A control variable, firm size is influenced by means of size proposition. Bigger firms will 
probably draw the consideration of antitrust enactment because of their high monopoly rents 
or reported profits.  Antitrust enactment has the ability to reorganise resources from these large 
firms. Large firms’ managers prefer to oversee accounting discretion, keeping in mind that the 
end goal is to reduce earnings (Watts and Zimmerman 1978).  However, bigger firms are more 
closely examined by outsiders, for example investment/financial investigators, than the smaller 
firms (Hussain 2000 and Hussain 1996).  This will lessen the managers’ opportunities to 
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exercise EM (Koh 2003).  Besides, information asymmetry is frequently small in substantial 
firms since they make more information public, which thus lessens the requirements for the 
practices of EM (LaFond and Watts 2008).  
Following Simunic (1980), Abbott et al. (2003) and Carcello et al. (2002), this research 
measured company size as natural logarithm of the total assets of the company. 
5.7.2. LEVERAGE (FLEVER) 
Leverage discusses in more detail about debt contracting inspirations for EM. Excessive 
leverage leads to a greater threat for a firm abusing its debt covenants (Press and Weintrop 
1990), and the infringement of debt covenants is identified with the choice to utilise AEM to 
manage earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). The firms having high leverage motivate their 
managers by providing incentives to practice AEM to avoid violating debt covenants.  
Furthermore, a ratio of higher leverage is related to excessive costs of debt financing (Piot and 
Janin 2007).  Because of the increase in debt, organisations may practise the wage expanding 
profit administration, keeping in mind the end goal to show a more advantageous financial 
position while consulting with lenders. 
Following Lee et al. (2012), Zamri et al. (2013), Zhu et al. (2015), Jha (2013), Kuo et al. (2014) 
and Arsov and Naumoski (2016) this research measured leverage as the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. 
5.7.3. RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 
Whilst agreeing with most of the past investigations into both EM and corporate governance, 
this examination will control for the performance of firms.  Various examinations, for example, 
Kothari et al. (2005) and Carter et al. (2003), demonstrate that not including the control variable 
return on assets in EM research may bring about a negative model. They propose that, for 
clarifying a company's reputation, return on assets is an advantageous measure. 
The earlier works by Jha (2013), and Swai and Mbogela (2016) revealed that the most widely 
recognised profitability measure is return on assets. Following Carter et al. (2003), Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) and Kothari et al. (2005), this research measured profitability as net income 
divided by lagged total assets.  
5.7.4. FIRM GROWTH (FGROW) 
Sales growth is expected to influence EM, as sales growth will influence accruals, for example, 
receivables and inventory. In addition, a large growth in sales regularly inflates the market's 
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desires for future cash flows, and that will influence EM (Ahmed and Duellman 2007). 
Companies which have fast growth may, likewise, be experiencing tension to keep up or 
surpass expected growth rates, urging their managers to take part in EM to accomplish a 
targeted rate of growth, or to cover downturns (Carcello and Nagy 2004). 
Following Adam and Goyal (2008) and Li and Kuo (2017), this research measured firm growth 
as the change in total assets over lagged total assets.  
5.7.5. BIG 4 AUDITORS (BIG 4) 
It is broadly acknowledged that Big 4 firms give greater audit quality over non-Big 4 firms 
(Becker et al. 1998 and Teoh and Wong 1993). Earlier literature recommends that bigger audit 
firms have a tendency to convey a higher quality of audit than smaller, less outstanding firms 
do. This is because they are less ready to accept the strategies of questionable accounting and 
will probably distinguish and report inconsistencies and errors (Becker et al. 1998). In addition, 
Palmrose (1986) and Palmrose (1988) revealed that Big 4 review firms procure reduced the 
experimental investigations. Additionally, Craswell et al. (1995), Fleischer (2017) and Hong-
jo et al. (2017) recommend that Big 4 auditors have greater quality of audit.  
Following El-Helaly et al. (2018), this research measured Big 4 auditors as a dummy variable 
given the value 1, if the firm uses one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
5.7.6 ALTMAN’S Z_SCORE (Z-SCORE) 
Altman’s Z-Score is a composite measure of default risk. It depends on the weighted average 
of a company’s financial ratios (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). A company’s Z-score gives an 
indication of the overall financial health of the company (Agrawal and Chatterjee, 2015). A 
poor Z-score might tempt its managers to distort reported earnings (Lara et al. 2012).  
Lara et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2012) did find a negative relationship between a company’s 
Z-score and the extent to which the company’s managers had manipulated real activities to 
distort reported earnings. 
Similarly, Jha (2013) found a negative relation between a company Z-Score and its 
discretionary accruals. Zang (2012) has countered that financially healthy companies can more 
easily manipulate earnings. Furthermore, Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015) agree with Zang and 
have warned lenders and investors to be cautious. Zang reports a positive correlation between 
company Z-scores and the manipulation of REM. Ghazali et al. (2015) report the same impact 
on accruals in Malaysia. 
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Overall, however, there is a shortage of empirical research linking Altman’s Z-Score and the 
distortion of reported earnings, by manipulation of either accruals or real activities. This does 
not inhibit Zang from her speculation that managers in companies characterised by poor 
financial health; might perceive real activities manipulations as relatively costly, since the 
primary goal of operational managers remains to improve operations. Therefore, she 
hypothesises that poor financial health in companies might lead the company’s managers to 
favour the manipulation of accruals rather than real activities (Saunders and Cornett, 2006).  
In Altman’s model, any score less than 1.81 indicates a high risk of default. Consistent with 
Yang (2010), Lara et al. (2012), Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015), Zang (2012), Jha (2013), 
Roychowdhury (2006), and Zhu et al. (2015). Lara et al. (2012) wonder whether suspect 
companies might manipulate accruals and/or activities so as to just beat or meet important 
earnings benchmarks. Companies with zero earnings might thereby be one candidate group of 
companies worthy of investigation (Zang, 2012). Regarding Yang (2010), Lara et al. (2012), 
Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015), Zang (2012) and Jha (2013), this research measured the Z-
score as this equation.  
1.2 (Working capitalTotal assets) +1.4 (Retained earningsTotal assets) +3.3 (EBIT Total 
assets) +0.6 (Market value of equityTotal liabilities) + 1.0 (SalesTotal assets)  
5.8. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH MODELS  
It is articulated that the costs of each type of EM represent an important factor that might affect 
managers’ decisions concerning the extent to which each type is used to arrive at the desired 
levels of earnings. Moreover, the timing of each type of manipulation is also another important 
factor. On the one hand, AEM takes place at the end of the fiscal year. However, if the accruals 
available for manipulation have been constrained by the manipulation in prior periods and/or 
the scrutiny of auditors, firms might run the risk of a shortfall on meeting target earnings 
(Gunny, 2010). On the other hand, the manipulation of real activities must take place during a 
fiscal period, because such manipulation would not affect reported earnings if practiced at the 
end of the financial period. Therefore, Zang (2012) concludes that managers use accruals and 
real activities manipulation strategies in sequential order. Based on this reasoning, Zang (2012) 
explores whether costs that managers bear, and constraints they face for manipulating accruals, 
would affect their decisions about real activities manipulations.  
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To investigate how manager’s trade off real versus accrual-based earnings management, this 
study estimates the following Zang (2012), the trade-off between REM and AEM can be 
modelled: 
 
EQUATION NUMBER (4.8) 
REM𝑖𝑡=𝛽0+𝛽1BSIZE𝑖𝑡+𝛽2 BMEET𝑖𝑡+𝛽3 BIND𝑖𝑡 +𝛽4 BFEM𝑖𝑡+𝛽5 ACSIZE𝑖𝑡+𝛽6 
ACMEET𝑖𝑡+𝛽7 ACIND𝑖𝑡+𝛽8 ACEXP𝑖𝑡+𝛽9 MOWEN𝑖𝑡+𝛽10 INSTITU 3%𝑖𝑡 +𝛽11 FSIZE𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽12 FLEVER𝑖𝑡+𝛽13 ROA𝑖𝑡+𝛽14 FGROW𝑖𝑡+𝛽15 BIG4𝑖𝑡 +𝛽16 Z-score+ ɛit            [5.16] 
This allows positive and negative changes in sales to have different coefficients.  
 
EQUATION NUMBER (4.9) 
AEM𝑖𝑡=𝛽0+𝛽1BSIZE𝑖𝑡+𝛽2 BMEET𝑖𝑡+𝛽3 BIND𝑖𝑡 +𝛽4 BFEM𝑖𝑡+𝛽5 ACSIZE𝑖𝑡+𝛽6 
ACMEET𝑖𝑡+𝛽7 ACIND𝑖𝑡+𝛽8 ACEXP𝑖𝑡+𝛽9 MOWEN𝑖𝑡+𝛽10 INSTITU 3%𝑖𝑡 +𝛽11 FSIZE𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽12 FLEVER𝑖𝑡+𝛽13 ROA𝑖𝑡+𝛽14 FGROW𝑖𝑡+𝛽15 BIG4𝑖𝑡 +𝛽16 Z-score+ 𝛽17 Unexpected 
REM it + ɛit            [5.17] 
Where REM is REM_1 and REM_2. AEM is discretionary accrual (modified Jones model and 
Kothari model). In equation (5.17), unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation 
(5.16). Return on assets (ROA) is included to control for performance only in the regression of 
modify Jones model and REM because the Kothari model has already been estimated that 
includes ROA as a driver 
The hypotheses are that the cost of each action determines the trade-off decisions between 
AEM and REM. When the cost of REM is high then managers turn towards AEM, and vice 
versa. Following Zang (2012), equations (6) and (7) capture the order between the different 
EM methods. Importantly, the level of REM depends on the recognised costs of both REM and 
AEM but does not depend on the level of AEM. In contrast, AEM depends on the identified 
costs of both REM and AEM but also depends on the level of the unexpected amount of REM 
(Unexpected_REM). The recursive model aims to capture the sequential relationship between 
accruals and real activities earnings management. Therefore, the residual values from the first 
equation (Unexpected_REM) are included in the second equation, because the extent of AEM 
is determined by the unexpected amount of real activities manipulation realised along with the 
costs associated with EM activities. 
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TABLE (5.3) SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND THEIR MEASUREMENTS  
 
Symbol Variable Operationalisation 
AEM Accrual-based  
Earnings 
The Modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. 




Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) to estimate real earnings 
management: 
REM_1 multiply abnormal discretionary expense by negative one and add it to 
abnormal production costs then aggregated as one measure. 
REM_2 abnormal cash flows from operations and the abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by negative one and then aggregated into one measure. 
BSIZE Board size The board size represents the total number of board directors. 
BMEET Board meetings The number of board meetings held annually by the board of directors. 
BIND Board independence The proportion of independent non-executive directors to total board members. 
BFEM Female on the board  The percentage of female directors to total board directors.                   
ACSIZE Audit committee size the total number of audit committee members existing at the year end 
ACMEET Audit committee 
meetings 
The annual audit committee meetings. 
ACIND Audit committee 
independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors in the audit committee to 
total committee members. 
ACEXP Audit committee 
expertise 




The percentage of total shares held by directors divided by the total number of 
shares. 
INSTITU 3% Institutional 
ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors 
 3% or more FSIZE Firm size the natural log of the total assets 
FLEVER Leverage total liabilities divided by total assets       
ROA Return on assets The earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets 
FGROW Sale growth the change in total assets scaled by total assets 







1.2 (Working capitalTotal assets) + 1.4 (Retained earningsTotal assets) + 3.3




5.9. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES  
Statistical multivariate data analysis can be classified as parametric and non-parametric. 
Researchers choose between parametric and non-parametric analysis depending on the 
characteristics of the data. Gujarati (2003) proposed five things to be considered when choosing 
a method of multivariate analysis: 
1) Normality: is the data normally distributed? 
2) Linearity: is the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable 
linear? 
3) Homoscedasticity: is the standard deviation of the dependent variable homogenous?  
4) Independence of error terms: is there risk of serial or autocorrelation? 
5) Multicollinearity: is there inter-correlation amongst the predictors in the model? 
 To check whether it is more appropriate in this research to use parametric or non-parametric 
analysis several tests will be employed to answer the above questions. 
Firstly, the histogram test will be used to check the normality problem (see Appendix 1). 
Secondly, the linearity problem will be examined using the Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q plot) test. 
Thirdly, this study will use the Breusch-Pagan/Cook- Weisberg and White’s general tests to 
test for heteroscedasticity. Fourthly, the pairwise Pearson correlation matrix and VIF tests will 
be applied to check for independence and multicollinearity problems. 
5.10. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
The present section viewed the panel regression analysis, which is the most general 
multivariate analysis method (Dougherty 2011). Through this test the association between EM 
and corporate governance practices is identified with cross-sectional panel regressions 
(Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008 and Peni and Vähämaa 2010). Panel data is recognised as 
a suitable model for studies of time-series for the reason that it distinguishes between the data 
of time-series and several organisations and it permits practitioners to remove any 
imperceptible heterogeneity among the sample of study (Himmelberg et al. 1999). There are, 
however, some econometric issues that need to be considered.  
Firstly, the Breusch and Pagan LM test needs to be used to evaluate whether the model fits 
both panel and pooled models. The result of the test is highly significant for all models (see 
Appendix 2), meaning that panel data is more fitting (Gujarati 2008). To make the choice 
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between random and fixed effect, the Hausman (1978) test will be used (McKnight and Weir 
2009). An insignificant result in the Hausman test will show that the random effects estimation 
can be used. 
The outcomes of models in both countries were not significant and, hence, the study could 
reject the null hypothesis (fixed effects) in favour of using the random effect method. However, 
there were significant models in both countries and, hence, the study could reject the null 























5.11. SUMMARY  
This chapter began with a discussion on research methodology and research paradigm. In 
addition, this chapter discussed the multiple regression models that will be used to test the 
hypotheses of this study. Also, this chapter develops a set of hypotheses to address the thesis 
research questions. Eleven primary hypotheses are presented, reflecting the research questions. 
The adopted methodology is justified by the objectivist (realism) ontological position and 
positive epistemology. Therefore, the hypothetic-deductive approach (examining theory) 
seems to be the appropriate approach for this study. This chapter provides a rationale for the 
choices and sample selections that have been made.  
This thesis uses a panel cross-sectional regression analysis to examine the impact of the 
independent variables on possible trade-off between AEM and REM behaviour. This chapter 
has described the use of two proxies for EM; discretionary accruals are the dependent variable 
of the AEM model and are computed from the modified Jones (1995) model, and Kothari 
model (2005). REM is computed from Roychowdhury’s (2006) model and, following Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), develops and combine the three measures of REM to 
compute an aggregate measure of REM activities. REM_1 – and REM_2.  
This chapter has discussed the choice of data collection techniques and different data sources, 
and their use, to collect research data. This research employs data from 223 of the UK non-
financial companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange FTSE 350, and 212 private 












CHAPTER SIX: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN 
AEM AND REM; RESULTS AND DISCUSSION IN THE UK AND INDIA 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are tested using the methods reported in Chapter 4. The 
results of the tests of the hypotheses are reported in this chapter. This chapter aims to establish 
whether corporate governance affects trade-off decisions between AEM and REM in the UK 
and India sample.  
This chapter is divided as follows: section 5.2 presents and discusses the descriptive statistics 
and univariate analysis; Section 5.3 presents and discusses a Correlation Matrix; Section 5.4 
discusses the results of the testing, and finally, section 5.5 presents the summary of this chapter. 
6.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This section presents the descriptive statistics results for the variables used in the extended EM 
models. The absolute values of discretionary accruals are calculated as a proxy for AEM using 
the modified Jones model (1995), Kothari model (2005) and REM1, REM2 and the aggregate 
real activities, are used as proxies for REM using the Roychowdhury (2006) model.  
The descriptive statistics of AEM in the UK are presented in Table 6.1; they show that the 
mean current value using the modified Jones model is 0.06, whereas the minimum and 
maximum values are 0.0005 and 0.81 respectively. Also, Table 6.1 shows that the mean current 
value using the Kothari model is 0.04, whereas the minimum and maximum values are 0.005 
and 0.90. Kothari et al. (2005) report mean abnormal accruals close to zero. The findings in 
Table 6.1 are consistent with prior research by Habbash (2010), who found that the mean was 
0.07 and that the minimum was 0.00001 of the absolute value of AEM in the UK companies. 
However, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) found the mean to be 0.06, and Arun et al. (2015), 
found the mean to be − 0.020. These results are not consistent with the results in Table 6.1, 
which show that the mean values of REM1, REM2 and aggregate REM in the UK are 0.005, 
0.043 and 0.0004 respectively. The mean value is consistent with Gunny (2010) who reports a 
zero mean for both REM1 and REM2. Furthermore, the means of REM1 and REM2 proxies 
are both positive, which means that the REM1 and REM2 are consistent with the findings of 
prior studies (e.g., Zang, 2012). The mean value of REM is less than the results obtained by 
Alhadab et al. (2015), in the UK, and Osma (2008), in the US, who found that the mean values 
of the aggregate of REM were 0.42 and 0.35 respectively. 
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In the Indian sample, Table 6.2 shows that the mean current value of the modified Jones model 
is 0.05, whereas the minimum and maximum values are -0.38 and 0.78 respectively. Also, 
Table 6.2 shows that the mean current value of the Kothari model is 0.06, whereas the minimum 
and maximum values are -0.06 and 0.788. Kothari et al. (2005) report mean abnormal accruals 
close to zero. The mean absolute value of AEM is lower than that which has been reported in 
Indian studies by Sarkar et al. (2008), Rajpal (2012) and Houqe et al. (2017), who found that 
the mean values of AEM were 0.09, 0.09 and 0.06 respectively.  
Table 6.2 shows that the mean value of aggregate REM, REM1 and REM2 in India are 0.018, 
0.022 and 0.020 respectively. The mean value is consistent with Gunny (2010), who reports a 
zero mean of aggregate REM, REM1 and REM2. Furthermore, the mean of REM_1 and 
REM_2 proxies are both positive meaning that the aggregate REM, REM_1 and REM_2 
measures are consistent with the finding of prior studies (e.g., Zang, 2012). These results are 
lower than the results obtained in a previous study in India by Enomoto et al. (2015) and Das 
et al. (2017), who found that the mean values of REM were 0.61 and 0.26 respectively.  
Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables of the corporate governance 
characteristics. The average board size was 9 members. The maximum value for the board size 
was 22 members and the minimum value was 4 members. The result was comparable to UK 
studies such as Peasnell et al. (2005) and Beekes et al. (2004) who reported that the average 
board size was 8 members. Habbash (2010) found that the average board size was 9 members. 
Rahman et al. (2013) and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) found that the average board size 
was 9 members. Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) found the average board size was 9 members. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, p. 12) states, “the code does not suggest a specific 
number of board members”. Despite the prior UK studies having different periods and samples, 
the results are compatible. 
From the Indian perspective, the average board size was 11 members. This study shows a 
higher mean board size than prior Indian studies, such as Thyil and Young (2009), who found 
that the average board size was 8 members. However, the result is consistent with other Indian 
studies, (e.g. Kumari and Pattanayak 2014 and Balasubramanian et al. 2010). 
The average number of board meetings was approximately 8 times per year. The maximum 
value for the Board meetings was 19 members and the minimum value was 3 members. The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) states that “the board shall meet at least three times in 
a year”. The result is consistent with prior UK studies such as Rahman et al. (2013), Al-Najjar 
109 
 
(2011), Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), and Habbash (2010). Overall, all results have the 
same number of board meetings; they were consistent with the study’s finding.  
In the Indian context, the average number of board meetings was 6 times per year. The 
recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) require “the board shall meet at least 
four times in a year”. The result shows the sampled companies met more frequently than laid 
down in the Indian code. This result is consistent with previous studies using India data, such 
as Jackling and Johl (2009) and Jaiswall and Banerjee (2012). On the other hand, the result is 
higher than some Indian studies but lower than others, such as the studies by Kapoor and Goel 
(2017) and Balasubramanian et al. (2010) who found that the mean numbers of board meetings 
were 5 and 7 times a year respectively. 
The board independence has a mean of 50%, which complies with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) that recommends at least half of the board members should be 
independent non-executive directors. This finding is higher than the results of other UK studies, 
such as O'Sullivan (2000), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Habbash (2010), who reported that the 
mean values of independent non-executive directors were 41%, 43%, and 44% respectively. 
Nevertheless, the result is close to the UK study by Basiruddin (2011) and Rahman et al. 
(2013); they found that the average board independence figures were 46% and 46.13% 
respectively. 
In the Indian sample, the mean value of independent directors was 52%. The recommendations 
of the Indian Companies Act (2013) state “where the chairperson of the board of directors is a 
non-executive director, at least one-third of the board of directors shall comprise of 
independent directors and where the listed entity does not have a regular non-executive 
chairperson, at least half of the board of directors shall comprise of independent directors” 
(Vaibhavi and Soundarya 2015). The results show that the percentages of independent board 
members are the same as in Indian studies by Hassan et al. (2017). Thus, they show that 
percentages of board independents are higher than found in Indian studies by Balasubramanian 
and George (2012) and Kapoor and Goel (2017) who found that the mean numbers of 
independent non-executive directors were 45% and 49% respectively. However, it shows lower 
percentages of independent directors, 55% and 56% respectively, than reported by Sarkar et al. 
(2008) and Kumari and Pattanayak (2014) from their Indian samples. 
The mean number of females on the board was 11%. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010) recommends, “The appointment of directors should take into account the gender 
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diversity of the board” (Council, F.R. 2012). The results are higher than those found by Singh 
and Vinnicombe, (2004) and Habbash (2010), in the UK. These studies found figures of 6.4% 
and 7% respectively. However, other studies such as Arun et al. (2015), in the UK, found that 
the mean number of female directors was 12%.  
In the Indian context, the mean proportion of females on the board was 6%. The 
recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) states that “all companies listed on stock 
exchanges must have at least one woman on its board of directors” (Vaibhavi and Soundarya 
2015). The results are consistent with an Indian study by Saeed et al. (2017). However, the 
result is higher than prior Indian studies by Balasubramanian et al. (2010) and Jhunjhunwala 
and Mishra (2012), who found that the mean proportion of females on the board was 5%.  
The mean of the number of members on the audit committees was 3.6 members. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010), suggests that “the minimum number of audit committee 
members should be three directors”. The results are similar to those found in other UK studies. 
For example, Mangena and Tauringana (2008) and Al-Najjar (2011) report an average audit 
committee size of 3.4 and 3.8 members respectively. Rahman et al.  (2013), Habbash (2010) 
and Basiruddin (2011), using UK samples, found that audit committee sizes averaged 3.55, 
3.58, and 3.6 members respectively. These results suggest significant compliance with the UK 
Code.  
In the Indian sample, the mean number of members; on the audit committees was 4. The 
recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) requires “audit committees to consist of 
a minimum of three members” (Mishra and Malhotra 2016). The result is consistent with an 
Indian study by Mishra and Malhotra (2016) and Gurusamy (2017). 
The mean number of audit committee meetings was 4 times per year. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010, states, "It is recommended there should be no fewer than three 
meetings during the year". The result is consistent with the UK Code. The result is also similar 
to findings in recent UK studies, such as Al-Najjar (2011), Rahman et al. (2013) and Basiruddin 
(2011). Both these studies reported, in all their studies, that audit committees met, on average, 
4 times a year. However, the result is higher than that found in the study by Habbash (2010), 
who found that audit committees met, on average, 3 times a year. 
In the Indian context, the mean number of audit committee meetings was 5 times per year. The 
recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) stipulate, “the laws require audit 
committees to meet at least four times in a year” (Mishra and Malhotra 2016). The result is 
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consistent with the Indian studies by Mishra and Malhotra (2016) and Bansal, and Sharma 
(2016). 
The average number of independent non-executive directors on audit committees was around 
83%. The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 recommends, “An audit committee is 
composed of a minimum of three independent directors”. This result indicates strong 
compliance with the UK corporate governance code. The same result, in a prior UK study by 
Habbash (2010), was reported to be 83%. In addition, it is slightly higher than the 72% reported 
by Basiruddin (2011). It is, however, lower than the 95%, and 89% reported in UK studies by 
Rahman et al.  (2013) and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017). 
In the Indian sample, the average percentage of independent directors on audit committees was 
83%. The recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) requires that “at least two-
thirds of audit committee members should be independent directors”. (Krishna et al. 2017). 
The results are slightly higher than the Indian study by Kapoor and Goel (2017), who found 
that the average value of independent directors on audit committees was 80%. The result is 
lower than that found in the Indian study by Mishra and Malhotra (2016); they found that the 
mean of independent directors on audit committees was 98%. 
The mean number of members of the audit committee having financial experience was 84%.  
According to the Corporate Governance Code 2010, “the board should satisfy itself that at least 
one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience”. The result 
reported in Table 6.1 shows some non-compliance with the UK corporate governance code 
2010. The result is slightly higher than reported in prior UK studies, such as Mangena and Pike 
(2005), Habbash (2010), Rahman et al. (2013) and Zaman et al. (2011), who found that the 
mean number of members of the audit committee having relevant financial experience was 
74%, 77%, 69% and 71% respectively. On the other hand, the results are lower than those 
found in previous UK studies, such as by Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), who found that the 
mean numbers of members having financial experience on audit committees was 90%. 
In the Indian case, the mean value of members of the audit committee having financial 
experience was 66%. The recommendations of the Indian Companies Act (2013) requires that 
“at least one member shall have accounting or related financial management expertise and all 
members of the audit committee shall be financially literate” (Mishra and Malhotra 2016). The 
results are higher than reported in prior Indian studies by Mishra and Malhotra (2016), who 
found that the mean value of financially experienced members on audit committees was 62%. 
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However, this result’s finding is lower than in the study reported by Balasubramanian et al. 
(2010), using Indian data, who found that the mean value of members having financial 
experience on the audit committee was 96%.   
The mean figure of managerial ownership was 5%. The result is higher than prior UK studies 
such as Bos et al. (2013), Habbash (2013), Basiruddin (2011) and Peasnell et al. (2005). Using 
UK data, they found that the mean levels of managerial ownership were 2%, 3%, 4% and 2% 
respectively. The results of this study are lower than some UK studies, for example O’Sullivan 
(2000) and Yu et al. (2015), who found mean directors’ holdings of 6% and 7% respectively. 
The difference in results between different UK samples may reflect the different time periods 
studied.  
In the Indian case, the mean value of managerial ownership was 50%. The result is similar to 
prior Indian studies such as those of Jaiswall and Banerjee (2012) and Sarkar et al. (2013). 
However, the result was higher than found in prior studies, such as Mishra and Malhotra 
(2016), who found that the mean level of managerial ownership was 38%. In addition, this 
study reported lower percentage holdings than other Indian studies, such as those reported by 
Bansal and Sharma (2016) and Sarkar et al. (2008). These studies found that the mean values 
of managerial ownership were 52% and 56% respectively.  
The average value of institutional owners holding at least 3% of the shares was 37%. The 
finding is higher than that reported in previous UK studies such as Habbash (2010), O’Sullivan 
(2000) and Rahman et al.  (2013) who reported that the average institutional ownership was 
24%, 32% and 25% respectively. The results of this study are lower than some UK studies. For 
instance, Yu et al. (2015) reported that the mean of institutional ownership was 38%.   
In the Indian context, the average value of institutional ownership was 15%. The result is lower 
than previous Indian results, such as Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) and Jaiswall and Banerjee 
(2012) who found that the average percentages of institutional owners were 35% and 33% 
respectively. It is possible that the average shareholding of institutional owners is low because 
India is a developing country where the practice of institutional ownership has not yet 
developed fully (Khanna and Palepu 2000).  
The average of firm size was 6.22. The result is similar to prior UK studies such as Basiruddin 
(2011) and Habbash (2010) who found the mean firm size was 6 in both studies. However, it 
is less than prior UK studies, such as Yu (2015), who found that the average firm size was 11. 
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On the other hand, it is higher than the study by Arun et al. (2015), using a UK sample, who 
found the mean firm size, was 3.  
In the Indian sample, the average firm size was 7.5. The results are lower than prior Indian 
studies, such as those conducted by Mishra and Malhotra (2016) and Ajay and Madhumathi 
(2015) and Kumar and Singh (2013), who found that the mean sizes of the firms were 10, 10.4 
and 9 respectively. However, Sarkar et al. (2008) and Gurusamy (2017) and Das et al. (2017) 
found the mean firm size was lower than the results in Table 6.2; they reported findings of 3. 
3.5 and 3.6 respectively. 
The mean leverage of firms was 55%. This result is slightly high compared to prior UK studies, 
e.g. Rahman et al.  (2013) and Sarkar et al. (2008) and Habbash (2010) and Katmon and Al 
Farooque (2017), who found that the mean leverages were 24%, 32%, 25% and 42% 
respectively. On the other hand, the results are lower than found in previous UK studies, such 
as by Kuang and Qin (2009), who used the 244 largest UK firms, and Velte (2018) who used 
a sample of 660 firm years' observations from 2014 to 2015. They found that the mean leverage 
was 57% and 58% respectively.  
In the Indian case, the mean value of Leverage was 53%. The results are lower than comparable 
prior Indian studies, such as Kapoor and Goel (2017) and Das et al. (2017), who found that the 
mean values of Leverage were 81% and 57% respectively. However, the result is higher than 
Indian studies such as Houqe et al. (2015) and Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) and Ghosh (2011) 
and Kumar and Singh (2013), who found that the average values of Leverage were 50%, 24%, 
37% and 25% respectively.  
The mean return on assets was 12%. This result is slightly high compared to figures found in 
UK prior literature, e.g. Yu (2015) and Rahman et al. (2013) and Arun et al (2015) and Habbash 
(2010), who found that the mean returns on assets were 6%, 7.6%, 10% and 11% respectively. 
In the Indian context, the mean return on assets was 13%. The results are lower than in prior 
studies, such as Mishra and Malhotra (2016) and Das et al. (2017), who found that the mean 
returns on assets were 22% and 15% respectively. However, they show higher results than 
Indian studies such as Bansal and Sharma (2016) and Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) and Ghosh 
(2011), who found that the mean returns on assets, were 9%, 8% and 6% respectively.  
The average sales growth was 8%. The result is higher than in UK studies by Rahman et al.  
(2013) who found that the mean value of sales growth was 5%. On the other hand, the results 
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are lower than found in previous UK studies, such as by Habbash (2010), who found that, the 
mean sales growth was 12%. 
In the Indian case, the average growth of the firms was 18%. The finding is slightly lower than 
reported in a prior Indian study by Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) who found firm growth of 
23.6%.  
The mean of the Big 4 audits was 71%. This result is lower than the 79% and 96% reported by 
Ferguson et al. (2004) and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) respectively, using UK data. In 
addition, Table 6.1 shows a result lower than the 96% and 91% reported by Rahman et al.  
(2013) and Velte (2018) using UK firms. This difference may be attributed to the different time 
horizon.  
In the Indian sample, with regard to the Big 4 auditors, the result shows that 26% of the sample 
firms have been audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. The result is similar to prior Indian 
studies, for example Das et al. (2017). However, the result is higher than the 20% and 17%, 
respectively, reported by Chittoor et al. (2012) and Houqe et al. (2017). In contrast, the result 
is lower than the 39% and 50% reported by Huber, (2011) and Hassan et al. (2017) respectively. 
The mean value of financial distress is reported at 1.30, which is lower than the required value 
of 1.8 for the company to be classified as healthy (Demirkan and Platt, 2009). The result is 
higher than the 0.73, 0.12 and 1.2 reported by Ghazali et al. (2015), Akbar et al. (2017), 
Martínez-Ferrero, et al. (2016) respectively. On the other hand, the results are lower than 5.525 
and 2.34 repotred by Abernathy et al. (2014) and Lanier et al. (2019). 
In the Indian sample, the mean value of financial distress is reported at 1.59, which is lower 
than the required value of 1.8 for the company to be classified as healthy (Demirkan and Platt, 
2009). The result is higher than the 0.99, 0.79 reported by Selahudin, N.F., (2014.) for Thailand 
and Malaysia respectively.  Also, it is higher than the 1.22 reported by Agrawal and Chatterjee 








TABLE (6.1) DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF AEM AND REM, MECHANISMS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES IN THE UK 
Variable N Mean Stan-Dev Minim Maxim 
AEMJones 2230 0.06063 0.0778 -0.0005 0.816 
AEMKothari 2230 0.04937 0.0866 -0.00578 0.902 
REM 2230 0.00044 0.2763 -0.2511 0.8992 
REM_1 2230 0.00524 0.2598 -0.0057 0.9367 
REM_2 2230 0.04321 0.1862 0.0469 0.5381 
BSIZE 2230 9.33 2.55 4 22 
BMEET 2230 8.42 2.47 3 19 
BIND 2230 0.50 0.10 0.11 0.88 
BFEM 2230 0.11 0.10 0 0.40 
ACSIZE 2230 3.65 0.88 2 8 
ACMEET 2230 4.08 1.54 2 13 
ACIND 2230 0.83 0.16 0.25 1 
ACEXP 2230 0.84 0.18 0.25 1 
MOWNE 2230 0.05 0.06 0.001 0.53 
INSTITU 3% 2230 0.37 0.16 0.03 0.78 
FSIZE 2230 6.22 0.71 4.04 8.69 
FLEVER 2230 0.55 0.29 0.003 5.74 
ROA 2230 0.12 0.37 0.00 4.17 
FGROW 2230 0.08 0.56 -0.99 5.18 
Big 4  2230 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Z-score 2230 1.306 0.898 -4.502 5.029 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management 
by using Kothari Model. REM, REM1 and REM2= real earnings management. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total 
numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND 
= Board of Director Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of 
female directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. 
ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent 
non-executive directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial 
qualification and experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. 
INSTITU 3% = the percentage of Institutional ownership of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural 
log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, 
measured by ROA (net income before interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled 
by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-4 auditors, 
and 0 otherwise. Z-SCORE= refers to Altman’s Z-Score.  
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TABLE (6.2) DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF AEM AND REM, MECHANISMS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES IN INDIA 
Variable N Mean Stan-Dev Minim Maxim 
AEMJones 2120 0.052 0.101 -0.382 0.788 
AEMKothari 2120 0.065 0.184 -0.065 0.765 
REM 2120 0.018 0.329 -0. 0.976 
REM_1 2120 0.022 0.311 -0.949 0.922 
REM_2 2120 0.020 0.245 -0.961 0.951 
BSIZE 2120 10.51 3.22 4 24 
BMEET 2120 6.24 2.29 4 14 
BIND 2120 0.52 0.10 0.2 0.71 
BFEM 2120 0.06 0.08 0 0.43 
ACSIZE 2120 4.22 1.36 3 10 
ACMEET 2120 4.82 1.36 2 12 
ACIND 2120 0.83 0.15 0.25 1 
ACEXP 2120 0.66 0.21 0.25 1 
MOWNE 2120 0.50 0.15 0.11 0.88 
INSTITU 3% 2120 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.82 
FSIZE 2120 7.59 0.68 4.88 9.74 
FLEVER 2120 0.53 0.49 0.05 8.56 
ROA 2120 0.13 0.25 -0.45 5.91 
FGROW 2120 0.18 0.45 -0.99 8.34 
Big 4  2120 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Z-score 2120 1.593 0.935 -1.235 6.232 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using 
Kothari Model. REM, REM1 and REM2= real earnings management. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board 
members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director 
Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board 
of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the 
percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% = the percentage of Institutional ownership 
of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by 
total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is 




6.3. MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST  
Multicollinearity can be a problem when two or more independent variables are associated, 
with a level of correlation of ± 80% (Grewal et al. 2004, Gujarati 2008 and Harris and Raviv 
2008). Multicollinearity makes it difficult to distinguish individual effects. Panel regressions 
tend to exhibit large variance (Murray 2005). If a perfect relationship happens to exist between 
the estimator variables, the results of the regression are not unique. Two commonly used 
checks, for multicollinearity, are the use of the Correlation Coefficients Matrix and Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF). These two methods have been employed extensively in the literature 
(Hair et al. 2006 and Al-Ghamdi and Ali 2012). The Pearson coefficient correlation is only 
suitable when the sampling distribution is normal or when the sample is large (Field, 2009). 
There is a high correlation between institutional and block holder’s ownership and between 
female members on the board and females on the audit committee. This study excluded the 
female members on the audit committee and block holder’s ownership to avoid any overlap. 
Overall, the Pearson Correlation Matrix does not indicate any significant problem of 
multicollinearity across the model variables. In Table 6.3, the Pearson correlations between 
abnormal discretionary accruals using the modified Jones and Kothari models and REM, 
REM_1 and REM_2 are significantly negative. These significantly negative correlation 
coefficients between AEM and the aggregate proxies of REM imply that companies are 
engaging in REM and AEM as substitutes. 
The correlation coefficient is a significant positive correlation between abnormal discretionary 
accruals by using the modified Jones model and ACSIZE, ACMEET, FGROW and by using 
the Kothari Model and BMEET, ACSIZE, ACMEET, MONWE and INSTITU. This positive 
correlation can be explained by firms in the UK engaging in upward AEM.  
The high and positive or negative correlations are less than 50% between all variables. The 
correlation statistics indicate that the correlation coefficients are not large enough to prohibit 
the use of a multivariate regression analysis and it is less than the threshold value of 80% 
(Gujarati 2004).  
To test for multicollinearity, the mean VIFs are presented in Table 6.4 for all three types of 
REM and discretionary accruals proxies, all the outputs of the VIF are less than 2.84, 
suggesting that there is no multicollinearity between the various variables. The mean VIF 
across variables is 1.37. A VIF value higher than the threshold of 10 is considered to be a 
problem of multicollinearity. VIF values between the threshold of 5 and 10 are potential 
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indicators of multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2006 and Gujarati 2004). All VIF values are 
significantly lower than the threshold of 5 and thus show that there is no significant problem 
of multicollinearity present. 
In the Indian case, the Pearson Correlation Matrix in Table 6.5 shows that there is no high 
correlation between the variables in the Indian sample. Therefore, the results confirm that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. According to Gujarati (2008), multicollinearity 
does not exist among explanatory variables. 
Figures in Table 6.5 show that the Pearson correlations between abnormal discretionary 
accruals using the modified Jones and Kothari models and REM, REM_1 and REM_2, are 
significantly negative. These signify negative correlation coefficients between AEM and the 
aggregate proxies of REM, implying that companies are engaging in REM and AEM as 
substitutes. 
The correlation coefficient is a significant positive correlation between abnormal discretionary 
accruals by using the modified Jones model and FSIZE and FGROW and by using the Kothari 
model and BFEM, ACEXPER, ROA and FGROW. This positive correlation can be explained 
by firms in India engaging in upward AEM.  
To test for multicollinearity, the mean VIFs are presented in Table 6.5 for all three types of 
REM and discretionary accruals proxies, all the outputs of the VIF are less than 2.76, 
suggesting that there is no multicollinearity between the various variables. The mean VIF 
across variables is 1.35. A VIF value higher than the threshold of 10 is considered to be a 
problem of multicollinearity. All VIF values are significantly lower than the threshold of 10 






TABLE (6.3) PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE UK  
 











ROA FGROW Big 4 Z-score 
AEMJones 1.000                     
AEMKothari 0.396 1.000                    
REM -0. 023 -0.022 1.000                   
REM1 -0.049 -0.044 0.462 1.000                  
REM2 -0.054 -0.022 0.512 0.415 1.000                 
BSIZE -0.071 -0.071 0.026 0.035 0.029 1.000                
 BMEET -0.016 0.023 0.040 0.018 0.026 -0.033 1.000               
BIND -0.123 -0.045 0.008 0.016 -0.017 0.108 -0.073 1.000              
BFEM -0.115 -0.079 0.044 0.054 0.001 0.233 0.015 0.314 1.000             
ACSIZE 0.075 0.055 -0.121 -0.109 -0.103 0.349 -0.070 0.078 0.159 1.000            
ACMEET 0.070 0.079 -0.113 -0.093 -0.104 0.251 0.098 0.050 0.062 0.302 1.000           
ACIND -0.127 -0.123 0.018 0.016 0.019 -0.039 -0.000 0.070 -0.043 -0.108 -0.053 1.000          
ACEXPER -0.014 -0.034 0.004 0.001 -0.022 0.001 -0.042 0.111 0.028 -0.118 -0.046 0.195 1.000         
MOWNE -0.004 0.016 0.079 0.075 0.042 0.045 0.028 0.029 0.039 -0.028 -0.045 -0.016 -0.071 1.000        
INSTITU  0.063 0.058 -0.037 -0.045 0.019 -0.151 0.035 -0.082 -0.124 -0.041 -0.021 0.002 -0.000 -0.111 1.000       
FSIZE -0.098 -0.043 -0.032 -0.024 0.009 0.350 -0.028 0.149 0.200 0.288 0.353 -0.049 0.002 -0.022 -0.124 1.000      
FLEVER -0.011 -0.040 0.000 -0.001 -0.017 0.149 0.053 0.025 0.039 0.108 0.008 0.033 -0.019 -0.009 -0.071 0.092 1.000     
ROA 0.147 -0.062 -0.219 -0.070 -0.307 -0.053 -0.029 -0.064 -0.017 -0.001 0.037 -0.025 -0.027 -0.033 -0.020 -0.202 0.038 1.000    
FGROW 0.063 -0.007 -0.018 -0.015 -0.035 -0.088 -0.022 -0.111 -0.098 -0.066 -0.066 0.014 -0.035 -0.015 0.029 -0.141 0.029 0.223 1.000   
Big 4  -0.113 -0.030 0.044 0.050 -0.147 0.044 0.054 -0.014 0.068 0.055 0.055 -0.067 -0.058 0.045 -0.018 -0.002 0.108 0.100 -0.011 1.000  
Z-score -0.041 0.002 0.045 0.014 0.028 -0.049 0.043 -0.001 -0.004 0.022 0.003 0.001 -0.020 0.046 -0.035 -0.017 0.030 0.001 0.003 0.074 1.000 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using Kothari Model. REM, REM1 and REM2= real earnings management. 
BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director Independence, proportion of independent directors 
to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the 
year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the 
total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm.  FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-4 auditors and 0 otherwise.  Z-


















FSIZE FLEVER ROA FGROW Big 4 Z-score 
AEMJones 1.000                     
AEMKothari 0.293 1.000                    
REM -0.104 -0.067 1.000                   
REM1 -0.080 -0.058 0.432 1.000                  
REM2 -0.126 -0.081 0.512 0.495 1.000                 
BSIZE -0.036 -0.019 0.046 0.047 0.001 1.000                
 BMEET -0.017 -0.001 -0.029 0.018 0.044 0.025 1.000               
BIND -0.106 -0.053 0.012 0.030 0.046 -0.174 -0.050 1.000              
BFEM -0.019 0.015 0.041 0.057 0.030 -0.028 0.003 0.028 1.000             
ACSIZE -0.019 -0.030 -0.046 -0.021 0.026 0.146 0.173 -0.019 0.110 1.000            
ACMEET -0.012 -0.058 0.044 0.046 0.033 0.191 0.204 -0.032 -0.002 -0.003 1.000           
ACIND -0.097 -0.058 0.043 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.049 0.071 0.038 -0.020 0.080 1.000          
ACEXPER -0.072 0.005 -0.069 -0.045 -0.038 0.020 0.075 0.062 0.140 0.042 0.038 0.003 1.000         
MOWNE -0.032 -0.035 -0.020 -0.019 -0.033 -0.074 -0.109 0.017 0.031 0.013 -0.114 0.046 -0.026 1.000        
INSTITU  -0.019 -0.027 0.028 0.098 0.104 0.065 0.213 0.084 0.081 0.203 0.051 0.039 0.036 -0.248 1.000       
FSIZE 0.040 -0.031 0.067 0.078 0.083 0.190 0.034 0.026 0.042 0.051 0.192 0.078 0.051 -0.088 0.052 1.000      
FLEVER -0.077 -0.014 -0.047 -0.054 -0.081 -0.108 -0.028 0.013 -0.053 -0.039 -0.095 -0.012 -0.073 0.561 0.030 -0.353 1.000     
ROA 0.234 0.054 0.258 -0.099 -0.313 -0.007 0.009 -0.011 0.021 -0.030 0.073 -0.018 0.023 0.044 0.012 -0.040 0.048 1.000    
FGROW 0.081 0.057 -0.035 -0.023 -0.033 0.029 0.078 0.013 -0.010 -0.000 0.024 -0.003 0.024 -0.007 -0.006 0.054 -0.005 0.069 1.000   
Big 4  -0.063 -0.032 -0.037 -0.031 -0.029 -0.022 0.053 -0.008 0.039 -0.014 -0.027 0.041 0.098 0.049 -0.045 0.018 0.002 0.020 0.016 1.000  
Z-score -0.004 -0.023 0.005 -0.003 -0.020 -0.047 0.026 0.040 -0.110 -0.021 0.005 -0.018 -0.009 -0.023 0.029 -0.126 0.086 0.051 -0.007 -0.020 1.000 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using Kothari Model. REM, REM1 and REM2= real earnings management. BSIZE= 
board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director Independence, proportion of independent directors to total board 
size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the 
percentage of total independent non-executive directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were 
owned by the directors of a firm.  FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before interest and taxes 





TABLE (6.5) COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS (VIF) IN THE UK 


























TABLE (6.6): COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS (VIF) IN INDIA 


























6.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section will discuss the multiple regression results obtained in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, 
regarding the relationship between mechanisms of corporate governance and the trade-off 
decision between AEM and REM in the UK and India.  
6.4.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEXPECTED REM AND AEM 
In Tables 6.7 and 6.8 association is indicated by a significantly negative coefficient for the 
variable between AEM, and unexpected REM. Choice of management strategies appears to be 
influenced by their respective cost H1, and there appears to be substitution between REM and 
AEM. H1 was that managers adjust results via accruals after real activities manipulations have 
taken place, and that the extent of AEM is negatively linked to any unexpected manipulation 
of real activities.  
To examine whether a company’s substitution of AEM for REM depends on different levels 
mechanisms of corporate governance, this study extended Zang’s (2012) model. As pointed 
out earlier, REM usually occurs during the fiscal year and is realised at the year-end, when 
managers have a further opportunity to manipulate the level of AEM. Thus, the timing 
difference allows managers to adjust the AEM based on the results of the REM. Therefore, the 
relationship between AEM and REM may differ depending on the level of constraint imposed 
by corporate governance practices.   
Consistent with Zang (2012), the coefficient on UNEXPRM was found to be negative and 
significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels in the UK and India respectively, showing that AEM is 
negatively associated with the unexpected partof REM. This result suggests that, as predicted 
by H1, managers do adjust the amount of AEM after REM is realised 
As discussed above, REM has to be executed and realised by the fiscal year-end, after which 
managers can still adjust the extent of AEM based on the observed impact of REM (H1). 
Therefore, the extent of REM is determined by the costs of both EM tools and other 
predetermined firm characteristics, but not by the realised outcome of AEM. The extent of 
AEM is determined not only by the costs of EM activities, but also by the unexpected amount 
of REM realised. H1 predicts that managers increase (decrease) the extent of AEM when REM 
turns out to be unexpectedly low (high). The Hypothesised direct and substitutive relation 
between the two EM methods implies a negative sign (Question 1) in the AEM equation.  
The recursive model purposes to capture the sequential relationship between AEM and REM. 
The residual values from the first equation (Unexpected REM) are included in the second 
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equation because the extent of AEM is determined by the unexpected amount of REM realised 
along with the costs associated with EM activities. Zang’s (2012) model is employed in the 
current research with minor changes. The costs associated with AEM and REM that are 
included in this research are corporate governance.  
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 exhibit the results of using the recursive model to measure the trade-off 
between AEM and REM in the UK and India.  
The first results are the ones that directly relate to the trade-off effect. The coefficient of 
Unexpected REM is significant and negative in both countries. These results are in line with 
the result found in Zang’s study. Unexpectedly high or low manipulation of REM is offset by 
lower or higher AEM. This substitutive effect was found in both the UK and India.  
The results provide strong evidence that firms in the UK and India use AEM and REM 
techniques as mutual substitutes, rather than as complements, when seeking to manipulate 
reported earnings. Zang (2012) argues that firms encounter different constraints for the two 
methods and provides evidence that the trade-off decision is dependent upon the relative costs 
and adverse consequences of the two strategies. She explains, unremarkably, that when one 
EM method is constrained, managers will make use of the other. UK and Indian firms appear 
to employ a method of trading off between the two manipulative techniques, rather than 
employing both simultaneously. Furthermore, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that the choice 
between these alternative strategies for EM varies predictably as a function of the firm’s ability 
to use AEM, given the costs of doing so. The negative relationship, between AEM and REM, 
provides support for the research findings of Barton (2001), Braam et al. (2015), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017), Zang (2012), Cohen et al. (2008), 
Doukakis (2014), Zhu et al. (2015), Mizik and Jacobson (2007) and Kuo et al. (2014). 
However, there are contradictions with the research findings of Kuo et al. (2012), who found a 
positive relationship between AEM and REM, and there are inconsistencies with Das et al. 
(2017) who considered 673 non-financial companies listed in India during the period 2009–







TABLE (6.7) ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AEM 
AND REM IN THE UK 
variables REM_1 REM_2 
REM_1 AEMJones REM_2 AEMJones 
Unexpected REM_1 ---- -0.011 --------- --------- 
Unexpected REM_2 --------- -------- ----- -0.018 
BSIZE 
 
+0.000 -0.021 0.486 -0.018 
BMEET 
 
0.473 +0.089 0.899 +0.093 
BIND 
 
0.752 -0.014 0.493 -0.013 
BFEM 
 
+0.002 -0.015 0.522 -0.017 
ACSIZE 
 
-0.000 +0.000 -0.003 +0.000 
ACMEET 
 
-0.000 0.110 -0.000 0.213 
ACIND 
 
0.752 -0.000 0.788 -0.000 
ACEXP 
 
0.323 0.252 0.536 0.250 
MOWNE 
 
0.259 0.467 0.746 0.409 
INSTITU 3% 
 
0.237 0.454 0.732 0.465 
FSIZE 
 
-0.035 0.131 -0.020 0.140 
FLEVER 
 
0.943 0.755 0.706 0.781 
ROA 
 
+0.012 -0.005 +0.000 -0.005 
FGROW 
 
0.210 -0.008 0.191 -0.008 
Big 4  
 
0.879 0.311 0.604 0.278 
Z-score 
 
0.679 0.531 0.877 0.564 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using the modified Jones model. REM_1 and, REM2 = real earnings management 
Unexpected REM_1 and REM2 = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. BSIZE= board size, measured by the 
total numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND 
= Board of Director Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female 
directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = 
the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and 
experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% = the 
percentage of Institutional ownership of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total 
assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net 
income before interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Z-SCORE= 




TABLE (6.8): ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AEM 
AND REM IN INDIA 
Variables REM_1 REM_2 
REM_1 AEMJones REM_2 AEMJones 
Unexpected REM_1 ----- -0.021 ------- -------- 
Unexpected REM_2 -------- ------- ----- -0.025 
BSIZE 
 
0.560 -0.000 0.892 -0.000 
BMEET 
 
0.379 0.781 0.178 0.823 
BIND 
 
0.391 -0.000 0.658 -0.000 
BFEM 
 
+0.000 0.610 +0.002 0.749 
ACSIZE 
 
0.911 +0.062 0.581 -0.072 
ACMEET 
 
0.503 0.654 0.116 0.706 
ACIND 
 
0.158 -0.032 0.131 -0.048 
ACEXP 
 
0.174 -0.000 0.180 -0.000 
MOWNE 
 
0.908 -0.033 0.314 -0.034 
INSTITU 3% 
 
-0.000 0.537 -0.000 0.571 
FSIZE 
 
0.498 0.735 0.975 0.735 
FLEVER 
 
-0.017 0.397 -0.008 0.412 
ROA 
 
-0.023 +0.013 -0.011 +0.015 
FGROW 
 
0.584 0.311 0.296 0.321 
Big 4  
 
0.382 -0.028 0.939 -0.028 
Z-score 
 
0.580 0.533 0.550 0.536 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using the modified Jones model. REM_1 and REM2 = real earnings management 
Unexpected REM_1 and REM2 = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total 
numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = 
Board of Director Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female 
directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = 
the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and 
experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% = the percentage 
of Institutional ownership of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= 
leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable 






6.4.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN AEM AND REM IN THE UK AND INDIA 
According to agency theory, corporate governance characteristics should increase the 
monitoring capacity of the board (Fama and Jensen 1983).  This section examines whether 
Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics, and Ownership Structures are 
associated with any trade-off decision between AEM and REM in the UK and India.  
6.4.2.1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN 
RELATION TO AEM AND REM  
Agency theory assumes that the actions of a company’s board should enhance the integrity of 
financial reporting by monitoring the company’s management and believes that a board of 
directors is well placed to do this because the board has the power to reward, or replace, the 
company’s senior managers (Fama and Jensen 1983). Company boards are legally responsible 
for monitoring the actions of their management (Vafeas 2005). There are at least four 
characteristics of a board which may influence the effectiveness of its governance, i.e. the size 
of the board, the number of board meetings, the number of independent directors and the 
number of females on the board. 
A manager’s decision to use a particular method to manipulate earnings is likely to be related 
to how constraining each method is perceived to be. It is important to investigate the costs and 
constraints of each form of EM, as perceived by the managers. As a preliminary investigation, 
this study sought to find out whether there was evidence of systematic switching to strategies 
for EM that might be perceived to be less constrained, when particular features of corporate 
governance were in play that might be less constrained by various features of the corporate 
governance process.  
6.4.2.1.1. BOARD SIZE AND EM 
The results of testing H2 appear in Table 6.7. H2 postalates that firms with a bigger board size 
are more (less) likely to engage in REM than AEM. 
 The coefficients on board size are significantly negative at a 0.01 level, related to AEM, and 
which is positive for REM_1 but insignificant for REM_2. Firms with higher numbers of board 
members constrain AEM, and the company is more likely to engage in REM, by cutting 
discretionary expenses and by overproducting, as demonstrated by a positive coefficient on 
REM_1. Intuitively, managers will prefer to employ manipulations that are less visible, and 
which carry less risk.  
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According to Zang (2012), companies prefer to use the least constrained activities. The findings 
of testing H2 are consistent with Zang’s assertion regarding which firms switch to using REM. 
These results underline the importance of understanding how managers perceive the costs, risks 
and consequences of each method of EM and trade-off decisions. Overall, the results indicate 
that board size exerts more pressure on firms in the UK, to constrain AEM rather than REM. 
The results in Table 6.7 indicate that H2 is empirically supported. 
The results of this research are consistent with previous studies, which found that board size is 
constrained by AEM (Habbash 2010, Rahman et al.  2013 and Peasnell et al. 2005). Each of 
these studies found that board size was significantly and negatively related to AEM (Ghosh et 
al. 2010 and Xie et al. 2003). However, the results of this research are inconsistent with other 
empirical studies, which have found that the size of the board was insignificantly related to 
either AEM or REM. See, for example, the UK study by Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), the 
US study by Marrakchi et al. (2001), the Canadian study by Park and Shin (2004) and the 
Australian study by Kent et al. (2010). Visvanathan (2008) and Graven (2009), in the US, did 
not detect any significant association between board size and the extent of REM. 
In the case of India, Table 6.8 shows that increasing the numbers of members on the board has 
a significant negative impact on AEM at the 0.05 level but had an insignificant impact on 
REM_1 and REM_2. These results indicate that less (more) members on the board results in 
higher (lower) levels of downward AEM. Therefore, it can be stated that increasing the number 
of on the board in fact constrains the use of AEM. The results in Table 6.8 appear to support 
the view that the bigger number of boards size constrain AEM but there is no evidence to 
increase REM; according to Zang (2012), a trade-off to increased REM is expected. Zang’s 
assertion is supported. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn as to whether increasing the 
number of members on the board increases the use of REM. It cannot be concluded that firms, 
which face increased numbers of members on the board have higher levels of REM. This study 
fails to support H2 in Indian firms empirically. 
The results are consistent with previous studies, such as Idris (2012), in Jordan, and Susanto 
and Pradipta (2016), in Indonesia, which did not detect any significant association between 
board size and REM. However, the results are inconsistent with Almasarwah (2015), who 
found no significant relationship between board size and AEM in Jordan. Furthermore, Nagar 
and Sen (2016) in India and Hsu and Wen (2015) in China found that increasing the board size 
reduced REM. Kumari and Pattanayak (2014) and Ahmed et al. (2006), in Singapore and 
Malaysia, and Sarkar et al. (2008), in India. These studies found that board size increased AEM.  
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6.4.2.1.2. FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETINGS AND EM  
The results of testing H3 appear in able 6.7 further indicates that the frequency of board 
meetings had a positive significant impact on AEM at the 0.10 level, while it is insignificant 
for both REM_1 and REM_2. This does not totally support our H3. 
The results show that the frequency of board meetings is observed to only have a significant 
positive effect on AEM. The results provide empirical support for the view that increasing the 
number of board meetings does not improve the monitoring of AEM. This is surprising and 
may be because the meetings exert no control over the managers. Consequently, when the 
frequency of board meetings is increased, the extra board meetings would be distributed 
throughout the working year, thus providing more opportunities for closer oversight of day-to-
day management. The results show no evidence of decrease in REM when the frequency of 
board meetings increase. Therefore, this study is unable to conclude that frequency of board 
meetings increases the use of REM. 
The result rejects the H3 that firms with bigger frequency of board meetings are more (less) 
likely to engage in REM than AEM. The above findings fail to provide support for trade off 
REM and AEM as substitutes on the basis of the relative costs. 
The study results are inconsistent with the prior studies by Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), 
Rahman et al. (2013), Habbash (2010), Marrakchi et al. (2001), Xie et al. (2001) and Kent et 
al. (2010). All found that the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and AEM 
was not significant. In the US, Visvanathan (2008) and Graven (2009) found that increasing 
the frequency of board meetings reduced REM. Anglin et al. (2013), in Canada, and Xie et al. 
(2003), in the US, who did find a significant and negative relationship between the frequency 
of board meetings and AEM.  
In the Indian case, Table 6.8 also reports that the frequency of board meetings had no significant 
impact on AEM or on REM_1 and REM_2. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn as to 
whether frequency of board meetings constrains the use of AEM. Due to these results, this 
study is unable to accept H3, which states that firms with a greater frequency of board meetings 
are more (less) likely to engage in REM than AEM. Therefore, the weak evidence that firm is 
trade off REM and AEM as substitutes. 
The results are similar to prior studies by Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), in Iran; found that the 
frequency of board meetings does not significantly influence AEM. Jaiswall and Banerjee 
(2012) in India. They found that more board meetings with higher attendance resulted in 
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reduced AEM. Singh et al. (2017) in India, Awais and Wang (2011) in Gulzar (2011) in China 
all found significant and positive associations between the frequency of board meetings and 
AEM. Nagar and Sen (2016), in India, also found that the number of board meetings was 
positively associated with REM. However, these results are inconsistent with a prior study by 
Zgarni et al. (2014) in Tunisia, who found that increasing the frequency of board meetings 
reduced REM 
6.4.2.1.3. THE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD AND 
EM  
The results of testing H4 appear in Table 6.7 and demonstrates that the coefficient on number 
of independent directors has a significantly negative impact on AEM at the 0.01 level but no 
significant impact on REM_1 and REM_2. According to Dahya and McConnell (2008), 
directors who are independent of the company organisation make better decisions and provide 
better monitoring of managers. AEM is more constrained when the number of independent 
directors increases. Intuitively, managers will prefer to employ manipulations that are less 
visible, and which carry the least risk, cost and consequence. The coefficient indicates that the 
number of independent directors exert more pressure on firms to constrain AEM. The negative 
coefficients on AEM suggest that firms with a high number of independent directors have 
higher costs of AEM, and there is no evidence that increased use of number of independent 
directors does not affect both REM_1 and REM_2. Therefore, H4, which states that firms with 
a high proportion of independent board members are more (less) likely to engage in REM than 
AEM, is rejected. The results are not supported and no comment can be made about trade-off 
between REM and AEM on the basis of their relative costs. 
The results are similar to the results of previous empirical studies. For example, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) in the UK, Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Marrakchi et al. (2001) and Anglin et al. 
(2013) in the US, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) in France and Canada, all of whom found that 
the more independent directors there were on the board, the lower the levels of AEM. Neither 
Visvanathan, (2008), in the US, nor Yu (2015) in the UK, however, found any consistent 
impact of the percentage of non-executive directors on the board on REM. However, the results 
are not similar to the results of other, previous, empirical studies, such as Osma (2008), in the 
UK, and Talbi et al. (2015), in the US. Both found that increasing the number of independent 
board members mitigated REM. Rahman et al. (2013) and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) in 
the UK, Kent et al. (2010), in Australia, and Park and Shin (2004), in Canada, all found that 
the number of independent directors on the board did not significantly affect the level of AEM. 
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Osma and Noguer (2007) found that there was a significant, but positive, association between 
the proportion of independent directors and the level of AEM in Spain.  
According to agency theory, independent directors should reduce managerial manipulations 
because the independent directors will seek to enhance their professional reputations as 
effective independent directors (Fama and Jensen 1983 and Elshandidy and Hassanein 2014).  
It follows that again H4 which states that firms with a high proportion of independent board 
members are more (less) likely to engage in REM than AEM, is not supported. Therefore, it 
cannot be affirmed that companies use REM and AEM as substitutes. 
The results are similar to other empirical studies, such as Kapoor and Goel (2017), Sarkar et 
al. (2008) in India, and Jaggi et al. (2009) in Hong Kong, who all found a negative association 
between the number of independent directors and AEM. Nagar and Sen (2016) in India found 
that the number of independents had no significant relationship to REM. However, the results 
are dissimilar to the results of previous empirical studies, such as Kang and Kim (2012) in 
Korea, Zgarni et al. (2014) and Affes and Romdhane (2011) in Tunisia, who all found that 
increasing the number of independent directors on the board reduced REM. Kumari and 
Pattanayak (2014), Sarkar et al. (2008) in India, Almasarwah (2015) in Jordan and Shah et al. 
(2009), in Pakistan, all found an insignificant relationship between the independence of the 
board and AEM. 
6.4.2.1.4. THE NUMBER OF FEMALES ON THE BOARD AND EM  
The results of testing H5 appear in Table 6.7, showing a coefficient at the level of 0.01 for the 
number of female directors on the board significantly reducing AEM and having a positive and 
significant effect on REM_1 at the 0.01 level, and an insignificant effect on REM_2. These 
results indicate that companies with higher numbers of female directors on the board engage 
in cutting discretionary expenses and overproduction. This result is consistent with the 
suggestion that increasing the number of females on the board of companies would reduce the 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders over, for example, the use of AEM to 
manipulate reported earnings. Results imply that increasing the number of females on the board 
will mitigate manipulations of AEM that distort reported earnings. This may be because women 
are more risk-averse or more moral. Female directors on the board are observed to have a 
significant effect on AEM only. This result suggests that the number of females on the board 
reduces AEM and increases REM activities. This result provides support for H5 which states 
that firms with a high percentage of females on theirboards are more (less) likely to engage in 
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REM than AEM. This study provides evidence that the trade-off between REM and AEM is 
based on the relative costs used on the UK firms.  
Results are consistent with the results found by Arun et al. (2015), Lakhal et al. (2015), 
Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Srinidh and Tsui (2011), who each found that increasing the 
number of females on the board constrained AEM. However, research by Mulder (2017) did 
not support the study findings. 
In the case of India, Table 6.8 shows that the number of female directors on the board has no 
significant impact on AEM but does significantly increase REM_1 and REM_2. The 
coefficients for the numbers of female directors on the board are positive and significant on 
REM_1 and REM_2 at the 0.01 level. This indicates that companies that have higher numbers 
of female directors on the board engage in cutting discretionary expenses, overproduction and 
sales-based manipulation. On the other hand, the coefficient indicating that the number of 
female directors on the board is insignificant related to AEM. This result shows that firms 
engage in more REM. Therefore, this study is unable to conclude that a high number of female 
directors constrains the use of AEM. The results suggest that H5 is not empirically supported. 
Prior research provides some support for the findings. For example, Ye et al. (2010) find an 
insignificant relationship between AEM and female top executives in China. However, the 
results are not borne out by the results of previous empirical studies, such as Omoye and Eriki 
(2014) in Nigeria, Hoang et al. (2017) in Vietnam, Awais and Wang (2011) and Gulzar (2011) 
in China who all found a positive association between AEM and female directors. Luo et al. 
(2017), in China, found that higher female participation on the board is associated with lower 
levels of REM.  
6.4.2.2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE GOVERNANCE IN 
RELATION TO AEM AND REM  
6.4.2.2.1. AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE AND EM  
To test H6, in Table 6.7, the coefficients of audit committee size are significantly negative for 
REM_1 and REM_2, at the 0.01 level, and significantly positive for AEM, at the 0.01 level, 
indicating that increasing the number of directors on the audit committee constrains REM by 
means of cutting discretionary expenses, overproduction and manipulation of sales. The 
positive coefficient on AEM is consistent with an increased number of members on the audit 
committee, suggesting the UK firms using AEM more. Firms which have a higher number of 
members on their audit committee substitute AEM for REM. The results empirically support 
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H6 which states that firms with a large-sized audit committee are more (less) likely to engage 
in REM than AEM. 
Prior research also shows that increasing the audit committee size is not effective in 
constraining the EM by either method; see, for example, studies by Rahman et al. (2013), in 
the UK, Sun et al. (2014), in the US and Mulder (2017), based on four West European countries, 
which found that audit committee size was positively associated with EM. Some research does 
support a claim that audit committee size constrains one or other method of EM for instance 
Habbash (2010) and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), in the UK, Davidson et al. (2005), in 
Australia and Xie et al. (2001) in the US, who each found no constraint on improved AEM. 
Visvanathan (2008), in the US, found no constraint on REM. 
In the case of India, Table 6.8 reveals that coefficients at the level of 0.1 for audit committee 
size are positive and significant for AEM, but not significant for REM_1 and REM_2. The 
positive coefficients suggest that increasing the audit committee size increases AEM upwards. 
Therefore, this study does not confirm that financial distress constrains the use of REM. 
Companies do not appear to substitute REM for AEM. No inferences can be drawn on H6, 
which states that firms with smaller sized audit committees are more (less) likely to engage in 
REM than AEM. 
The results are consistent with prior research by Mishra and Malhotra (2016), in India, and 
(2015), in Jordan, which both found that audit committee size has a significantly downward 
effect on AEM. Inaam et al. (2012), in Tunisia and Kang and Kim (2012), in Korea, found that 
increasing the audit committee size tended to reduce REM. But, Hamdan et al. (2013), in Jordan 
and Rahman and Ali (2006), in Malaysia; these studies all found that the relationship between 
audit committee size and AEM was insignificant. However, the results are not consistent with 
studies by Susanto and Pradipta (2016), in Indonesia, which claimed to find that the size of the 
audit committee had no significant effect on REM. Furthermore, Suleiman and Alhaji (2015), 
in Nigeria, and Supriyaningsih and Fuad (2016), in Indonesia, all found that increasing the 
audit committee size significantly increased AEM. 
6.4.2.2.2. THE FREQUENCY OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND EM  
To test H7, the results in Table 6.7 suggest that increasing the number of audit committee 
meetings has no significant impact on AEM but does significantly reduce either REM_1 or 
REM_2 at the level 0.01. The results indicate that firms which increase the frequency of audit 
committee meetings are less likely to undertake REM, because REM is constrained by 
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increasing the frequency of audit committee meetings. This may be because statutory or 
regulatory year-end meetings are normally already in place to constrain AEM. However, the 
findings show that increased frequency of audit committee meetings reduces REM. The 
coefficients on audit committee meetings are negative for REM, indicating that audit 
committee meetings are more likely to constrain firms’ attempts to manage earnings with REM. 
Due to the insignificant results on AEM, this study is unable to conclude that greater audit 
committee meetings increase the use of AEM. It is not possible to say whether or not companies 
trade-off between REM and AEM. Neither is this result consistent with H7, which states that 
firms with low frequency audit committee meetings are more (less) likely to engage in REM 
than AEM. 
Prior research has returned mixed results for the effect of the frequency of audit committee 
meetings on the manipulation of earnings by their method. For example, Xie et al. (2003), Lin 
et al. (2006), Bédard et al. (2004), in the US, and Baxter and Cotter (2009), in Australia, all 
claim that increasing the frequency of audit committee meetings reduces AEM. However, a 
study by Graven (2015), in the US, found no significant relationship between the frequency of 
audit committee meetings and the level of REM in the US. However, the results are not 
consistent with previous studies by research by Rahman et al. (2013) and Habbash (2010), in 
the UK, and Davidson et al. (2005), Bédard et al. (2004) and Yang, and Krishnan (2005), in 
the US, who found that the relationship between the frequency of audit committee meetings 
and extent of AEM was not significant. An even stronger challenge comes from Ghosh et al. 
(2010), in the US, and Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), in the UK, who found that the extent 
of AEM significantly increased when the frequency of audit committee meetings increased. 
Visvanathan (2008), in the US, found a negative association between the number of audit 
committee meetings and REM through the reduction of discretionary expenses.  
In the case of India, Table 6.8 shows that increasing the number of audit committee meetings 
has no significant impact on either AEM or REM_1 or REM_2. These results may indicate that 
increasing the number of audit committee meetings is not an important driver for a good audit 
committee monitoring of AEM and REM practices. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn as 
to whether increasing the number of audit committee meetings constrains the use of AEM or 
REM. This study does not support H7.  
The results are similar to the previous research by Saleh et al. (2007) and Rahman and Ali 
(2006), in Malaysia, and Hassan and Ibrahim (2014), in Nigeria. However, the results are 
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inconsistent with previous studies by Mishra and Malhotra (2016), in India, and Hoopsamut 
and Jaikengkit (2009), in Thailand. 
6.4.2.2.3. THE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT MEMBERS ON AUDIT COMMITTEE 
AND EM  
To test H8, Table 6.7 shows that increasing the number of independent members on the audit 
committee significantly has a negative impact on AEM at the 0.01 level but has no significant 
impact on either REM_1 or REM_2. The results indicate that the number of independent 
members on the audit committee puts more constraint on AEM.  
The negative coefficients on AEM suggest that firms with a high number of independent 
members on the audit committee have higher costs of AEM, and there is no evidence that an 
increased number of independent members on the audit committee leads to use of both REM_1 
and REM_2. It cannot be confirmed that firms do not trade off REM and AEM as substitutes 
on the basis of the relative costs. Therefore, H8 is rejected, which states that firms with a high 
percentage of audit committee independence are more (less) likely to engage in REM than 
AEM. 
There is evidence in the literature that independent committee members seek to monitor and 
mitigate AEM, (Rahman et al.  2013, Klein 2002, Wilson 2011, Kent et al. 2010 and Amar 
2014) all of whom found that the higher the percentage of independent audit committee 
members, the lower the observed level of AEM. Likewise, Carcello and Nagy (2004), Graven 
(2009), Visvanathan (2008) and Huang et al. (2009), in the US, found no significant 
relationship between the number of independents on the audit committee and REM. However, 
the results are not consistent with studies such as Atmon and Al Farooque (2017), in the UK, 
Osma and Noguer (2007), in Spain and Xie et al. (2003), in the US, who found that the number 
of independent members on an audit committee did not significantly reduce AEM. The result 
contrasts with a study by Sun et al. (2014), in the US, which found that increasing the number 
of independents on an audit committee did reduce REM. 
In the case of India, Table 6.8 shows that increasing the number of independent members on 
the audit committee significantly reduces AEM at the 0.05 level but has no significant impact 
on either REM_1 or REM_2. This result indicates that firms with a higher number of 
independent members on the audit committee are less likely to undertake AEM. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that firms which have more independent members on the audit committee 
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have higher levels of REM. There is no evidence of trade-off between REM and AEM. There 
is no empirical support for H8. 
The results are consistent with previous studies by Kang and Kim (2012), in Korea, and Su et 
al. (2014), in China, who found no significant relationship between the degree of independence 
of the audit committee and REM. Kapoor and Goel (2017), in India, Puat et al. (2013), in 
Malaysia, and Hamdan et al. (2013), in Jordan, also found that increasing the percentage of 
independent members on the audit committee significantly reduced AEM. Thus, the results are 
inconsistent with previous studies by Inaam et al. (2012), in Tunisia and Hassan and Ibrahim 
(2014), in Nigeria; all these studies found that increasing the number of independent members 
on an audit committee reduced REM. Mishra and Malhotra (2016), in India and Bin-Muhamed 
(2013), in Malaysia, all found that the number of independent members on the audit committee 
was insignificantly associated with AEM. 
6.4.2.2.4. THE LEVEL OF FINANCIAL EXPERTISE ON AUDIT COMMITTEE AND 
EM 
To test H9, the results in Table 6.7 show no effect of financial expertise on the audit committee, 
on either AEM or REM_1 and REM_2. These results may indicate that the financial expertise 
of the audit committee is not an important driver for a good audit committee monitoring of 
AEM and REM practices. No inferences can be drawn as to whether financial expertise of the 
audit committee constrains the use of AEM or REM. This result suggests that increasing the 
financial expertise of the audit committee is not important for corporate governance monitoring 
of either AEM or REM manipulation. The results reject H9, which states that firms with a high 
percentage of audit committee expertise are more (less) likely to engage in REM than AEM. 
UK Firms do not substitute REM for AEM.  
The results are consistent with previous research by Sun and Liu (2014), in the US, who found 
no significant relationship between increasing audit committee expertise and any reduction in 
REM. Thus, the results are inconsistent with previous research by Katmon and Al Farooque 
(2017), in the UK, Lin et al. (2010), in the US and by Habbash (2010), in the UK and Xie et al. 
(2003), Zalata et al. (2018), Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Bédard et al. (2004) in the US, who 
also found that increasing audit committee expertise reduced AEM. Baxter and Cotter (2009), 
in Australia, found that increased audit committee expertise significantly, reduced AEM. 
Carcello and Nagy (2004), working in the US, reported a finding that increasing audit 
committee expertise actually increased REM. 
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In the Indian case, Table 6.8 demonstrates that increasing the financial expertise of the audit 
committee does significantly decrease AEM at the 0.01 level. However, the effect on REM_1 
amd REM_2 was not significant.  
The result indicates that the financial expertise of the audit committee exerts more pressure on 
firms to constrain AEM than REM. Firms with greater financial expertise in the audit 
committee have higher costs of AEM. The coefficient indicates that the financial expertise of 
the audit committee exerts more pressure on firms to constrain AEM. The result suggests that 
firm with a high number of financial experts on the audit committee have higher costs of AEM, 
and there is no evidence of increased use for both REM_1 and REM_2. Therefore, H9 is 
rejected. The Indian Firms do not substitute REM for AEM. It cannot be confirmed that firms 
do not trade off REM and AEM as substitutes on the basis of the relative costs. 
The findings are consistent with prior studies by Susanto and Pradipta (2016), in Indonesia, 
Inaam et al. (2012), in Tunisia, Supriyaningsih and Fuad (2016) working in Indonesia, Mishra 
and Malhotra (2016), in India and Rahman and Ali (2006), in Malaysia. However, the results 
are inconsistent with work by Puat and Susela (2013), in Malaysia and Lo et al. (2010), in 
China. 
6.4.2.3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN RELATION TO AEM AND REM 
This section will discuss the findings in Table 6.7 from the point of view of the impact of 
ownership structures, on the trade-off decisions between AEM and REM in the UK. Two types 
of ownership structure will be considered: managerial ownership and institutional ownership. 
6.4.2.3.1. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND EM 
Testing H10, the resuls in Table 6.7 present that increasing the percentage of managerial 
ownership has no significant impact on REM_1, REM_2 or AEM. H1 predicts that the trade-
off between REM and AEM is based on the relative costliness of the two activities. Managerial 
ownership constraints do not appear to affect the use of either AEM or REM.  Agency theory 
predicts that high managerial ownership will lead to better-mitigated manipulation motivation 
to use EM (Florackis et al. 2015 and Rashid 2016). However, the mean level of managerial 
ownership in the UK only was 5%. In any event, this might have been too low to have any 
significant effect. In addition, where levels of managerial ownership were much higher, it is 
possible that it was no longer necessary for the managers to manipulate earnings in order to 
transfer significant wealth from the company to ‘themselves’ (Ali et al. 2007). These results 
may indicate that managerial ownership is not an important driver for a good ownership 
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structures monitoring either AEM or REM practices. The UK firms did not substitute REM for 
AEM. This study is unable to accept H10. 
The results are consistent with previous research, such as that by Laux and Laux (2009), Bos 
et al. (2013) and Habbash (2010) in the UK, and Ballesta and Meca (2007), in Spain, who each 
found that increasing the proportion of managerial ownership had no significant effect on 
AEM. Likewise, Demers and Wang (2010), in the US, found no significant effect of managerial 
ownership on the use of REM. However, the results are inconsistent with research by Peasnell 
et al. (2005), in the UK, who found that managerial ownership significantly increased AEM. 
However, Warfield et al. (1995), in the US, found that managerial ownership significantly 
reduced AEM. Roychowdhury (2006), in the US, found that the level of managerial ownership 
reduced REM. 
In the Indian study, Table 6.8 presents that increasing the percentage of managerial ownership 
significantly decreased AEM at the 0.05 level. However, the effect on REM_1 and REM_2 
was not significant. The result indicates that increasing the percentage of managerial ownership 
exerts more pressure on firms to constrain AEM. No inferences can be drawn as to whether 
increased percentage of managerial ownership increased the use of AEM. Therefore, the results 
for India in Table 6.8 do not support H10. There is no evidence that managers in India substitute 
REM for AEM on the basis of the relative costs. 
The results are consistent with work by Shayan-Nia (2017), in Malaysia, Idris (2012), working 
in Jordan, Nagar and Sen (2016), working in India and Susanto and Pradipta (2016), in 
Indonesia, who all suggested that REM is not significantly related to the level of management 
ownership. Teshima and Shuto (2008), in Japan, and Saleem (2016), in Jordan, found that 
increasing managerial ownership significantly reduced AEM. However, the results are 
inconsistent with previous research by Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010), in Jordan, who found that 
managerial ownership significantly increased AEM. Furthermore, Yeo et al. (2002), in 
Singapore, found an insignificant relationship between managerial ownership and AEM. 
6.4.2.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND EM 
To test H11, Table 6.7 shows that increasing institutional ownership has no significant impact 
on REM_1, REM_2 or AEM. These results may indicate that institutional ownership is not an 
important driver for a good ownership structures monitoring either AEM or REM practices. 
These results suggest that, while higher institutional ownership does not constrain either AEM 
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or REM, they fail to confirm that there is substitution observed under institutional ownership 
in UK firms. Firms do not substitute REM for AEM. This study is unable to accept H11.  
The results are consistent with previous research by Peasnell et al. (2000), Peasnell et al. (2005) 
and Rahman et al. (2013) in the UK, which found that there was no significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and AEM. Similarly, Alves (2012), in Portugal, found that the 
effect of institutional ownership on AEM was not significant while Rebai (2011) reported no 
significant relationship between the level of institutional ownership and the use of REM in the 
US. However, Hadani et al. (2011), in the US, did find that increasing institutional ownership 
reduced AEM. Roychowdhury (2006) and Bushee (1998), in the US, found that increased 
institutional ownership reduced the use of REM. 
In the case of India, Table 6.8 provides evidence that increasing institutional ownership 
significantly decreases REM_1 and REM_2 at the 0.01 level and does not affect AEM. These 
results indicate that increasing institutional ownership exerts more pressure on firms to 
constrain REM. Firms with higher institutional ownership have higher costs of REM. The 
negative coefficients on REM suggest that firms with higher institutional ownership have 
higher costs of REM, and there is no evidence of increased use of AEM. Therefore, H11 is 
rejected. There is no evidence that company’s trade-off between AEM and REM. 
The results are consistent with previous research by Sarkar et al. (2008), in India, Siregar and 
Utama (2008), in Indonesia and Al-fayoumi et al. (2010), in Jordan, who each found that the 
effect of institutional ownership was insignificantly associated with AEM. Li (2010), in China, 
found that high levels of institutional ownership were significantly associated with REM. Liu 
et al. (2015), working in Taiwan, and Idris (2012), in Jordan, found that REM was negatively 
correlated with institutional ownership. Whereas Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010), in Jordan, reported 
that institutional ownership significantly increased AEM. Ajay and Madhumathi (2015), in 
India, and Shah et al. (2009), in Pakistan, found that institutional ownership significantly 
reduced AEM. Mehrani et al. (2017), in Iran, found that institutional ownership had a positive 
effect on AEM. 
6.4.2.4. CONTROL VARIABLES IN RELATION TO AEM AND REM 
The association of firm size with less REM_1 and REM_2 is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. There is also weak evidence that company size has a negative impact on AEM. This may 
be because larger companies normally have more sophisticated internal control systems and 
more competent internal auditors, both of which would mitigate REM. Larger firms are also 
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usually audited by large audit firms with more experienced auditors which could prevent EM. 
Large firms may also be more concerned about their reputation, which could prevent them from 
manipulating earnings (Kim et al. 2003 and Lemma et al. 2013). The results are supported by 
studies such as Graven (2009), Makare (2013) and Peasnell et al. (2000), in the UK.  
In the Indian case, Table 6.8 shows that firm size has no significant impact on either AEM or 
REM_1 and REM_2. The results are consistent with studies by Chouaibi et al. (2016) and 
Shayan-Nia et al. (2017). However, the results are inconsistent with studies by Razzaque et al. 
(2016), Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) and Ajit et al. (2013). 
Leverage has no significant relationship with AEM and REM_1 and REM_2. The results 
support those of Habbash (2010), in the UK and Visvanathan (2008) and Cheng (2004). but 
not other work done, in the UK, by Basiruddin (2011) or by Charitou et al. (2007), in the US. 
In the Indian case, the leverage has a significantly negative effect on REM_1 and REM_2 but 
does not significantly affect the level of AEM. Higher leverage is more likely to constrained 
REM than AEM. An insignificant relationship is not consistent with the argument that leverage 
provides a controlling and monitoring mechanism, which limits the extent of EM (Zamri et al. 
2013). The results are consistent with studies by Jelinek (2007) and Wasimullah et al. (2010), 
however, these findings are inconsistent with prior research by Kang and Kim (2012) and 
Sarkar et al. (2008).  
The results show a significant and positive correlation at the 0.01 level between REM_1 and 
REM_2 for companies that achieve higher returns on assets employed. However, there is a 
significantly negative effect at the 0.01 level on AEM. These results imply that there is, in 
general, strong evidence that higher profitability is associated with lower AEM and with higher 
REM. The results support the research findings of Chen et al. (2012), in the US and Rahman 
et al.  (2013), in the UK, but are inconsistent with those of Makarem (2015) and Roychowdhury 
(2006), in the US and Habbash (2010), in the UK.  
In the Indian case, profitability has a significantly positive effect on AEM, and a significantly 
negative effect on REM_1 and REM_2. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) have argued that very 
unprofitable companies are more likely to use AEM to improve their reported performance. 
This research shows profitable Indian companies preferring AEM to REM when it is 
constrained by probability. The results are consistent with previous studies by Liu and Tsai 
(2015) and Singh et al. (2017). However, the results are inconsistent with studies by Zamri et 
al. (2013) and Ajit et al. (2013).  
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The results show that companies with higher growth rates have significantly lower levels at the 
0.01 level of AEM but that higher growth rates do not significantly affect REM_1 and REM_2. 
These results are consistent with Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), in Greece and Habbash 
(2010), in the UK, but are inconsistent with Rahman et al. (2013), in the UK. 
In the Indian case, firm growth had no significant effect on the manipulation of either AEM or 
REM_ and REM_2. The results are inconsistent with previous studies by Liu and Tsai (2015), 
Rahman and Ali (2006) and Ajay and Madhumathi (2015).  
Big 4 Auditors insignificantly effect REM_1 and REM_2 and AEM.  These results may be 
because audits are generally balance-sheet focused (Bell et al. 2008). The results are consistent 
with studies by Cohen et al. (2008) and Zhu et al. (2015) in the UK but are inconsistent with 
studies by Chi et al. (2011). 
In the Indian case, Table 6.7 shows that the use of one of the Big 4 Auditors had a significant 
negative effect on AEM, but no significant effect on REM_1 and REM_2. The study assumes 
that firms audited by a Big 4 auditor used less AEM. The results show consistency with studies 
by Saleem (2016), Humayun et al. (2011) and Houqe et al. (2017), in India. These all found a 
negative association between the Big 4 audit firms and AEM. Becker et al. (1998) and Francis 
et al. (1999) show that firmswith Big 4 auditors tend to have less AEM, implying that Big 4 
auditors effectively restrict clients' opportunistic reporting behavior. However, the results are 
inconsistent with other studies such as Guo (2011), Zhang (2008), Zhang and Gimeno (2010) 
and Habib et al. (2014).  
The Z-score is not significantly correlated with even one of the proxies for AEM or REM_1 or 
REM_2. There is no evidence for a substitutive relationship between REM and AEM. 
Therefore, the preliminary evidence that financial distress constrains downward REM cannot 
be reaffirmed. The results are consistent with Osten (2012) but are inconsistent with studies by 
Zang (2012). 
In the Indian case, Table 6.7 shows that the Z-score has no significant impact on either AEM 
or REM_1 and REM_2. Based on the study results, no evidence is provided for the substitutive 
relation between REM and AEM. Therefore, the preliminary evidence that financial distress 
constrains downward REM cannot be reaffirmed. The results are consistent with Osten (2012) 





6.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
This study embodies three robustness tests. First, discretionary accruals are used to gauge 
AEM. In the literature, various models are proposed to measure discretionary accruals. The 
models of EM range from simple models, in which total accruals are used as a measure of 
discretionary accruals, to more sophisticated models that utilise regression analysis to 
decompose accruals into their discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Bartov et al. 
2000).  
This thesis employs the most extensively used models in the EM literature, which is identified 
as the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1996). This is the most common model used to 
capture EM (see for example, Dechow et al. 1996, Kasznik, 1999, Jha, 2013 and Doukakis 
2014). The modified Jones model is found to provide more powerful tests of EM compared 
with the standard Jones models (Islam et al. 2011, Swai 2016 and Doukakis 2014).  
The performance matched the discretionary accruals model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005), 
which is employed in addition for the purpose of robustness. This follows Charfeddine et al. 
(2013) who also used the modified Jones model and the Kothari et al. (2005) model, in an 
investigation of the determinants of EM in Tunisian firms over the period 2003-2009 and find 
that their results depend on the model used to estimate discretionary accruals. There is no 
perfect model. For example, Kothari et al. (2005) state that their performance-matched model 
cannot solve all of the problems arising from the discretionary accruals’ models or from a 
researcher’s failure to recognise other incentives that tempt the manipulation of accruals. 
Further, Keung and Shih (2014) show that performance matching will systematically cause 
discretionary accruals to be underestimated. Thus, the use of a single model may not be an 
adequate approach, and the use of a range of alternative models may be more effective in the 
detection of EM. The results remain unchanged when utilising the modified Jones (Dechow et 
al. 1996) model and the Kothari et al. (2005) model; this study still finds that there is trade-off 
between AEM by using the modified Jones model and the Kothari model and unexpected REM, 
REM_1 and REM_2.  When running all regressions again for these two models, the main 
results do not change. Therefore, the results are robust with respect to different models (see 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10). 
Second, for additional robustness this study re-ran its REM models, adding the absolute value 
of aggregate REM and including (PROD), (DISEXP), and (CFO). In Table 6.9, this study 
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decomposes REM obtained results, consistent with the joint REM_1 and REM_2 results 
reported in Table 6.9.  
Third, in particular, this study aimed to explore the time-specific effects resulting from the 
implementation of the 2010 and 2013 CODE in the UK and India on the correlations between 
corporate governance mechanisms and trade-off between AEM and REM. The study offers 
new detailed evidence on the compliance levels with the 2010 UK Combined Code and 2013 
India Combined Code. As a result, the Combined Code was revised in 2010 in the UK and 
2013 in India and aims to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of corporate 
governance. 
The time-specific effects, in the sense that corporate governance mechanisms impact the trade-
off between AEM and REM, may be different (or changed) across time with regard to the 
passage of the CODE. Similar model estimation methods have been used by Peasnell et al. 
(2000) and Cohen et al. (2008) to investigate the impact of the Cadbury Report (UK) and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US) on EM across time.  
The summarised statistics are categorised into pre- and post-CODE periods (2006-2009 vs. 
2011–2015) in the UK and (2006-2012 vs 2014-2015) in India. The Company Law and 
Securities Law were becoming effective in 2010 and 2013 in the UK and India. This study 
excludes 2010 and 2013 from the post-CODE period to control the possible effects of adopting 
the new Company Law and Securities Law. This study adds these regressions to see the time 
wide effects, and because Cohen et al. (2008) find that managers have shifted away from AEM 
to REM in the post-SOX period. The evidence in Table 6.9 supports the findings.  
This study presents the results of the corporate governance mechanism impacting the trade-off 
between AEM and REM before and after the 2010 and 2013 CODE in the UK and India in 
Tables 6.11 and 6.14 respectively. The statistics show that, generally, there is a statistically 
significant difference to the full-sample results reported in Tables 6.11 and 6.14. The results 
regarding the effect of corporate governance on trade-off AEM and REM in both countries 
exist during the post-CODE period, when compared to those in the pre-CODE period. 
The regression results of the costs of REM and AEM on the use of aggregate of all proxies of 
REM are provided in Table 6.12. Table 6.12 shows a significant negative coefficient between 
AEM and unexpected REM in the Jones and Kothari models. Since all results have negative or 
downward unexpected REM, they suggest that firms switch between AEM, REM, REM_1 and 
REM_2 in both models and in both countries, the UK and India. 
144 
 
This study finds similar results when using the two AEM models measured by aggregate REM. 
Most of the results of the Kothari model are similar to the regression result provided in mean 
analysis by using the Jones model. However, it finds different results regarding variables 
especially in pre- and post- combined code in both countries, the UK and India. Also, the results 

























TABLE (6.9) ASSOCIATION BETWEEN REM AND AEMJONES AND 
AEMKOTHARI IN THE UK  
Variables REM AEMKothari AEMJones 
Unexpected REM ------ -0.010 -0.035 
BSIZE  
 
+0.000 -0.005 -0.020 
BMEET 
 
0.407 0.785 +0.089 
BIND 
 
0.959 0.416 -0.014 
BFEM 
 
+0.001 -0.015 -0.016 
ACSIZE 
 
-0.000 +0.089 -0.000 
ACMEET 
 
-0.000 +0.000 +0.000 
ACIND 
 
0.888 -0.000 -0.000 
ACEXP 
 
0.589 0.450 0.244 
MOWNE 
 
0.498 0.501 0.464 
INSTITU 3% 
 
0.306 0.315 0.143 
FSIZE 
 
-0.001 -0.047 0.135 
FLEVER 
 
0.850 0.659 0.768 
ROA -0.000 ------- +0.005 
FGROW 
 
0.525 0.592 +0.008 
Big 4  
 
0.609 0.673 0.292 
Z-score 
 
0.873 0.603 0.543 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using 
Kothari Model. REM = real earnings management.  Unexpected REM = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. 
BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year 
held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board 
size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members 
existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and 
financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. 
INSTITU 3% = the percentage of Institutional ownership of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log 
of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by 
ROA (net income before interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 
4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Z-SCORE= 





TABLE (6.10) ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
REM_1 AND REM_2 AND AEMKOTHARI IN THE UK 
variables REM_1 REM_2 
REM_1 AEMKothari REM_2 AEMKothari 
Unexpected REM_1 ----- -0.002 -------- --------- 
Unexpected REM_2 -------- --------- ----- -0.002 
BSIZE 
 
+0.000 -0.005 0.486 -0.004 
BMEET 
 
0.473 0.718 0.899 0.761 
BIND 
 
0.752 0.593 0.493 0.381 
BFEM 
 
+0.002 -0.051 0.522 -0.019 
ACSIZE 
 
-0.000 0.193 +0.003 0.106 
ACMEET 
 
-0.000 +0.001 -0.000 +0.000 
ACIND 
 
0.752 -0.000 0.788 -0.000 
ACEXP 
 
0.323 0.553 0.235 0.472 
MOWNE 
 
0.259 0.944 0.746 0.445 
INSTITU 3% 
 
0.237 0.543 0.732 0.353 
FSIZE 
 
-0.035 -0.019 -0.020 -0.048 
FLEVER 
 
0.943 0.672 0.706 0.651 
FGROW 
 
0.210 0.446 0.191 0.598 
Big 4  
 
0.879 0.356 0.604 0.665 
Z-score 
 
0.679 0.426 0.877 0.608 
AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using Kothari Model. REM_1 and REM_2 = real earnings management.  Unexpected REM_1 
and REM_2 = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board 
members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director 
Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board 
of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the 
percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% = the percentage of Institutional ownership of 
those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total 
liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before interest and taxes divided by total assets). 
FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being 




TABLE (6.11) PRE – POST (2010) COMBINED CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK AND AEM AND REM 
Variables pre 2010 Post 2010 



























Unexpected REM_1 ---- 0.140 -0.084 ----- ------ ------ ---- ---- ----- ---- -0.050 -0.028 ---- ------ ---- ---- ---- ----- 
Unexpected REM_2 ---- ---- ----- ---- 0.134 -0.005 ---- ---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ---- 0.119 0.149 ---- ---- ----- 
Unexpected REM ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------ ----- -0.224 -0.067 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------ ----- -0.180 -0.181 
BSIZE 
 
+0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.183 -0.002 -0.005 +0.000 -0.003 -0.005 +0.073 0.698 0.392 0.377 0.703 0.392 +0.026 0.714 0.378 
BMEET 
 
0.372 +0.001 0.312 0.759 +0.002 0.337 0.581 +0.001 0.321 0.483 0.356 0.275 0.950 0.375 0.289 0.246 0.356 0.287 
BIND 
 
+0.006 -0.065 0.280 0.756 -0.059 0.240 +0.036 -0.069 0.280 -0.029 0.255 0.730 -0.001 0.262 0.749 -0.023 0.247 0.761 
BFEM 
 
0.318 0.668 0.556 0.156 0.584 0.706 -0.073 0.676 0.577 +0.003 -0.048 -0.067 0.194 -0.043 -0.060 +0.002 -0.041 -0.057 
ACSIZE 
 
-0.008 +0.002 +0.004 -0.001 +0.003 +0.005 -0.014 +0.003 +0.004 -0.001 +0.004 0.830 -0.052 +0.005 0.814 -0.003 +0.004 0.861 
ACMEET 
 
0.215 0.498 +0.036 0.453 0.499 +0.034 0.259 0.498 +0.034 -0.001 +0.005 +0.002 -0.009 +0.005 +0.002 -0.001 +0.006 +0.003 
ACIND 
 
0.805 -0.029 -0.000 0.601 -0.027 -0.000 0.925 -0.027 -0.000 0.598 +0.011 -0.001 0.714 -0.013 -0.001 0.713 -0.012 -0.001 
ACEXP 
 
0.701 0.477 0.430 0.144 0.488 0.416 0.749 0.484 0.432 0.583 0.928 0.359 0.555 0.891 0.335 0.556 0.904 0.336 
MOWNE 
 
0.909 +0.000 0.230 0.389 +0.000 0.205 0.692 +0.000 0.222 0.891 -0.031 0.799 0.385 -0.029 0.827 0.849 -0.025 0.852 
INSTITU  
 
0.126 0.674 0.670 0.232 0.639 0.689 0.112 0.608 0.653 0.149 0.696 0.154 0.411 0.640 0.162 0.308 0.674 0.156 
FSIZE 
 
0.1750 0.281 0.246 0.181 0.272 0.275 -0.029 0.283 0.253 0.237 0.331 0.763 0.403 0.361 0.793 -0.092 0.338 0.790 
FLEVER 
 
0.500 0.947 0.318 0.785 0.929 0.349 0.419 0.961 0.314 0.812 0.863 0.298 0.908 0.949 0.275 0.805 0.869 0.299 
ROA 
 
-0.012 0.407 ------- -0.000 0.390 -------- -0.000 0.432 ------- 0.317 +0.004 ------- -0.000 +0.003 ------ -0.000 +0.003 --------- 
FGROW 
 
+0.088 +0.008 0.432 0.327 +0.009 0.424 +0.003 +0.008 0.418 -0.027 0.386 0.292 -0.012 0.391 0.287 0.189 0.381 0.294 
Big 4  
 
0.631 0.285 0.498 0.359 0.284 0.496 0.410 0.278 0.488 0.825 0.713 0.681 0.938 0.829 0.654 0.667 0.804 0.659 
Z-score 
 
0.295 0.481 0.419 0.124 0.536 0.422 0.134 0.501 0.425 -0.075 0.847 0.552 0.199 0.816 0561 -0.086 0.858 0.540 
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TABLE (6.12) ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
REM, AEMJONES AND AEMKOTHARI IN INDIA 
Variables REM AEMKothari AEMJones 
Unexpected REM -------- -0.002 -0.016 
BSIZE  
 
0.185 0.569 -0.000 
BMEET 
 
-0.088 0.843 0.525 
BIND 
 
0.894 -0.004 -0.011 
BFEM 
 
+0.000 -0.093 0.592 
ACSIZE 
 
0.215 0.498 +0.004 
ACMEET 
 
0.157 0.638 0.633 
ACIND 
 
+0.032 0.351 0.271 
ACEXP 
 
-0.002 -0.056 -0.000 
MOWNE 
 
0.486 -0.000 -0.005 
INSTITU 3% 
 
0.159 0.754 0.289 
FSIZE 
 






ROA -0.000 0.391 +0.000 
FGROW 
 
0.414 +0.017 +0.001 
Big 4  
 
0.102 00365 0.675 
Z-score 
 
0.231 0.235 0.235 
AEMJones=Accrual earnings management by using Modified Jones Model. AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using Kothari 
Model. REM = real earnings management.  Unexpected REM = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. BSIZE= board 
size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board 
of directors. BIND = Board of Director Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the 
percentage of female directors on the board of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the 
yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent 
non-executive directors on the audit committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial 
qualification and experience. MOWNE = the percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% 
= the percentage of Institutional ownership of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total 
assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Z-SCORE= refers to 
Altman’s Z-Score.  
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TABLE (6.13) ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
REM_1, REM_2 AND AEMKOTHARI IN INDIA 
variables REM_1 REM_2 
REM_1 AEMKothari REM_2 AEMKothari 
Unexpected REM_1 ----- -0.017 -------- ---------- 
Unexpected REM_2 ------------- ---------- ----- -0.024 
BSIZE 
 
0.560 0.469 0.892 0.469 
BMEET 
 
0.379 0.597 0.178 0.624 
BIND 
 
0.391 -0.011 0.658 -0.010 
BFEM 
 
+0.000 0.891 +0.002 0.751 
ACSIZE 
 
0.911 0.292 0.581 0.268 
ACMEET 
 
0.503 -0.044 0.116 -0.049 
ACIND 
 
+0.058 -0.090 +0.031 0.125 
ACEXP 
 
-0.074 0.659 0.180 0.692 
MOWNE 
 
0.908 -0.008 0.304 -0.008 
INSTITU 3% 
 
+0.000 0.515 +0.000 0.457 
FSIZE 
 
0.498 0.168 0.975 0.169 
FLEVER 
 
-0.017 0.898 -0.008 0.911 
FGROW 
 
0.584 +0.012 0.296 +0.013 
Big 4  
 
0.382 -0.029 0.939 -0.029 
Z-score 
 
0.580 0.337 0.550 0.340 
AEMKothari= Accrual earnings management by using Kothari Model. REM_1 and REM_2 = real earnings management.  Unexpected 
REM_1 and REM_2 = unexpected REM is the estimated residual from equation. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of 
board members. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BIND = Board of Director 
Independence, the proportion of independent directors to total board size. BFEM= the percentage of female directors on the board 
of directors. ACSIZE = the total number of audit committee members existing at the yearend. ACMEET = the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year. ACIND = the percentage of total independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee board. ACEXP = the percentage of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience. MOWNE = the 
percentage of the total shares that were owned by the directors of a firm. INSTITU 3% = the percentage of Institutional ownership 
of those who hold at least 3% or more. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured 
by total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets). FGROW = the change in total assets scaled by total assets. Big 4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 




TABLE (6.14) PRE – POST (2013) COMBINED CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA AND AEM AND REM 
Variables Pre 2013 post 2013 





























--- -0.006 -0.048 ------ ---- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- 0.680 0.207 --- --- ------ ---- ----- ----- 
Unexpected REM_2 
 
---- ----- ----- ----- -0.004 0.221 ----- ------ ------ ---- ----- ----- ---- 0.657 -0.060 ---- ----- ----- 
Unexpected REM 
 
------ ----- ----- ----- ---- ---- ------ -0.001 -0.021 ----- ------ ----- ---- ---- ------- ------- 0.572 0.328 
BSIZE 
 
0.362 -0.000 0.902 0.321 -0.000 0.892 0.219 -0.000 0.825 0.772 0.558 -0.076 0.634 0.565 -0.081 0.660 0.835 0.747 
BMEET 
 
0.165 0.944 0.294 0.129 0.993 0.311 0.260 0.544 0.525 -0.099 0.870 0.618 0.282 0.873 0.642 -0.032 0.747 0.275 
BIND 
 
0.248 -0.000 -0.020 0.830 -0.000 -0.021 0.253 -0.020 -0.011 0.625 0.766 0.808 0.576 0.763 0.797 0.758 0.677 0.234 
BFEM 
 
+0.001 0.783 0.333 +0.027 0.939 0.296 +0.000 0.746 0.745 0.144 0.717 0.427 +0.059 0.698 0.366 0.152 0.603 0.306 
ACSIZE 
 
0.164 0.129 0.147 0.819 0.149 0.132 0.432 +0.009 0.335 +0.000 0.573 0.187 +0.000 0.570 0.169 0.115 0.445 0.920 
ACMEET 
 
0.435 0.799 -0.092 0.417 0.772 -0.096 0.333 0.628 0.957 0.544 0.415 0.157 0.263 0.415 0.157 0.210 -0.000 0.905 
ACIND 
 
+0.089 -0.096 -0.089 0.159 0.159 0.112 0.211 0.204 0.338 0.246 -0.000 0.580 +0.030 -0.000 0.544 0.278 0.110 0.700 
ACEXP 
 
0.416 -0.000 0.491 0.502 -0.000 0.513 -0.016 -0.000 -0.037 -0.006 0.106 0.496 -0.052 0.107 0.480 -0.009 -0.068 0.113 
MOWNE 
 
0.497 0.177 0.180 0.646 0.179 0.712 0.187 -0.007 -0.011 0.747 -0.076 0.412 0.904 -0.078 0.454 0.833 0.308 0.468 
INSTITU 3% 
 
+0.000 0.221 0.306 +0.000 0.239 0.226 0.100 +0.056 0.921 0.868 0.322 0.400 0.998 0.317 0.385 0.923 0.101 0.889 
FSIZE 
 
0.568 0.559 0.411 0.732 0.578 0.418 0.603 0.662 0.695 0.949 0.113 0.413 0.898 0.114 0.151 0.421 0.342 +0.007 
FLEVER 
 
-0.040 0.221 0.769 -0.007 0.221 0.783 0.258 0.365 +0.094 0.704 0334 0.536 0.684 0.335 0.539 0.479 +0.000 0.755 
ROA 
 
-0.000 +0.000 --------- -0.000 +0.000 -------- -0.000 +0.001 ----- 0.114 +0.000 -------- -0.000 +0.000 ------ -0.000 0.829 ---- 
FGROW 
 
0.398 +0.000 +0.040 0.359 +0.000 +0.042 -0.072 +0.000 0.124 0.886 0.828 0.823 0.660 0.833 0.796 0.527 0.378 +0.000 
Big 4  0.724 -0.016 -0.012 0.731 -0.016 -0.012 0.498 0.372 0.426 0.850 0.363 0.929 0.990 0.360 0.955 0.714 0.431 0.125 
Z-score 
 
0.521 0.787 0.305 0.309 0.818 0.321 0.136 0.301 0.120 0.738 0.638 0.395 0.364 0.629 0.511 0.325 0.120 0.325 
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6.6. SUMMARY  
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the substitution between AEM, REM_1, and REM_2 in UK and Indian firms.  
The research was based on a sample of 223 non-financial companies listed in the UK Financial 
Times Stock Exchange FTSE 350 and using a sample of 212 private sector companies in India, 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange, for the fiscal years 2006 to 2015. This chapter used 
corporate governance as an independent variable, including board characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics and ownership structures, and used the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals as proxy for AEM,  
Two types of Multicollinearity Tests, the Pearson Correlation Matrix and the Collinearity 
Diagnostics (VIF) were used to test whether there was multicollinearity between the 
independent variables. The results show that there is no significant problem of 
multicollinearity.   
The chapter discussed the descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control 
variables, highlighting the means, the minima, the maxima and their standard deviations.  
The results provide strong evidence that firms in the UK and India use AEM and REM as 
mutual substitutes, rather than as complements, when seeking to manipulate reported earnings. 
In addition, the results also provide strong evidence that, board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics, or the ownership structure of the company in the UK and India constrained 
either AEM, REM, both or neither. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that some but 
not all corporate governance mechanisms’ costs and constraints play a role in managers’ trade-











CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this research is to examine the impact of mechanisms of corporate governance 
on trade-off between AEM and REM, in the non-financial sectors of UK and Indian companies, 
during the period 2006-2015. 
Based on a review of the literature, and motivated by the gaps in the literature, hypotheses are 
tested in this thesis. This research has two objectives. Firstly, to examine the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the trade-off between AEM and REM by managers of 
non-financial UK companies listed on the FTSE 350 during the period 2006-2015. Secondly, 
to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the trade-off between AEM 
and REM by managers of non-financial Indian companies listed on the BSE 500, during the 
period 2006-2015.  
The literature relating to corporate governance and AEM and REM provides two perspectives. 
The first argues that companies with low levels of corporate governance are more likely to 
evidence higher levels of AEM and REM (Rahman and Ali 2006, Kao and Chen 2004, 
Obigbemi, et al. 2016, Ching et al. 2006, Dechow et al. 1996, González and Garcia-Meca 2014, 
Awais and Wang 2011, Gulzar 2011 and Shawver et al. 2006). The second perspective argues 
that a higher level of corporate governance is less likely to be associated with AEM and REM 
(Roychowdhury 2006, Ghosh et al. 2010, Xie et al. 2003, Sánchez‐Ballesta and Ballesta 2007, 
Jayati 2006 and Kang and Kim 2012). Other studies do not report any relationship between 
corporate governance, AEM and REM (Park and Shin 2004, Katmon and Al Farooque 2017, 
Rahman et al.  2013, Habbash 2010, Chtourou et al. 2001, Xie et al. 2001 and Kent et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, the research was based on the assumptions of agency theory, but informational 
asymmetry, stewardship theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory might be more 
relevant to understanding the link between corporate governance, AEM and REM.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 reviews the research findings, Section 7.3 
outlines potential limitations. Section 7.4 presents implications of the study, and Section 7.5 






7.2. REVIEW OF FINDINGS  
Eleven hypotheses and the key findings of their tests are summarised in this chapter. The 
overall results suggest that corporate governance attributes constrain the likelihood of trade-
off between AEM and REM in the UK and India. 
 
7.2.1. REVIEW OF UK FINDINGS 
Consistent with H1 the UK results found that levels of AEM in both the Jones and Kothari 
models were significantly and negatively associated with the aggregate levels of REM_1, 
REM_2 and REM, and vice-versa. The UK firms appear to employ a method of trading off 
between the two manipulative techniques, rather than employing both simultaneously. 
Evidence of this switching or trade-off by managers was found. 
Consistent with H2 this study finds that increasing the size of the board is significantly 
negatively related to AEM and is positive on REM_1. Firms with higher number of members 
on their board constrain AEM and are more likely to engage in REM by cutting discretionary 
expenses and overproduction. The results indicate that board size exerts more pressure to 
constrain AEM than REM. The results indicate that H2 is empirically supported. 
Inconsistent with H3, increasing the frequency of board meetings does appear to increase the 
level of AEM but is insignificant with REM_1 and REM_2. These findings support that 
corporate governance does not provides effective monitoring that mitigate AEM or decreased 
REM. These findings do not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, which impact 
the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H4, increasing the number of directors who are independent on the board 
reduces AEM but no significant evidence of an association with REM_1 or REM_2 has been 
found. These findings do not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, which impact 
the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Consistent with H5, increasing the number of females on the board is significantly negatively 
related to AEM and is positive on REM_1. Firms with a higher number of females on the board 
constrain AEM and are more likely to engage in REM by cutting discretionary expenses and 
overproduction. The results indicate that females on the board exert more pressure to constrain 
AEM than REM. The results indicate that H5 is empirically supported. 
The results empirically support H6, that increasing the size of the audit committee has a 
significantly negative effect on REM_1 and REM_2 and has a significantly positive effect on 
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AEM. The coefficient indicates that an increased number of directors on the audit committee 
constrains REM by using methods such as cutting discretionary expenses, overproduction and 
sales-based manipulation. The positive coefficient on AEM is consistent with an increased 
number of members on the audit committee, implying that UK firms use AEM more.  
Inconsistent with H7 increasing the number of audit committee meetings has no significant 
impact on AEM but does significantly reduce either REM_1 or REM_2. The results indicate 
that firms, which increase the frequency of audit committee meetings, are less likely to 
undertake REM, because REM is constrained by increasing the frequency of audit committee 
meetings. Firms do not substitute REM for AEM.  
Inconsistent with H8, increasing the number of directors who are independent on the audit 
committee is associated with significant REM_1 and REM_2 but no significant evidence of an 
association with AEM has been found. These findings do not support those mechanisms of 
corporate governance, which impact the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H9, neither AEM nor REM_1 nor REM_2 is significantly affected by 
increasing the level of audit committee financial expertise. This finding is not consistent with 
agency-based assumptions that corporate governance will mitigate AEM and REM. This 
finding does not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, which impact the trade-
off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H10, increasing the percentage of managerial ownership has no significant 
impact on either REM_1, REM_2 or AEM. Managerial ownership constraints do not appear to 
affect the use of either AEM or REM.   
Inconsistent with H11, increasing institutional ownership has no significant impact on REM_1, 
REM_2 or AEM. These results may indicate that institutional ownership is not an important 
driver for good ownership structures monitoring either AEM or REM practices. These results 
suggest that, while higher institutional ownership does not constrain either AEM or REM, they 
fail to confirm that there is substitution observed under institutional ownership in UK firms. 







7.2.2. REVIEW OF INDIAN FINDINGS 
Consistent with H1, the results from India found that levels of AEM in both the modified Jones 
and Kothari models were significantly and negatively associated with the aggregate levels of 
REM_1, REM_2 and REM, and vice-versa. The Indian firms appear to employ a method of 
trading off between the two manipulative techniques, rather than employing both 
simultaneously. This study provides evidence that there is a trade-off between AEM and REM 
in Indian companies.   
Inconsistent with H2, increasing the number of directors on the board reduces AEM but no 
significant evidence of an association with REM_1 or REM_2 has been found. These findings 
do not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, which impact the trade-off between 
AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H3, increasing the frequency of board meetings had no significant impact on 
AEM or on REM_1 and REM_2. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn as to whether 
frequency of board meetings constrains the use of AEM. Due to these results, this study is 
unable to accept H3, Therefore, the evidence is weak that firms trade-off REM and AEM as 
substitutes.  
Inconsistent with H4, increasing the number of directors who are independent on the board 
reduces AEM but no significant evidence of an association with REM_1 or REM_2 has been 
found. These findings do not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, which impact 
the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H5, increasing the number of females on the board does appear to increase 
the level of REM_1 and REM_2 but is insignificant with regard to AEM. These findings 
support that corporate governance does not provide effective monitoring that mitigates REM 
or decreased AEM. These findings do not support those mechanisms of corporate governance, 
which impact the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H6, increasing the number of directors on the audit committee does appear 
to increase the level of AEM but is insignificant with regard to REM_1 and REM_2. These 
findings support that corporate governance does not provide effective monitoring that mitigates 
AEM or decreased REM. These findings do not support those mechanisms of corporate 
governance, which impact the trade-off between AEM and REM. 
Inconsistent with H7, increasing the number of audit committee meetings has no significant 
impact on AEM, REM_1or REM_2. These results may indicate that increasing the number of 
audit committee meetings is not an important driver for a good audit committee monitoring of 
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AEM and REM practices. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn as to whether increasing the 
number of audit committee meetings constrains the use of AEM or REM. This study does not 
support H7.  
Inconsistent with H8, increasing the number of independent members on the audit committee 
in a firm is considered to be an element of good corporate governance and provides an 
additional monitoring mechanism of the financial reporting process. This study shows that 
increasing the number of independent members on the audit committee significantly reduces 
AEM but has no significant impact on either REM_1 or REM_2. This result indicates that firms 
with a higher number of independent members on the audit committee are less likely to 
undertake AEM. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that firms which have more independent 
members on the audit committee have higher levels of REM. There is no evidence of trade-off 
between REM and AEM. There is no empirical support for H8. 
Inconsistent with H9, increasing the financial expertise of the audit committee does 
significantly decrease AEM. However, the effect on REM_1 and REM_2 was not significant. 
The result indicates that the financial expertise of the audit committee exerts more pressure on 
firms to constrain AEM than REM. Firms with greater financial expertise on the audit 
committee have higher costs of AEM. The coefficient indicates that the financial expertise of 
the audit committee exerts more pressure on firms to constrain AEM and there is no evidence 
of increased use for both REM_1 and REM_2. Therefore, H9 is rejected.  
Contrary to H10, increasing the percentage of managerial ownership significantly decreased 
AEM. However, the effect on REM_1 and REM_2 was not significant. The result indicates 
that increasing the percentage of managerial ownership exerts more pressure on firms to 
constrain AEM. No inferences can be drawn as to whether increased percentage of managerial 
ownership increased the use of AEM. Therefore, the results for India do not support H10. There 
is no evidence that managers in India substitute REM for AEM on the basis of the relative 
costs. 
Inconsistent with H11, increasing institutional ownership significantly decreases REM_1 and 
REM_2 and does not affect AEM. These results indicate that increasing institutional ownership 
exerts more pressure on firms to constrain REM. Firms with higher institutional ownership 
have higher costs of REM. The negative coefficients on REM suggest that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have higher costs of REM, and there is no evedince of increased use of 





7.3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The main aim of this research is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the trade-
off between AEM and REM in the UK and India. This section discusses possible implications 
of the main findings for the theory and practice of EM.  
Agency theory has dominated approaches to research into the effectiveness of corporate 
governance and the manipulation of reported earnings. The cost of mechanisms for monitoring 
managers, in order to protect shareholders from the management’s perceived conflict, has been 
termed the inevitable agency cost. Agency theory asserts that the separation between ownership 
and management inevitably leads managers to collude against owners in order to increase the 
managers’ personal wealth (Rahman and Ali, 2006).  
Accordingly, these findings will be of potential interest to various stakeholders, including 
investors, auditors, regulators and agencies for economic development in emerging economies, 
and also to managers of companies who wish to increase the confidence of investors in the 
quality of their financial reporting. The findings may also help regulators by providing 
empirical evidence as to which mechanisms of corporate governance are useful and which are 
not. This might help regulators and policy makers to develop future schemes of financial 
reporting and more effective regulatory frameworks. In addition, company analysts can use 
these findings to assess whether different mechanisms of corporate governance have had 
undesirable and unintended consequences. This may have occurred when such mechanisms 
have motivated managers to manipulate in-year operational activities in ways that are hard to 
monitor and detect, and which have implications for cash flow and liquidity and for product 
and market development, when these methods affect stock levels, production levels or spending 
on research and development. All these threaten the longer-term viability and prosperity of 
companies.  
7.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research has limitations in the scope of its data collection and in its interpretive paradigm. 
Samples were limited to the non-financial sectors of the UK and Indian economies. This 
limitation is consistent with previous research (Naser et al. 2002, Al-Akra and Hutchinson 2013 
and Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014). Although codes of corporate governance differ from 
one country to another, the findings however, can be generalisable to established and emerging 
economies that have standards and regulations similar to the UK and India. A common, yet 
inevitable, limitation related to studies of AEM and REM is faulty estimation of the proxies 
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used. So far, the literature suggests no model or proxy that is free of criticism.   Abnormal 
levels of earnings do not necessarily identify companies, which use AEM, and REM. Siregar 
and Utama (2008) doubt the validity of the modified Jones model that was used in this research. 
Further limitations may have been inherited from the methods that have been used to gather 
and score the levels of corporate governance. Although the methods, which have been used in 
this research have been widely used in previous studies, they are subjective. This subjectivity 
in the use of secondary data was judged to be a price worth paying for the size of a research 
sample which covered more than 435 companies, over a period that covered more than 10 
years, in two countries. Finally, this thesis did not address causality. The findings provided 
evidence of association but not causality. 
7.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
There are several potential areas for future study on the association between corporate 
governance and trade-off between AEM and REM.  
Firstly, it would be interesting to extend the scope of this research to include companies from 
the financial sector.  
Secondly, the underlying assumption of this research is that the motives for managers’ 
manipulations are to increase their personal wealth. It would be interesting to investigate the 
decision-making and motivation of the managers who were found to use AEM and REM by 
using research methodologies whose paradigms had their roots in management behaviour. 
Thirdly, the research used a total discretionary accrual by using the modified Jones model 
Dechow et al. (1995) and REM1 and REM2 were used to estimate the aggregate real activities 
as proxies for measurements of REM. Furthermore, this study used robustness tests by using 
Kothari et al.’s (2005) performance-matched model as a proxy for AEM and Roychowdhury’s 
(2006) model as proxies for measurements of REM, and of any trade-off between the two 
methods. Since this model is suspect, it would be desirable to repeat this research using a 
different model.  
Fourthly, the findings provide strong evidence that, board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics, or the ownership structure of the company in the UK and India constrained 
either AEM, REM, both or neither. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that some, but 
not all, corporate governance mechanisms costs and constraints play a role in managers’ trade-
off between AEM and REM decisions in the UK and India. In addition, the effect of other 
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Appendix 2: Hausman Test and Breusch and Pagan Test in the UK and India  










                Prob>chi2 =      0.8702
                          =        9.93
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE      .0006783      .002355       -.0016767        .0017054
        Big4     -.0106435     .0031643       -.0138079        .0168622
       FGROW     -.0229428    -.0218065       -.0011362        .0019396
         ROA     -.1058684     -.109908        .0040396        .0121958
      FLEVER      .0030688     .0014146        .0016541        .0049035
       FSIZE     -.0335589     -.030449         -.00311        .0117586
    INSTITU3     -.0383617    -.0375399       -.0008218        .0094304
       MOWNE      -.180439    -.1066091       -.0738298        .0397125
      ACEXPE     -.0211928    -.0246985        .0035058        .0057518
       ACIND      .0086249      .006942        .0016829        .0023663
      ACMEET     -.0139466    -.0133485        -.000598        .0008729
      ACSIZE     -.0174241    -.0190524        .0016284        .0010175
        BFEM      .1438574     .1374929        .0063645        .0122754
        BIND      .0160422     .0147659        .0012762        .0113937
       BMEET      .0016607       .00147        .0001907        .0006053
       BSIZE      .0114522     .0111843        .0002679         .000751
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  3672.93
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0432544       .2079769
                       e      .024897       .1577878
                    RM_1     .0673331       .2594862
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        RM_1[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]




2.2. The relationship between AEM (Modified Jones Model) and unexpected REM and 










                Prob>chi2 =      0.0002
                          =       45.24
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE     -.0014119    -.0019785        .0005665        .0008891
        Big4     -.0103036    -.0220181        .0117145        .0077939
       FGROW      .0176732     .0152456        .0024276        .0009045
         ROA      .0485647     .0591835       -.0106187         .006389
      FLEVER      .0024013     .0034101       -.0010089         .002554
       FSIZE     -.0106651    -.0105963       -.0000688        .0053509
    INSTITU3      .0094144     .0122104        -.002796        .0049501
       MOWNE      .0282573     .0216126        .0066447        .0203425
      ACEXPE      -.011155    -.0114809        .0003258        .0029972
       ACIND     -.0345178    -.0402529        .0057351        .0010619
      ACMEET      .0052719     .0056232       -.0003513        .0004559
      ACSIZE      .0071783     .0069144        .0002639        .0005269
        BFEM     -.0419118     -.042935        .0010232         .006179
        BIND     -.0451754    -.0488253        .0036499        .0059165
       BMEET       .001379      .000705        .0006739        .0003164
       BSIZE      -.002143    -.0019952       -.0001478        .0003772
   UnexpREM1     -.0273953    -.0255499       -.0018455        .0024862
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   932.99
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0026359       .0513414
                       e     .0035762       .0598016
                AcMJones     .0060612        .077854
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        AcMJones[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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2.3. The relationship between AEM (Kothari et al. Model) and unexpected REM and 











                Prob>chi2 =      0.5045
                          =       16.27
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE     -.0023437    -.0013129       -.0010308        .0016052
        Big4      .0122716    -.0025978        .0148694        .0115815
       FGROW      .0066201     .0043401          .00228        .0020668
         ROA     -.0857003    -.0707064        -.014994        .0116722
      FLEVER     -.0042723     -.003789       -.0004833        .0047541
       FSIZE     -.0216937    -.0095406       -.0121531        .0078965
    INSTITU3      .0100159      .013141       -.0031251        .0089645
       MOWNE      .0035724      .024792       -.0212196        .0344876
      ACEXPE     -.0075491    -.0083642        .0008151        .0056563
       ACIND     -.0575679    -.0630052        .0054373        .0024725
      ACMEET        .00584      .006178       -.0003381        .0008375
      ACSIZE      .0032258     .0038504       -.0006246        .0010137
        BFEM     -.0441512    -.0478316        .0036804        .0110133
        BIND     -.0094418    -.0176201        .0081783         .011046
       BMEET     -.0003828    -.0002462       -.0001366        .0005726
       BSIZE     -.0033805    -.0028656       -.0005148        .0006586
   UnexpREM1     -.0440456     -.038071       -.0059745        .0049525
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   147.66
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0017328       .0416265
                       e     .0061152       .0781995
                 KAModel     .0075079       .0866484
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        KAModel[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.3089
                          =       18.26
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE        .00009     .0006057       -.0005157        .0011819
        Big4      .0075321     .0073547        .0001774        .0117806
       FGROW     -.0176727    -.0156907       -.0019821          .00117
         ROA     -.5025481    -.4989496       -.0035984        .0084305
      FLEVER      .0048185      .005131       -.0003125        .0033694
       FSIZE     -.0370441    -.0228702       -.0141739        .0082072
    INSTITU3     -.0107423    -.0074795       -.0032628        .0065357
       MOWNE      .0090832     .0209641        -.011881        .0277498
      ACEXPE      .0061478    -4.32e-06        .0061521        .0039343
       ACIND      .0042572     .0040785        .0001787        .0014058
      ACMEET     -.0083159    -.0081265       -.0001894        .0006021
      ACSIZE     -.0087598    -.0101362        .0013764        .0006908
        BFEM      .0265127     .0192978         .007215        .0084608
        BIND     -.0127123    -.0220874         .009375        .0078179
       BMEET      .0002433     .0001785        .0000647        .0004194
       BSIZE     -.0000293     .0011151       -.0011444        .0005204
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  3695.29
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0192978       .1389165
                       e     .0118059       .1086551
                    RM_2      .034696       .1862687
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        RM_2[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.0819
                          =       23.11
                 chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE      .0043719     .0048748       -.0005029        .0044034
       FGROW     -.0055911    -.0071324        .0015413        .0017072
         ROA     -.2126587    -.2117332       -.0009255        .0195223
      FLEVER     -.0801133    -.0689916       -.0111217        .0114248
       FSIZE     -.0029872     .0096479       -.0126351        .0120518
    INSTITU3      .2912719     .3064393       -.0151675        .0246313
       MOWNE     -.0303984      .004306       -.0347044        .0529099
      ACEXPE      -.060145    -.0751667        .0150217        .0278713
       ACIND      .0384317     .0441899       -.0057582        .0068058
      ACMEET      .0024573     .0041035       -.0016463        .0029858
      ACSIZE      .0063754     .0006762        .0056991        .0016913
        BFEM      .5741726     .4202675        .1539051        .0618005
        BIND     -.1226557    -.0614626       -.0611931        .0342581
       BMEET      .0035383     .0025124        .0010259        .0009227
       BSIZE      .0007781     .0017007       -.0009225        .0018202
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   973.88
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0311251       .1764229
                       e       .06269       .2503797
                    RM_1     .0969594       .3113831
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        RM_1[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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2.6. The relationship between AEM (Modified Jones Model) and unexpected REM and 










                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       86.60
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE     -.0014261     -.001535        .0001089        .0016371
       FGROW      .0145771     .0141722        .0004049        .0002763
         ROA      .0795546      .114629       -.0350744        .0072074
      FLEVER      .0126825    -.0076014        .0202838         .004205
       FSIZE     -.0081117     .0013027       -.0094144        .0043531
    INSTITU3      .0258995     .0161459        .0097536        .0089997
       MOWNE     -.0795705     -.044988       -.0345825        .0191368
      ACEXPE     -.0729313    -.0579039       -.0150274        .0102594
       ACIND     -.0121011    -.0165264        .0044254        .0024183
      ACMEET     -.0010805    -.0007424        -.000338        .0011067
      ACSIZE       .005046     .0032005        .0018455        .0006256
        BFEM     -.0210496    -.0183563       -.0026933        .0228939
        BIND     -.0672231    -.0862269        .0190038          .01273
       BMEET      .0006872     .0001731        .0005141         .000332
       BSIZE     -.0046198     -.003165       -.0014548         .000669
  UnexpREM_1     -.0344622    -.0328164       -.0016458        .0025292
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   502.21
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0020418       .0451865
                       e     .0068061        .082499
                AcMjones     .0102074       .1010315
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        AcMjones[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.0569
                          =       24.51
                 chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ZSCORE      .0051392     .0038483        .0012909         .003563
       FGROW     -.0106138    -.0102427       -.0003712        .0013735
         ROA     -.5084513    -.5156213          .00717        .0158451
      FLEVER     -.0562475    -.0582732        .0020257        .0092569
       FSIZE     -.0214749    -.0003043       -.0211706        .0096156
    INSTITU3       .339036     .3181166        .0209194        .0200156
       MOWNE      .0704357     .0494046        .0210311        .0422399
      ACEXPE     -.0386675    -.0423231        .0036556        .0224136
       ACIND        .03758     .0386567       -.0010767        .0055326
      ACMEET      .0081227     .0070629        .0010598        .0024137
      ACSIZE       .004045     .0021289        .0019161         .001376
        BFEM      .3659455     .2362342        .1297113        .0497993
        BIND     -.0004159     .0250247       -.0254406        .0277553
       BMEET      .0030032     .0030711       -.0000679        .0007495
       BSIZE      .0006782    -.0002786        .0009568        .0014626
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   790.38
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u      .015649       .1250958
                       e     .0371167        .192657
                    RM_2     .0601001       .2451531
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        RM_2[companyname1,t] = Xb + u[companyname1] + e[companyname1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
